Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2026-115483: This is an unauthenticated arbitrary file read vulnerability in the Everest Forms plugin (versions <= 3.6.3) via the attach_entry_files() function. The vulnerability has a CVSS score of 7.5 (High) and is classified as CWE-22 (Path Traversal). It allows attackers to read sensitive files such as wp-config.php by exploiting the email attachment functionality when a form contains a field with a meta key matching /signature_/ and the notification has file attachments enabled. Exploitation requires the Everest Forms Pro add-on for signature fields and file attachments.
Root Cause: The root cause lies in the attach_entry_files() method located in everest-forms/includes/abstracts/class-evf-form-fields-upload.php, around lines 1725-1735 and 1761-1766. The method iterates over entry meta values and, when a meta key matches /signature_/, it checks file_exists($meta_value) and directly appends $meta_value to $entry_files without validating that the path resides within the WordPress uploads directory. This allows an attacker to supply an arbitrary local file path (e.g., ../../wp-config.php) as the value of a signature field. The patched version introduces resolve_uploads_file_path() which uses realpath() and validates that the resolved path is inside the uploads directory or a specified subdirectory (e.g., everest_forms_uploads/{form_id}/signature). Additionally, the patch removes the unsafe signature check in the second loop, ensuring only file-upload and image-upload types are processed.
Exploitation: An attacker first identifies a form that has a field with meta key matching /signature_/ (e.g., a text field labelled "Signature") and whose email notification has "Attach Files" enabled. The attacker then submits the form with the signature field value set to a path traversal payload such as ../../../../wp-config.php. The form must be configured to send the notification to an attacker-controlled email address. Upon submission, the plugin processes the entry, and attach_entry_files() attaches the file at the provided path to the email. The attacker receives the email with the sensitive file attached, thereby reading arbitrary files on the server. No authentication is required.
Patch Analysis: The patch (version 3.6.4) replaces the direct file_exists() check with a new helper method resolve_uploads_file_path(). This method takes a file path and an optional subdirectory. It uses realpath() to resolve the path and verifies that the resolved path is a regular file and that it is contained within the uploads directory (or the specified subdirectory). If the path is outside, it returns false. The patch also removes the signature check in the second loop, ensuring that only file-upload and image-upload types are processed via the safe resolution method. This prevents path traversal because realpath() canonicalizes the path and the prefix check ensures it stays within the uploads directory. The patch also includes other unrelated security hardening, such as capability checks and sanitization, but the core fix for this CVE is the path validation.
Impact: Successful exploitation allows an unauthenticated attacker to read arbitrary files on the web server, including sensitive configuration files like wp-config.php, which contains database credentials, authentication keys, and other secrets. This can lead to complete compromise of the WordPress site and underlying database, potentially enabling further attacks such as privilege escalation, data theft, or remote code execution if other vulnerabilities are chained. The CVSS score of 7.5 reflects the high confidentiality impact.

