Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2026-126699: Majestic Support plugin for WordPress (versions up to 1.2.4) contains an unauthenticated stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the ‘mjsupport_message’ parameter. Attackers can inject arbitrary JavaScript into support tickets, which executes when a staff member or administrator views the ticket and clicks a crafted link. The CVSS score is 6.1 (Medium).
The root cause lies in insufficient sanitization and output escaping of user-supplied ticket messages. In majestic-support/modules/majesticsupport/model.php, the function getSanitizedEditorData() applies wp_filter_post_kses() to the raw input, which allows tags with class and href attributes. However, wp_kses_post preserves numeric character references (e.g., ") inside the href attribute. The plugin bundles VenoBox, a lightbox library that binds to elements with the class ‘venobox’ and copies the browser-decoded href value into innerHTML, enabling script execution. The vulnerability is triggered when a staff member clicks a specially crafted link within the ticket message, as the VenoBox payload executes on click rather than on page load. Exploitation requires the attacker to plant the link in a ticket message, which is submitted via the unauthenticated ticket creation form handled by the ‘mjsupport_message’ parameter.
An attacker submits a support ticket with a malicious payload in the ‘mjsupport_message’ field, such as a link with class ‘venobox’ and a crafted href containing HTML entities (e.g., " onmouseover=alert(1) x="). When a staff member views the ticket and clicks the link, VenoBox processes the href, decodes the entities, and injects the resulting string into innerHTML, executing the script in the staff member’s browser. The attack requires no authentication and can be delivered remotely. The payload is stored in the database and executes only upon a staff member’s click, meaning the attacker cannot trigger it independently; an administrator or staff action is required.
The patch adds a new private method MJTC_stripVenoboxBinding() in model.php, called within getSanitizedEditorData() before wpautop(). This method removes the ‘venobox’ class token from any class attribute and drops any data-href attributes from the content. This neutralizes the VenoBox binding because the library selects elements by the .venobox class and uses the data-href or href as the image source. Legitimate venobox links generated by the plugin’s own templates (for attachments) are not affected, as they do not pass through the editor. Additionally, the patch increments version numbers and update checks from 124 to 125. The fix ensures that attacker-supplied markup cannot trigger VenoBox’s innerHTML injection.
If exploited, this vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of a staff member’s browser. This could lead to session hijacking, theft of sensitive data (including cookies and authentication tokens), privilege escalation by performing actions on behalf of the staff member, and potentially full site compromise if an administrator is targeted. The stored nature of the XSS means the payload persists until removed, and it affects all users who view the ticket, though execution requires a click on the malicious link.







